Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Application to relocate a fuel pipeline; MI Admin Code, R 792.10447(1)(c); The Public Service Commission’s (PSC) ruling on a motion in limine; The Administrative Procedures Act (APA); MCL 24.272(3); The Michigan Rules of Evidence (MREs); MRE 401; Scope of the consideration of the public need; The public trust doctrine; The PSC’s lack of common-law powers; Comparisons the PSC used for its analysis under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA); MCL 324.1705(2); “Conduct”; Alternatives; MCL 324.1703(1); Adequacy of the analysis of the impact of greenhouse-gas emissions (GHGs); Thomas Twp v John Sexton Corp of MI; Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc; An attempted appeal as of right
Finding no basis to reverse or remand, the court affirmed the PSC’s order conditionally approving petitioner-Enbridge Energy’s application “to relocate a portion of its ‘Line 5’ fuel pipeline into a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac.” Intervenor-appellants asserted that in considering the application, the PSC “erred by only looking to the public need for the new portion of pipeline, to be located in a tunnel underneath the lakebed (‘the Replacement Project’), as opposed to reconsidering the need for Line 5 as a whole.” But the court found it difficult to find that the PSC abused its discretion in “concluding that the need for Line 5 as a whole was simply not a salient issue in the proceedings because the application was for the Replacement Project, not for the construction of Line 5 as a whole.” The court also rejected some appellants’ argument that the PSC’s ruling on the motion in limine related to this issue violated the APA and MREs, again determining “there was no abuse of discretion by virtue of the PSC’s evidentiary ruling, given that the application at issue was for the Replacement Project.” And while it at first blush appeared the PSC “violated its own ruling by incorporating references to the need for Line 5 as a whole into its” final order, the court concluded that in “large part, what the PSC was stating in the December order was that the already-established public need for Line 5 was a piece of the puzzle demonstrating a need for the Replacement Project.” Further, the court found an appellant’s reliance on the public trust doctrine was misplaced given that the PSC has no common-law powers. It also held that the PSC’s “general MEPA decision was adequately supported by the law and evidence.” Noting that “the ‘conduct’ sought to be ‘authorized or approved’ was the Replacement Project[,]” the court found that the PSC, in “looking to the desired ‘conduct,’ was following the plain language of MCL 324.1705(2).” As to appellants’ argument that the PSC used improper comparisons in its analysis under the MEPA, the court concluded the PSC “acted appropriately because it could have limited its ‘comparisons’ analysis to just alternatives for the Straits segment of pipeline . . . but instead decided to look to all presented alternatives, and ultimately it reached a decision that was supported by the evidence in the record.” The court further found that two appellants failed to show they were entitled to appellate relief related to “their arguments about how the PSC evaluated the impact of GHGs.”
Disability insurance benefits; Whether plaintiff was “disabled” under the Social Security Act; 42 USC §§ 416(i) & 423(d); 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4); Whether plaintiff retained the “residual functional capacity” to work as a cashier; Effect of her “mental impairments” on residual functional capacity; Whether the administrative law judge (ALJ) followed required procedure
The court held that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff-Napier’s mental impairments were not severe but mild, and that the ALJ did not fail to account for those mental impairments in assessing her residual functional capacity. Using the “‘five-step sequential evaluation process’ for adjudicating claims of disability[,]” the ALJ concluded that Napier was not disabled at step four. The ALF determined that she “retained the ‘residual functional capacity’ to perform her past relevant work as a cashier.” Napier argued that the ALJ failed to explain how her mental impairments played into the residual functional capacity analysis. But the court noted that when asked what kept her from being able to work, she listed “physical symptoms and did not mention her depression or anxiety.” The court explained that this could have caused the ALJ to have “reasonably inferred that Napier did not consider herself to be severely affected by her mental impairments.” In addition, “the ALJ emphasized that Napier’s treatment history with respect to her anxiety and depression was quite limited” and noted the lack of any “history of inpatient or outpatient mental health treatment.” The ALJ summarized the findings of three different mental health professionals who opined that Napier did not suffer from severe mental impairments, and noted evidence that her symptoms could be controlled through medication. The ALJ also considered Napier’s testimony about her inability to perform her regular activities. The court held “that substantial other record evidence indicated that Napier’s mental impairments were not severe,” and that the ALJ did not err by including evidence about the activities she could perform in the analysis. The court also rejected her argument that the ALJ failed to follow the required procedures when assessing medical opinions, finding that these assertions were not supported by the record. The ALJ explicitly noted why it found two experts more convincing than a third. The court held that the record clearly showed “that the ALJ adequately accounted for Napier’s mental impairments in formulating her residual functional capacity[,]” and adequately considered her “limitations in the residual functional capacity analysis.” Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of Napier’s application for disability insurance benefits.
First Amendment retalaition & due process claims against defendants in their individual capacities; Absolute prosecutorial immunity; Absolute judicial immunity; Qualified immunity; Substantive & procedural due process; Claims against defendants in their official capacities; Sovereign immunity; Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC)
The court held that plaintiff-Cooperrider stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim related to the suspension of his business’s liquor license and that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to defendants-Beshear, Perry, and Duke on this claim. But it found that those defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on his due process claims, that other defendants were entitled to absolute quasi-prosecutorial and quasi-judicial immunity, and that sovereign immunity barred his claims against all defendants in their official capacities. Cooperrider sued Kentucky Governor Beshear and other state officials, alleging that they violated his First Amendment and due-process rights by revoking his liquor license after he disapproved of Beshear’s Covid-19 policies in social media posts. The district court dismissed all claims. On appeal, the court first considered whether the claims against defendants-DABC officials (Newton, Woods, and Taylor) in their individual capacities were properly dismissed based on absolute immunity. It concluded that Newton, the DABC’s general counsel, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity where he engaged in “a quasi-prosecutorial role in initiating and prosecuting the enforcement action” against Cooperrider’s business and that Woods and Taylor were entitled to absolute judicial immunity when they issued the final order revoking the business’s alcohol license. As to the claims against Beshear, the Secretary of the Kentucky Public Protection Cabinet (Perry), and the General Counsel for the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Duke) in their individual capacities, the court noted that, “at the pleading stage, Cooperrider need only ‘allege[] facts “that would allow a jury to find that [the adverse action] was motivated at least in part by” [Cooperrider’s] speech.’” It found “that the complaint plausibly alleges that Beshear, Perry, and Duke violated Cooperrider’s clearly established right to criticize the state government without retaliation.” But his substantive due process claims against them failed where he did not allege that they “engaged in constitutionally arbitrary or conscience-shocking conduct.” The procedural due process claim also failed where Cooperrider received adequate process before the deprivation. The court affirmed as to the dismissal of Newton, Woods, and Taylor based on absolute immunity; as to the grant of qualified immunity to Beshear, Perry, and Duke on the procedural and substantive due process claims; and as to the dismissal of the claims against all defendants in their official capacities. It reversed as to the dismissal of Beshear, Perry, and Duke based on qualified immunity as to the First Amendment retaliation claim, and remanded.
Speedy trial; Prejudice; 180-day rule; MCL 780.131; Jailhouse letter; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Fair & impartial jury; Sleeping or confused juror; Waiver of jury instruction claim; Cumulative effect of the alleged errors
Finding no reversible error regarding, among other things, a speedy trial and the 180-day rule, the court affirmed defendant-Beach’s first-degree premeditated murder and felony-firearm convictions. “Although there were substantial delays between” his arrest and trial, the court concluded “that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.” As to the first factor, “the length of the delay in this case was substantial: over three years.” As to the second factor, the court concluded “that the prosecution was predominantly responsible for the 13-month prepandemic delay. On the other hand, Beach contributed to many of the delays in the last three months before his trial began. The remainder of the pandemic and postpandemic delays were due to COVID-19’s impact on the courts, and neither side is at fault.” The court found that to the extent “the prosecution is at fault for a portion of the delay, the stark lack of prejudice preponderates against finding a speedy-trial violation.” As to the third factor, “Beach filed numerous pro se motions invoking his right to a speedy trial, initially moving for relief on [9/16/20], which was approximately 19 months after his arrest.” As to the “fourth factor—prejudice to the defendant—there was a conclusive lack of prejudice to the defense or to Beach’s person.” Thus, the court concluded “that despite the significant delays in this case, Beach’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.” Also, his argument as to the 180-day rule failed. A “defendant is not entitled to relief under MCL 780.131 if they were detained in the county jail before trial.” In this case, “Beach was being held at the Detroit Reentry Center for absconding from parole. And ‘this Court has consistently held that, until revocation of parole, a paroled prisoner who is being detained locally, and against whom a parole hold has been filed, is not, because of the hold, awaiting incarceration in a state prison nor an inmate of a penal institution to whom the 180-day rule applies.’” The court held that “another reason to rule in favor of the prosecution on Beach’s 180-day-rule argument is that there is nothing in the record establishing the exchange of notices between the MDOC and the prosecutor’s office as required by MCL 780.131(1) to trigger its application.” Finally, the court held that “assuming that the 180-day rule was triggered in this case, the prosecution commenced an action on the charges well within 180 days after Beach was placed in the Detroit Reentry Center.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Conflict of interest; Cuyler v Sullivan; People v Smith; MRPC 1.7 & 1.9; Whether the trial court had to presume prejudice; Distinguishing People v Davenport; Duty to investigate; Alternative suspects; Cross-examination; Impeaching witnesses; Right of confrontation; Failure to move to admit testimony under an investigative subpoena; Matters of trial strategy; Failure to assert collateral estoppel; Failure to object to the prosecution’s use of a deceased witness’s statements; Impeachment using prior inconsistent statements; MRE 607 & 613
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based on a conflict of interest, and rejected his claims that his attorneys were ineffective in multiple ways. He was convicted of first-degree murder. He argued that his attorneys (C and B) had a conflict of interest because their organization, the county’s “Office of the Defender, had earlier represented” a key witness (T) against him. He contended the Office represented T “in other cases in which [T] received a benefit for implicating defendant in the death of the victim.” He relied on MRPC 1.7 and 1.9. But the court concluded neither of these rules “established that his trial lawyers had an actual conflict of interest on the basis of the evidence that a lawyer from the same organization once represented” T. He conceded that C and B were not T’s “lawyers at the time of his criminal prosecution in this case.” He instead suggested that another attorney (A) “who worked for the Office of the Defender, might still have been [T’s] lawyer for [T’s] probation violation when defendant was first charged in this case.” But he failed to present evidence supporting this. Absent “evidence that the Office of the Defender still represented [T], MRPC 1.7(a) did not apply, and MRPC 1.7(b) would only apply to the extent that [C’s and B’s] representation might have been ‘materially limited’ by their responsibilities to [T] as a third person to the litigation.” And to the extent that the Office “owed duties to [T] as a third person under MRPC 1.7(b), those duties did not prevent [it] from attacking [T’s] credibility even if the attack exposed him to charges of perjury.” As to MRPC 1.9, the record showed “this case was not the same or a substantially related matter to any matter for which a lawyer from the Office of the Defender represented [T]. As such, MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) did not apply.” As to defendant’s assertion “that the trial court had to presume prejudice” based on the court’s decision in Davenport, the court found that case distinguishable. In addition, it determined that he was not entitled to relief based on his “claims that his trial lawyers provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate alternative suspects and by failing to properly cross-examine witnesses against him.” Affirmed.
The Confrontation Clause; Limitations on cross-examination; Boggs v Collins; Information available to the jury; Balancing the government’s interests against defendant’s interest in confronting & cross-examining the adverse witness; Whether error was harmless
The court held that the district court’s cross-examination limitations violated defendant-Taylor’s rights under the Confrontation Clause by limiting his ability to cross-examine a “crucial witness” about his potential bias and motive in testifying. A jury convicted Taylor of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and FIP. At trial, the only evidence that connected him to a bag containing drugs and a firearm was the testimony of one witness (H), who claimed that Taylor had asked him to hold the bag. But H had pending drug charges of his own when interviewed by federal agents. Although no promises were made, “one agent told [H] to talk to his lawyer because it was possible to receive a benefit for assisting law enforcement.” There was also testimony that the state prosecutor may have considered trading dismissal of some charges in return for testimony about Taylor. The district court ruled that Taylor could question H about H’s felony convictions only if H “opened the door” and that his pending FIP charge was inadmissible. Taylor claimed, among other things, that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of H. The court agreed and found that this issue resolved the appeal. Applying the three-part balancing test in Boggs, it held that H’s “felony conviction falls squarely within the prototypical forms of bias that defendants can explore during cross-examination.” In addition, whether a witness has been offered “preferential treatment” for testimony “constitutes ‘core impeachment evidence.’” The limitations here went directly to “Taylor’s ability to cross-examine [H] about matters going to bias, prejudice, or his motivation to testify.” Further, the information the jury did receive was insufficient to reveal the penalties H was facing and whether he expected leniency for his testimony. The court held that Taylor’s interest in uncovering H’s possible bias and motive outweighed the government’s interest in avoiding “a ‘mini trial’” as to H’s conduct. The court additionally concluded that because H’s testimony was “central to the prosecution,” and there was no other evidence connecting Taylor to the contraband, the error was not harmless. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Child support; Whether the trial court properly found that defendant had a duty of support; Whether he was precluded from raising the defense of non-parentage; MCL 552.2315; Whether a court in Brazil determined his parentage of the child; Uniform Child Support; Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
Holding that the record before the trial court did not establish that Brazil had determined defendant’s parentage of the child, the court vacated the trial court’s order that he pay child support and remanded. Plaintiff-mother “is an obligee residing in Brazil, and the child resides in Brazil, which is a foreign country within the meaning of the UIFSA. Articles 1 through 7 of the UIFSA apply in this case, and empowered the trial court to establish child support given that no prior child support order exists in this case.” But the trial court could only do so “upon finding, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that defendant had a duty of support.” The issue was whether it “properly found that defendant had a duty of support before ordering defendant to pay child support.” The court noted that the “trial court found that defendant had a duty of support because defendant’s name appeared on the child’s birth certificate in Brazil.” In so determining, it accepted plaintiff’s claim “that under Brazil law, any man designated as the father on a child’s birth certificate is thereby determined by law to be the father of that child, and that defendant therefore was precluded from raising the defense of non-parentage by § 315 of the UIFSA, MCL 552.2315.” However, the court held that it erred, because it accepted plaintiff’s claim “that parentage had been established under Brazil law without proof that this had in fact occurred.” The trial court’s decision was “based exclusively on the ipse dixit of the birth certificate, without permitting defendant to challenge the parentage of the child.” Also, the record indicated “that defendant consistently sought to establish the parentage of the child and did not concede that the issue had been determined under Brazil law.”
Divorce; Default; MCR 2.603(A); Motion to set aside a default; MCR 2.603(D)(1) & (2); Good cause; Bullington v Corbell; Division of assets; Draggoo v Draggoo; Spousal support; Modification of a spousal support ruling; Koy v Koy
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-ex-wife’s motion to set aside the default, but did err as to its rulings on property division and spousal support. Thus, it affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The trial court entered a default judgment of divorce after denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default for failure to establish good cause. It split the parties’ property and denied spousal support as to either of them. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to set aside the default. “There is no dispute that the complaint was served on defendant on” 11/7/23. “Nor is there any dispute that on [11/28/23], the day the response to the complaint was due, none was filed by defendant.” Thus, on 12/1/23, "plaintiff was entitled to seek default for defendant’s failure to respond.” In addition, she did not demonstrate good cause to set the default aside as neither of her excuses held water. As to her excuse that she was involved in a “domestic case,” it noted that even if she “explained the circumstances—that she was the victim of domestic violence . . . such explanation still did not adequately explain why she could not respond, especially where the assault occurred two months before the answer was due.” As to her excuse that she had health reasons for not responding, it noted that she “provided an arguably reasonable excuse for not being able to respond between [11/13/23 and 11/18/23] but did not do so for the remainder of the time she was not in the hospital.” However, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred in its property division and spousal support rulings, finding “the trial court’s division of the retirement account, its award of the vehicles, and its order that spousal support be nonmodifiable were all unequitable under the circumstances.”