The Confrontation Clause; Limitations on cross-examination; Boggs v Collins; Information available to the jury; Balancing the government’s interests against defendant’s interest in confronting & cross-examining the adverse witness; Whether error was harmless

The court held that the district court’s cross-examination limitations violated defendant-Taylor’s rights under the Confrontation Clause by limiting his ability to cross-examine a “crucial witness” about his potential bias and motive in testifying. A jury convicted Taylor of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and FIP. At trial, the only evidence that connected him to a bag containing drugs and a firearm was the testimony of one witness (H), who claimed that Taylor had asked him to hold the bag. But H had pending drug charges of his own when interviewed by federal agents. Although no promises were made, “one agent told [H] to talk to his lawyer because it was possible to receive a benefit for assisting law enforcement.” There was also testimony that the state prosecutor may have considered trading dismissal of some charges in return for testimony about Taylor. The district court ruled that Taylor could question H about H’s felony convictions only if H “opened the door” and that his pending FIP charge was inadmissible. Taylor claimed, among other things, that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of H. The court agreed and found that this issue resolved the appeal. Applying the three-part balancing test in Boggs, it held that H’s “felony conviction falls squarely within the prototypical forms of bias that defendants can explore during cross-examination.” In addition, whether a witness has been offered “preferential treatment” for testimony “constitutes ‘core impeachment evidence.’” The limitations here went directly to “Taylor’s ability to cross-examine [H] about matters going to bias, prejudice, or his motivation to testify.” Further, the information the jury did receive was insufficient to reveal the penalties H was facing and whether he expected leniency for his testimony. The court held that Taylor’s interest in uncovering H’s possible bias and motive outweighed the government’s interest in avoiding “a ‘mini trial’” as to H’s conduct. The court additionally concluded that because H’s testimony was “central to the prosecution,” and there was no other evidence connecting Taylor to the contraband, the error was not harmless. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.