Divorce; Default; MCR 2.603(A); Motion to set aside a default; MCR 2.603(D)(1) & (2); Good cause; Bullington v Corbell; Division of assets; Draggoo v Draggoo; Spousal support; Modification of a spousal support ruling; Koy v Koy

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-ex-wife’s motion to set aside the default, but did err as to its rulings on property division and spousal support. Thus, it affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The trial court entered a default judgment of divorce after denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default for failure to establish good cause. It split the parties’ property and denied spousal support as to either of them. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to set aside the default. “There is no dispute that the complaint was served on defendant on” 11/7/23. “Nor is there any dispute that on [11/28/23], the day the response to the complaint was due, none was filed by defendant.” Thus, on 12/1/23, "plaintiff was entitled to seek default for defendant’s failure to respond.” In addition, she did not demonstrate good cause to set the default aside as neither of her excuses held water. As to her excuse that she was involved in a “domestic case,” it noted that even if she “explained the circumstances—that she was the victim of domestic violence . . . such explanation still did not adequately explain why she could not respond, especially where the assault occurred two months before the answer was due.” As to her excuse that she had health reasons for not responding, it noted that she “provided an arguably reasonable excuse for not being able to respond between [11/13/23 and 11/18/23] but did not do so for the remainder of the time she was not in the hospital.” However, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred in its property division and spousal support rulings, finding “the trial court’s division of the retirement account, its award of the vehicles, and its order that spousal support be nonmodifiable were all unequitable under the circumstances.”