Ineffective assistance of counsel; Conflict of interest; Cuyler v Sullivan; People v Smith; MRPC 1.7 & 1.9; Whether the trial court had to presume prejudice; Distinguishing People v Davenport; Duty to investigate; Alternative suspects; Cross-examination; Impeaching witnesses; Right of confrontation; Failure to move to admit testimony under an investigative subpoena; Matters of trial strategy; Failure to assert collateral estoppel; Failure to object to the prosecution’s use of a deceased witness’s statements; Impeachment using prior inconsistent statements; MRE 607 & 613

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based on a conflict of interest, and rejected his claims that his attorneys were ineffective in multiple ways. He was convicted of first-degree murder. He argued that his attorneys (C and B) had a conflict of interest because their organization, the county’s “Office of the Defender, had earlier represented” a key witness (T) against him. He contended the Office represented T “in other cases in which [T] received a benefit for implicating defendant in the death of the victim.” He relied on MRPC 1.7 and 1.9. But the court concluded neither of these rules “established that his trial lawyers had an actual conflict of interest on the basis of the evidence that a lawyer from the same organization once represented” T. He conceded that C and B were not T’s “lawyers at the time of his criminal prosecution in this case.” He instead suggested that another attorney (A) “who worked for the Office of the Defender, might still have been [T’s] lawyer for [T’s] probation violation when defendant was first charged in this case.” But he failed to present evidence supporting this. Absent “evidence that the Office of the Defender still represented [T], MRPC 1.7(a) did not apply, and MRPC 1.7(b) would only apply to the extent that [C’s and B’s] representation might have been ‘materially limited’ by their responsibilities to [T] as a third person to the litigation.” And to the extent that the Office “owed duties to [T] as a third person under MRPC 1.7(b), those duties did not prevent [it] from attacking [T’s] credibility even if the attack exposed him to charges of perjury.” As to MRPC 1.9, the record showed “this case was not the same or a substantially related matter to any matter for which a lawyer from the Office of the Defender represented [T]. As such, MRPC 1.9(a) and (b) did not apply.” As to defendant’s assertion “that the trial court had to presume prejudice” based on the court’s decision in Davenport, the court found that case distinguishable. In addition, it determined that he was not entitled to relief based on his “claims that his trial lawyers provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate alternative suspects and by failing to properly cross-examine witnesses against him.” Affirmed.