Speedy trial; Prejudice; 180-day rule; MCL 780.131; Jailhouse letter; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Fair & impartial jury; Sleeping or confused juror; Waiver of jury instruction claim; Cumulative effect of the alleged errors

Finding no reversible error regarding, among other things, a speedy trial and the 180-day rule, the court affirmed defendant-Beach’s first-degree premeditated murder and felony-firearm convictions. “Although there were substantial delays between” his arrest and trial, the court concluded “that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.” As to the first factor, “the length of the delay in this case was substantial: over three years.” As to the second factor, the court concluded “that the prosecution was predominantly responsible for the 13-month prepandemic delay. On the other hand, Beach contributed to many of the delays in the last three months before his trial began. The remainder of the pandemic and postpandemic delays were due to COVID-19’s impact on the courts, and neither side is at fault.” The court found that to the extent “the prosecution is at fault for a portion of the delay, the stark lack of prejudice preponderates against finding a speedy-trial violation.” As to the third factor, “Beach filed numerous pro se motions invoking his right to a speedy trial, initially moving for relief on [9/16/20], which was approximately 19 months after his arrest.” As to the “fourth factor—prejudice to the defendant—there was a conclusive lack of prejudice to the defense or to Beach’s person.” Thus, the court concluded “that despite the significant delays in this case, Beach’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.” Also, his argument as to the 180-day rule failed. A “defendant is not entitled to relief under MCL 780.131 if they were detained in the county jail before trial.” In this case, “Beach was being held at the Detroit Reentry Center for absconding from parole. And ‘this Court has consistently held that, until revocation of parole, a paroled prisoner who is being detained locally, and against whom a parole hold has been filed, is not, because of the hold, awaiting incarceration in a state prison nor an inmate of a penal institution to whom the 180-day rule applies.’” The court held that “another reason to rule in favor of the prosecution on Beach’s 180-day-rule argument is that there is nothing in the record establishing the exchange of notices between the MDOC and the prosecutor’s office as required by MCL 780.131(1) to trigger its application.” Finally, the court held that “assuming that the 180-day rule was triggered in this case, the prosecution commenced an action on the charges well within 180 days after Beach was placed in the Detroit Reentry Center.”