Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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42 USC § 1983; Eighth Amendment; Excessive force; Throwing an inmate to the ground; Cordell v McKinney; Johnson v Sootsman; Hudson v McMillian; Claim that defendant ignored plaintiff’s medical needs
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court properly denied defendant-corrections officer (Voit) qualified immunity on plaintiff-inmate’s (Erickson) excessive force claim, concluding “a reasonable jury could find that Voit gratuitously assaulted” Erickson. But it found that Erickson did not show “that Voit knew of and consciously disregarded his need for medical treatment.” Erickson was an inmate in defendant-county’s jail when the incident occurred. After Erickson repeatedly hit and kicked his cell door, among other things, Voit returned to the cell, handcuffed him, and walked him to a holding cell. Voit “threw the still-handcuffed Erickson to the ground by grabbing his right arm and swinging him around in a circular motion. Erickson hit the ground on his knees. Voit immediately dropped on top of (the much smaller) Erickson and started pulling him by the neck and wrist to get him to lie flat. Voit quickly got [him] on his side, but Erickson was still not on his stomach. So Voit began to pull him by the handcuffed arms, which caused Erickson’s body to rub back and forth against the floor for another ten seconds.” Voit then placed his knee on Erickson’s back below his neck and kept it there for the approximately 40 seconds “it took him to uncuff Erickson’s hands. [He] then took his knee off Erickson’s back and” left the cell. The next day, Erickson told another deputy that he needed medical care. He was taken to the hospital and was diagnosed with back contusions and a fractured upper rib. Voit was charged with assault and battery. He was acquitted and retired. Erickson sued under § 1983 for excessive force and failure to provide medical care. The district court denied Voit qualified immunity on both claims. The court concluded “a jury could find that Voit threw Erickson down and held him to the ground for no reason other than his malicious intent to harm Erickson because of his disrespectful behavior.” The record showed that Erickson had calmed down, acknowledged his “childish” behavior, and complied with Voit’s order to exit the cell. He also “permitted Voit to handcuff him, and walked to the holding cell without resistance.” A jury could find that he did not pose a serious threat, and that the amount of force used was excessive. And the fact that “Voit actually harmed Erickson could further lead a reasonable jury to conclude that he intended to harm him.” The court found that its “holding in Cordell clearly established an Eighth Amendment violation here.” Thus, it affirmed the district court’s ruling on the excessive force claim. But it reversed as to the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, noting Erickson “showed no visible signs of injury at” the time of the incident. Remanded.
Employment discrimination action; Age, sex, ethnicity, & national origin discrimination; Direct evidence; Major v Village of Newberry; Circumstantial evidence; Hazle v Ford Motor Co; Breach of contract; Total Quality, Inc v Fewless
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-hospital summary disposition of plaintiff-doctor’s employment discrimination and breach of contract claims. Plaintiff sued defendant claiming it discriminated against him on the basis of his age, sex, ethnicity, and national origin by terminating his employment as a neurosurgeon in favor of a younger, less experienced, non-Egyptian female. He also alleged it breached his contract. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant because there was a genuine issue of material fact whether it discriminated against him on the basis of his age, nation of origin, ethnicity, and sex. First, “when viewed in context, it is clear that plaintiff failed to produce any direct evidence of discrimination and the trial court did not err in making this determination.” Second, plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that he was treated unequally compared to similarly situated employees who did not share his protected characteristics, and the trial court did not err by concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant regarding his breach of contract claim because there was a genuine issue of material fact whether it breached the terms of the Agreement by failing to pay him for on-call neurosurgical work. Under the “plain, unambiguous terms of the Agreement,” defendant was “required to pay plaintiff $1,500 for each day that he performed on-call neurosurgical services. The record shows [it] directed plaintiff not to ‘perform any work activity on'” its behalf commencing 11/3/20 through 2/1/21, “the date of termination. And plaintiff did not provide any on-call services during this 90-day notice period. Because plaintiff did not perform on-call services during that timeframe,” defendant was “not required to pay him under the Agreement’s terms.” Affirmed.
Restitution; People v Grant; Denial of a request for a restitution hearing; Rescission of a contempt order; MCR 6.435(B); Whether contempt was direct or indirect; In re Contempt of Murphy; Revision of the presentence investigation report (PSIR); People v Lampe; Waiver; State Appellate Defender Office (SADO)
The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s “due-process rights by ordering him to pay $11,211.05 in restitution and denying his request for a restitution hearing.” It also did not err in rescinding its erroneous order holding SADO in contempt for his prior appellate counsel’s abandonment of his case. Finally, he waived any challenge as to any alleged inaccuracies in his PSIR on appeal as well as his proportionality challenge to his sentence. He pled guilty to second-degree home invasion and receiving and concealing stolen property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. He was sentenced pursuant to a sentencing agreement to concurrent terms of 120 to 480 months. As to his restitution argument, the court noted that at sentencing, he “did not ‘effectively challenge the accuracy of the factual information[]’ in his PSIR pertaining to the victim’s loss or the amount of restitution to be paid.” As a result, no “dispute” existed requiring “the trial court to make express findings supporting the amount.” Given that he “‘did not present any information contrary to the amount of restitution imposed or offer support for any other’” amount, the trial court could “rely on the presumptively accurate PSIR, . . . which calculated the victim’s loss at $11, 211.05.” Defendant next asserted that the trial court erred in rescinding the contempt order, and “that, to the extent there were any procedural due-process issues, [it] should have held a contempt hearing.” The court again disagreed. It found that he mischaracterized the contempt here as direct when it was indirect because his former “counsel’s failures occurred ‘outside the court’s direct view[.]’” As a result, the trial court had to conduct “an evidentiary hearing to determine whether former appellate counsel or SADO actually committed contempt.” There was no dispute that the necessary procedures were not followed and thus, the “trial court’s decision to hold SADO in indirect contempt was” erroneous and it was within its authority to rescind the contempt order. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Proportionality to the circumstances of a juvenile offender; Miller v Alabama
Concluding that defendant could not “show that his sentence was disproportionate[,]” the court affirmed. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to 40 to 60 years for the felony-murder conviction, 23 to 60 years for the armed robbery conviction, and consecutive terms of 2 years for each count of felony-firearm. Defendant argued “that his sentence for felony-murder was disproportionate to his circumstances as a juvenile offender.” In this case, the “prosecution requested that defendant, who was 17 years old when he committed the charged offenses, be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The trial court complied with the statutory mandate to hold a hearing on the prosecution’s motion.” Defendant contended that the trial “court did not adequately consider his youth and attendant circumstances during sentencing, but this argument is unsupported by the record.” At his “sentencing, the trial court clearly considered his youth and attendant circumstances during its review of the Miller factors.” The trial “court considered several mitigating circumstances, including that defendant’s intelligence was still developing, that his home environment was poor, and that he had the potential for rehabilitation.” As to aggravating circumstances, the trial court found that he “had supportive adults in his life upon whom he chose not to rely, that he clearly executed his criminal plan, that peer pressure was not a factor, and that he was aware of the consequences of his actions, including criminal liability.” The court noted that “trial courts need not articulate their bases for considering an offender’s youth during sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a in which the offender is sentenced to a term of years.” Even so, it found that “the rationale discussed on the record shows that the court adequately considered defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances during sentencing.”
Divorce; Child custody; The statutory best-interest factors; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc; Evidentiary hearing; Right to a fair trial in a custody case; In re JK; De novo hearing; Custody assessment; Motion for reconsideration; Impeachment evidence; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a); In re Contempt of Henry
The court held that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to admit plaintiff-mother’s expert’s testimony, and (2) there were no due process violations. The trial court ordered joint legal custody, with primary physical custody granted to plaintiff and parenting time granted to defendant-father. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request to admit a witness who was an expert in coercive control and intimate partner violence. The testimony of the “witnesses, paired with the trial court’s twenty years of experience in presiding over family law cases, was more than sufficient to present a clear picture of plaintiff’s allegations of domestic violence.” Indeed, because the “witnesses had firsthand knowledge of plaintiff’s circumstances prior to the divorce, the evidence was far more relevant than the evidence that could have been obtained from an expert witness who had never met the children or interacted with the family.” In this bench trial, “the trier of fact was the court itself. Ultimately, plaintiff has not given this Court cause to question the trial court’s reliance on its training and experience.” The court also found no due process violations in this case. “[T]he combination trial and de novo hearing cured the alleged errors raised by plaintiff. Not only did plaintiff testify extensively, but the trial court issued a new decision that was based on the evidence admitted at trial, barring one exception that cut in plaintiff’s favor.” In addition, she did not show “any reliance on the custody assessment, let alone reliance that rendered the trial court’s findings against the great weight of the evidence, or its ultimate custody determination a palpable abuse of discretion.” Further, the court’s review of her motion for reconsideration compelled it “to conclude that plaintiff’s ‘palpable error’ was that the trial court did not adopt her view of the evidence or refrain from exercising its right to control the proceedings in order to arrive at the truth effectively and efficiently.” Moreover, the “trial court properly interpreted and applied the rules of evidence to prohibit plaintiff from using extrinsic evidence to prove a specific instance of conduct for purposes of attacking the witness’s credibility.” Finally, plaintiff did “not overcome the presumption that the trial judge was unbiased. She has not suggested any extrajudicial event or information that could serve as a source of bias, and she cannot establish grounds for disqualification or prejudice on the basis of repeated rulings against her.” Affirmed.
Claims arising from receiving contaminated remdesivir (an FDA-approved medication); Immunity for manufacturing defects under the federal Public Readiness & Preparedness (PREP) Act; 42 USC §§ 247d-6d(a)(1) & (2)(B); Hudak v Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills (6th Cir); “Loss”; “Covered person”; “Covered countermeasure”; Effect of the fact the product allegedly contained microscopic glass particles; Willful misconduct exception to immunity; § 247d-6d(d)(1)
The court held that the PREP Act’s plain language clearly granted defendants-Gilead “and St. Joseph immunity from all liability for injuries that were not caused by willful misconduct.” As plaintiffs did not allege that either defendant “engaged in willful misconduct by manufacturing or administering remdesivir to” plaintiff-DN, plaintiffs’ claims failed. The then-83-year-old DN allegedly received two contaminated doses of the FDA-approved medication remdesivir in 2021 after being diagnosed with COVID-19. He then suffered two strokes. St. Joseph later informed DN’s guardian that the two doses “involved recalled lot numbers of the drug.” The recall was due to “the presence of glass particulates.” Plaintiffs subsequently filed this suit. Defendants argued that the trial court erred in denying their summary disposition motions “because the PREP Act’s plain language grants immunity from manufacturing defect claims.” The court agreed. Plaintiffs argued that “the remdesivir administered to DN should not be considered a ‘covered countermeasure’ because Gilead manufactured, and St. Joseph administered, a product containing microscopic glass particles. Plaintiffs maintain that it is the glass particles, and not the remdesivir itself, that caused DN’s lasting injuries.” The court understood their argument but concluded that “Congress acted to prevent suits like this in the face of a serious public health emergency. Gilead and St. Joseph are ultimately correct: under the PREP Act, no liability can attach here.” Under the Act’s plain language, defendants “cannot be held liable for any alleged wrongdoing short of ‘willful misconduct.’ . . . Plaintiffs did not plead in avoidance of the PREP Act by alleging that Gilead or St. Joseph engaged in willful misconduct in this case, nor does it appear that an unintentional error allegedly causing contamination of the remdesivir during the manufacturing process rises to the level of willful misconduct for which [they] can be held liable.” The court found that to “conclude that manufacturing defects prevent products from being considered ‘covered countermeasures’ under the PREP Act, we would necessarily have to render some of the language of the PREP Act nugatory[.]” Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants summary disposition.
Continuation of involuntary mental health treatment; “Person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(1); MCL 330.1401(1)(b) & (c)
Finding no clear error in the probate “court’s factual findings and no abuse of discretion in its decision to continue the order for involuntary mental health treatment[,]” the court affirmed the probate court’s order denying respondent’s petition for discharge from involuntary mental health treatment. He argued that “clear and convincing evidence did not support the probate court’s decision to continue the order requiring him to engage in involuntary mental health treatment.” He reasoned that the probate “court did not adequately determine that he is a ‘person requiring treatment.’” Respondent pointed out that the probate court’s order “did not specify the particular provisions under which it found that respondent continued to require treatment under MCL 330.1401(1). However, the underlying one-year continuing order selected all three provisions [MCL 330.1401(1); MCL 330.1401(1)(b); MCL 330.1401(1)(c)] as grounds for the probate court’s findings and order. Only one basis is necessary, but we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings under all three provisions.” Ultimately, the testifying expert, a psychologist, and the two authorized reporters, another psychiatrist and a licensed master social worker, “all plainly provided evidence that respondent is a person suffering from mental illness and in need of mental health treatment.”
Defamation; Reighard v ESPN, Inc; Limited-purpose public figure; Distinguishing Hutchinson v Proxmire; Whether the statement at issue was a protected opinion & not a statement of determinable fact; Ireland v Edwards; Actual malice; Failure to investigate; Smith v Anonymous Joint Enter; Failure to retract; Tortious interference with a business expectancy; Grant of summary disposition before discovery was completed; Traverse City Curling Club (TCCC)
The court held as to plaintiffs’ defamation claim that plaintiff-Gersenson “was, as a matter of law, a limited-purpose public figure and that” no genuine issue of material fact existed as to actual malice. It found that summary disposition was not premature despite discovery being incomplete. And given that “plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claim was undisputedly premised on the viability of their defamation claim, the trial court did not err in” also dismissing this claim. The statement at issue (“no need to make things up”) was made by defendant-Jolly on his radio talk show aired by the other two defendants. The court first agreed “with the trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Gersenson was a limited-purpose public figure in this case.” It found that the trial court was correct that “there was a public controversy surrounding the $2 million grant to [nonparty-]TCCC. As” shown by a “Michigan Capitol Confidential article, there was a dispute regarding whether the grant was based on actual need or was instead the product of cronyism. And as plaintiffs allege, by the time of Gersenson’s radio interview with defendants, the Michigan Capitol Confidential was planning to publish a second article on the subject. Gersenson inserted himself into the public controversy by requesting that the radio station interview him on the air so that he may have a platform for discussing the grant.” The court found plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. And while they asserted that this case was analogous to Hutchinson, the court noted differences between the cases. However, it agreed with plaintiffs “that the trial court erred by determining that Jolly’s statement was a protected opinion and not a statement of determinable fact.” The court noted that whether “Gersenson was intentionally fabricating information was a provable fact. . . . Accordingly, Jolly’s statement was potentially actionable because it went beyond protected opinion and was capable of defamatory meaning.” But the court determined that reversal was not warranted because plaintiffs could only sustain their defamation claim “if they could show a genuine factual dispute as to whether the statement was made with actual malice.” The court agreed with the trial court that they “failed to do so and, relatedly, that they failed to show that summary disposition on that basis was premature.” Affirmed.
Alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA); Judicial interpretation of statutes; The public’s right to “address” public bodies under the OMA; MCL 15.263(5)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-Michigan House of Representative and Senate summary disposition of plaintiffs-advocacy groups’ lawsuit concerning the right to “address” public bodies under the OMA. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging defendants violated the OMA by not letting them speak in opposition to proposed legislation being discussed at several meetings. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by concluding that the right to “address” a public body under MCL 15.263(5) can be satisfied through oral and written submissions. As an initial matter, it noted what the trial court did not decide and what was not at issue on appeal, before explaining that “plaintiffs’ challenge is solely to the trial court’s interpretation of the term ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5).” Turning to the merits, it then noted that plaintiffs merely asserted “it was ‘plainly understood by everyone involved’ that public address under MCL 15.263(5) means only oral address by members of the public present at the meeting.” They essentially argued “that the word ‘address’ in the statute has acquired a particular technical meaning or has become a term of art.” However, they provided “no legal support for that assertion,” and the court found it “generally unpersuasive.” Plaintiffs also argued “that the Legislature indicated that it understood the word ‘address’ to refer only to oral address when it amended the OMA in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.” But the Legislature “merely added a provision to the OMA governing the conduct of electronic meetings.” This provision “provides guidance for a public body seeking to permit oral public comment at an electronic meeting. We decline to read [it] as proof of the Legislature’s intent when interpreting a different statutory provision that was enacted decades earlier.” In the “absence of any evidence that the Legislature intended a particular definition for the word ‘address’ in MCL 15.263(5), or evidence that the word has become a legal term of art, or evidence that defining the word to include written communication would be at odds with the purposes of the OMA, we see no reason why the word should not be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Thus, it affirmed “the trial court’s interpretation of MCL 15.263(5).” Finally, the court stressed “that, contrary to plaintiffs’ grim portent that this holding will enable all public bodies across the state to dispense with public comment altogether, we do not hold that a public body complies with the OMA by accepting written communications only. . . . We merely decline plaintiffs’ request to interpret MCL 15.263(5) in a manner that would, in all circumstances, preclude the acceptance of written communications in lieu of oral communications, or that at least would preclude a court from considering that acceptance when analyzing a challenge to a public body under the OMA.”