Restitution; People v Grant; Denial of a request for a restitution hearing; Rescission of a contempt order; MCR 6.435(B); Whether contempt was direct or indirect; In re Contempt of Murphy; Revision of the presentence investigation report (PSIR); People v Lampe; Waiver; State Appellate Defender Office (SADO)

The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s “due-process rights by ordering him to pay $11,211.05 in restitution and denying his request for a restitution hearing.” It also did not err in rescinding its erroneous order holding SADO in contempt for his prior appellate counsel’s abandonment of his case. Finally, he waived any challenge as to any alleged inaccuracies in his PSIR on appeal as well as his proportionality challenge to his sentence. He pled guilty to second-degree home invasion and receiving and concealing stolen property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. He was sentenced pursuant to a sentencing agreement to concurrent terms of 120 to 480 months. As to his restitution argument, the court noted that at sentencing, he “did not ‘effectively challenge the accuracy of the factual information[]’ in his PSIR pertaining to the victim’s loss or the amount of restitution to be paid.” As a result, no “dispute” existed requiring “the trial court to make express findings supporting the amount.” Given that he “‘did not present any information contrary to the amount of restitution imposed or offer support for any other’” amount, the trial court could “rely on the presumptively accurate PSIR, . . . which calculated the victim’s loss at $11, 211.05.” Defendant next asserted that the trial court erred in rescinding the contempt order, and “that, to the extent there were any procedural due-process issues, [it] should have held a contempt hearing.” The court again disagreed. It found that he mischaracterized the contempt here as direct when it was indirect because his former “counsel’s failures occurred ‘outside the court’s direct view[.]’” As a result, the trial court had to conduct “an evidentiary hearing to determine whether former appellate counsel or SADO actually committed contempt.” There was no dispute that the necessary procedures were not followed and thus, the “trial court’s decision to hold SADO in indirect contempt was” erroneous and it was within its authority to rescind the contempt order. Affirmed.