Defamation; Reighard v ESPN, Inc; Limited-purpose public figure; Distinguishing Hutchinson v Proxmire; Whether the statement at issue was a protected opinion & not a statement of determinable fact; Ireland v Edwards; Actual malice; Failure to investigate; Smith v Anonymous Joint Enter; Failure to retract; Tortious interference with a business expectancy; Grant of summary disposition before discovery was completed; Traverse City Curling Club (TCCC)

The court held as to plaintiffs’ defamation claim that plaintiff-Gersenson “was, as a matter of law, a limited-purpose public figure and that” no genuine issue of material fact existed as to actual malice. It found that summary disposition was not premature despite discovery being incomplete. And given that “plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claim was undisputedly premised on the viability of their defamation claim, the trial court did not err in” also dismissing this claim. The statement at issue (“no need to make things up”) was made by defendant-Jolly on his radio talk show aired by the other two defendants. The court first agreed “with the trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Gersenson was a limited-purpose public figure in this case.” It found that the trial court was correct that “there was a public controversy surrounding the $2 million grant to [nonparty-]TCCC. As” shown by a “Michigan Capitol Confidential article, there was a dispute regarding whether the grant was based on actual need or was instead the product of cronyism. And as plaintiffs allege, by the time of Gersenson’s radio interview with defendants, the Michigan Capitol Confidential was planning to publish a second article on the subject. Gersenson inserted himself into the public controversy by requesting that the radio station interview him on the air so that he may have a platform for discussing the grant.” The court found plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary unpersuasive. And while they asserted that this case was analogous to Hutchinson, the court noted differences between the cases. However, it agreed with plaintiffs “that the trial court erred by determining that Jolly’s statement was a protected opinion and not a statement of determinable fact.” The court noted that whether “Gersenson was intentionally fabricating information was a provable fact. . . . Accordingly, Jolly’s statement was potentially actionable because it went beyond protected opinion and was capable of defamatory meaning.” But the court determined that reversal was not warranted because plaintiffs could only sustain their defamation claim “if they could show a genuine factual dispute as to whether the statement was made with actual malice.” The court agreed with the trial court that they “failed to do so and, relatedly, that they failed to show that summary disposition on that basis was premature.” Affirmed.