Sentencing; Proportionality to the circumstances of a juvenile offender; Miller v Alabama

Concluding that defendant could not “show that his sentence was disproportionate[,]” the court affirmed. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to 40 to 60 years for the felony-murder conviction, 23 to 60 years for the armed robbery conviction, and consecutive terms of 2 years for each count of felony-firearm. Defendant argued “that his sentence for felony-murder was disproportionate to his circumstances as a juvenile offender.” In this case, the “prosecution requested that defendant, who was 17 years old when he committed the charged offenses, be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The trial court complied with the statutory mandate to hold a hearing on the prosecution’s motion.” Defendant contended that the trial “court did not adequately consider his youth and attendant circumstances during sentencing, but this argument is unsupported by the record.” At his “sentencing, the trial court clearly considered his youth and attendant circumstances during its review of the Miller factors.” The trial “court considered several mitigating circumstances, including that defendant’s intelligence was still developing, that his home environment was poor, and that he had the potential for rehabilitation.” As to aggravating circumstances, the trial court found that he “had supportive adults in his life upon whom he chose not to rely, that he clearly executed his criminal plan, that peer pressure was not a factor, and that he was aware of the consequences of his actions, including criminal liability.” The court noted that “trial courts need not articulate their bases for considering an offender’s youth during sentencing hearings conducted under MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a in which the offender is sentenced to a term of years.” Even so, it found that “the rationale discussed on the record shows that the court adequately considered defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances during sentencing.”