Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Michigan’s requirement that electricity providers get their capacity from within the state; MCL 460.6w (Act 341); Individual Local Clearing Requirement (ILCR); Whether Michigan can prevent in-state retailers from obtaining their merchandise from outside the state; Challenge under the “dormant Commerce Clause”; Whether the ILCR is “facially discriminatory”; Wyoming v Oklahoma; Whether an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause applied; General Motors v Tracy; Whether Congress authorized the ILCR in the Federal Power Act (FPA); “Strict scrutiny”; Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC); Load Serving Entity (LSE)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that Michigan’s ILCR (requiring electricity providers obtain their capacity from in-state facilities) “ facially discriminates” against interstate commerce, that the FPA does not immunize the ILCR, and that strict scrutiny must be applied. This case involved “Michigan electricity market regulations that expressly restrict where Michigan’s electricity retailers may procure their capacity.” Every LSE serving the Michigan retail market “needs to procure some amount of its total capacity from within the confines of Michigan’s lower peninsula.” Plaintiffs sued defendant-MPSC and its commissioners alleging that Michigan’s ILCR violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court ruled that the ILCR did not violate the Commerce Clause. On appeal, the court held that “the ILCR is facially discriminatory.” After reviewing a Supreme Court case involving state regulation of electricity markets, Wyoming, the court held that the ILCR results in “a law that is explicitly ‘territorially based,’ requiring those that sell electricity in Michigan’s lower peninsula to procure a certain percentage of its electrical capacity from that region.” It rejected defendants’ arguments based on a case involving Ohio’s natural gas market, Tracy, finding that case distinguishable and concluding that “far from establishing an exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, Tracy simply clarified what qualifies as discrimination in the unique regulatory setting in which that case arose.” It also rejected the contention that Congress authorized the ILCR in the FPA, concluding that “recognition of a state’s general authority to regulate does not amount to a clear and unambiguous statement immunizing the state from Commerce Clause scrutiny when it acts under that general authority.” The court determined that strict scrutiny must be applied. Thus, the inquiry is “whether the state demonstrated that the ILCR is the only means of achieving its goal of securing a reliable energy supply. The district court, however, never reached that question.” Reversed and remanded.
Waiver of right to the assistance of counsel; Forfeited right to assistance of counsel
The court held that “defendant did not waive his right to the assistance of counsel, and the record does not support the conclusion that this right was forfeited.” Thus, it vacated his convictions and remanded. He was convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon (silencer). The prosecution contended that he “forfeited his right to counsel by engaging in dilatory conduct.” Specifically, it faulted him “for perpetually failing to retain an attorney despite repeated warnings that doing so would lead to self-representation.” The prosecution’s position was “not supported by the record.” Instead, the record suggested “that defendant was caught between a rock and a hard place because he was unable to establish eligibility for a public defender but also unable to pay a private attorney’s retainer.” While nothing in the record suggested “that the aim was to delay the proceedings, defendant was certainly responsible for the first few months of delay due to attorney turnover.” Despite the prosecution’s claim “that defendant was engaging in dilatory conduct to draw out the proceedings and delay the trial, defendant’s statements that he contacted dozens of attorneys but could not get anyone to take the case went unrebutted.” Despite openly questioning his credibility, the trial “court did nothing to assess the veracity of defendant’s statements.” Also, it was clear from the record that he “was repeatedly and persistently attempting to obtain the assistance of a public defender.” The court held that there was “nothing in the record regarding the possibility that the [trial] court could have ordered the public defender office to appoint an attorney then subsequently order defendant to compensate the public defender office upon completion of a closer examination of his finances.” In sum, it concluded that while it was possible that he “could afford an attorney but delayed the proceedings by perpetually failing to retain one, the record before us is insufficient to support such a finding.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for a second-degree murder conviction; Self-defense; People v Bailey
Holding that the evidence “was sufficient establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not kill the victim in self-defense[,]” the court affirmed his second-degree murder conviction. He was also convicted of felony-firearm, FIP of a firearm, and FIP of ammunition. He asserted the victim (his father) “charged at him, potentially with a weapon, causing defendant to fear for his safety and shoot” him. Essentially, he asked the court “to reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, which” it was not permitted to do. It noted that the evidence “is viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution and issues of credibility are resolved in favor of the verdict[.]” The victim’s brother (U) and niece (C) were present for the argument between defendant and the victim, “and witnessed the shooting. There were some variances between their testimonies, but ‘[a] jury is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.’” The testimony of U and C “established that the argument took place on the porch, that defendant eventually left the porch and walked into the street, that [he] took a gun out when he was in the street. They agreed the victim did leave the porch and begin moving toward defendant, but they both testified that they did not see a weapon in the victim’s hands.” There was no evidence he “was armed at any point. Further, [C] testified that the victim came off the porch after defendant told him to, and both eyewitnesses also testified that they did not hear [him] threaten defendant. The victim was shot seven times, and the eyewitnesses both testified that defendant continued shooting [him] after he fell to the ground. This established that the force used went beyond that necessary to repel” his advance. Another witness who was “at the house but not outside during the shooting, testified that she heard the gunshots while she was inside the house and that she then heard defendant say, ‘He ain’t gonna punk me out like that.’ This comment suggests that [he] shot the victim out of anger arising from a perceived disrespect.” Lastly, it was undisputed that he “fled the scene and lied to the police, suggesting consciousness of guilt.”
Motion to withdraw a plea; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to timely file a motion to suppress; Trial strategy; Harmless error; Ineffective assistance in the context of a guilty plea; Whether defendant’s plea was “understanding, voluntary, & accurate”; MCR 6.302(A); Adjournment
The court held that the trial court “did not err or otherwise abuse its discretion by accepting defendant’s guilty plea and subsequently refusing to set it aside. Nor has defendant shown that he was prejudiced by any arguable ineffective assistance of counsel.” He was convicted of possession of child sexually abusive material (aggravated possession), possession of child sexually abusive material, and resisting or obstructing a police officer, after child sexually abusive materials were found on his cell phone following the raid of an alleged drug house. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that defense counsel was ineffective because she failed to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order and untimely filed the motion to suppress evidence. It noted he had not argued, much less “shown, that the incriminating evidence against him would have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.” Further, his “guilty plea was made, as the record shows, voluntarily and knowingly.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for an adjournment, which would have allowed him to obtain a ruling on his suppression motion before deciding whether to accept the guilty-plea terms offered by the prosecution. “Given the trial court’s broad authority to control its courtroom, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant an adjournment to accept a late motion filing.” Its decision was within the range of principled outcomes. And even if the trial court abused its discretion, defendant failed to show prejudice. Affirmed.
Motion to suppress firearm evidence seized during a traffic stop; Applicability of the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement; Duration of the stop; United States v Williams; “Probable cause” to search defendant’s jacket
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the warrantless search of the car in which defendant-Peake-Wright was a passenger was not “unreasonably prolonged” by the 14-minute police search for information and that “the totality of the circumstances—including Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and his criminal history—gave the officers the ‘independent reasonable suspicion’” needed to continue detaining him. He was a passenger in a car driven by a person (M) with a suspended license. When defendant got out of the vehicle, he began acting “‘amped up’ and ‘freak[ed] out.’” The police handcuffed him but did not arrest him. A pistol was found in his jacket as an officer was removing it from the car. Defendant was indicted for FIP of a firearm. He argued that the evidence should be suppressed. The district court ruled the automobile exception applied where “Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and criminal history gave rise to probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.” On appeal, the court first rejected his claim that the traffic stop “became unlawful” when the police extended it beyond what he considered to be a reasonable time for the initial stop based on M’s suspended license. It held that “Peake-Wright’s strange behavior during the stop gave rise to an independent reasonable suspicion that justified prolonging the stop.” Moreover, it held that this “reasonable suspicion did not dissipate prior to the search of his jacket.” The court noted that “[t]he police may continue a traffic stop ‘beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate the original cause for the stop’ only if the continued stop is ‘grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.’” The officers here “‘diligently pursued’” an investigation of M’s open arrest warrant, which took “approximately 14 minutes.” Further, a drug-sniffing dog’s failure to alert to the presence of drugs did not transform the stop into an unlawful seizure. The officers “had probable cause to pursue the search of Peake-Wright’s jacket. The dog’s failure to alert did not destroy that probable cause because the factors contributing to that determination did not point specifically to drug possession as opposed to the possession of other types of contraband, such as a weapon.” And several facts “gave rise to probable cause to believe that Peake-Wright’s jacket contained contraband.” His removal of his jacket after the stop (despite bitterly cold weather), his apparent attempts to distance himself from it, and the officers’ familiarity with his previous firearm history all combined to establish “probable cause to search the jacket, and the jacket alone.” The court affirmed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
Custody; D’Onofrio factors; D’Onofrio v D’Onofrio (NJ Super)
The court concluded that only “one of the D’Onofrio factors slightly favored the change of domicile; the rest did not. The trial court emphasized that [defendant-mother] had failed to put forth adequate evidence showing how [the child] ARC’s quality of life would be improved by the move. Rather, as the trial court explained, defendant had shown only how her own life would be improved. Our review of the trial court’s findings does not convince us that the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for change of domicile for ARC. She challenged the trial court’s findings as to the D’Onofrio factors. According to her, these factors supported the change in domicile. As to factor (a), “the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the move did not have the capacity to improve the quality of life for both ARC and defendant.” As to factor (b), the court held that “although defendant presented evidence of attitude issues exhibited by ARC, we discern no error in the trial court’s determination that such issues were minor and appeared normal given the circumstances.” It concluded that at “best, this factor was neutral.” As to “factor (c), defendant acknowledged that driving nine hours every other weekend was not realistic.” The court found that the “facts supported weighing this factor either neutrally or slightly in favor of the move.” Finally, as to “factor (d), the trial court determined that this was inapplicable” concerning plaintiff-father’s payment of child support. On appeal, defendant asserted “that plaintiff was behind on a significant portion of his child support.” However, he “testified that he was ordered to pay $16 per month in child support, and the child support order in the record confirms this. Apart from defendant’s testimony, there is nothing in the record indicating that plaintiff was behind on support. The trial court found that [her] testimony was not credible, and we discern no error based on the lack of evidence.”
Involuntary mental-health treatment order; A person requiring treatment pursuant to MCL 330.1401(1)(c); In re Tchakarova; “Impaired judgment”; Inability to understand the need for treatment; A “substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm”; Proper procedures for ordering hospitalization; MCR 5.741(A); MCL 330.1469a(1)-(3); MCL 330.1470; Consideration of alternatives; Forced electroconvulsive therapy (ECT); MCL 330.1717(1); Power of attorney (POA)
The court held that petitioner established the requirements under MCL 330.1401(1)(c) by clear and convincing evidence and thus, the probate court did not err by issuing an order for involuntary mental-health treatment. It also rejected respondent’s claims that the probate court failed to follow the proper procedures and “to consider less invasive alternatives.” He did not challenge MCL 330.1401(1)(c)’s mental illness element but did challenge the other elements – “(1) that the person’s mental illness impairs his or her judgment such that he or she cannot understand that he or she needs treatment, and (2) that this impaired judgment ‘presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm’ to himself or herself or others in the near future.” As to the first, “respondent demonstrated delusions of grandeur, including that he could predict the outcomes of major football games, that he was reaching ‘third puberty,’ and that his diabetes and other medical conditions were effectively cured. [He] also generally demonstrated impaired judgment by ceasing to take his medication before being hospitalized and by electing to take unprescribed testosterone.” Thus, for purposes of MCL 330.1401(1)(c), he showed impaired judgment. Further, the evidence of his “noncompliance with his treatment plan and” his testimony about “his belief that he was cured supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s mental illness impaired his judgment such that he failed to understand his need for treatment.” As to the second element, the court concluded the evidence about his “diabetes, catatonia, and testosterone-usage all satisfy the statutory element that [his] impaired judgment presented a substantial risk of significant physical harm to himself in the near future.” In addition, it found that “the probate court followed the procedures laid out in MCR 5.741(A) because it received both a written report from a licensed social worker and oral testimony from respondent’s psychiatrist describing the type, extent, appropriateness, and adequacy of” the proposed treatment. It also followed the “proper procedures in MCL 330.1469a(1),” (2), and (3), as well as satisfied the requirements of MCL 330.1470. As to respondent’s “claim that the ordered treatment included forced ECT[,]” because his sister (who has medical POA) “would not consent to it, the probate court’s order could not force [him] to receive ECT.” Affirmed.
Negligence; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Premises liability; Possession & control; Derbabian v S & C Snowplowing, Inc; Distinguishing Siegel v Detroit City Ice & Fuel Co; General negligence; Finazzo v Fire Equip Co; Waiver
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-airline summary disposition of plaintiff-employee’s premises-liability claim, but did err by granting it summary disposition of plaintiff’s general negligence claim. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she sustained while working at a customer service agent at the airport. The trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant’s motion for summary disposition finding that the premises liability claim lacked merit, but that there remained a question of fact as to whether its policy of traversing a conveyor belt constituted general negligence. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by dismissing her premises liability claim because defendant was in possession and control of the ticket counter when she was injured. “Plaintiff has failed to establish that defendant had possession and control of the premises at issue, or that there is a genuine issue of material fact in that regard.” However, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant failed to show it was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff’s general negligence claim. “[P]laintiff can—and did—bring a general-negligence claim premised on the distinct, common-law duty that defendant owed to act with due care and not unreasonably endanger others. And while plaintiff’s general-negligence claim overlaps with her premises-liability one and is correspondingly precluded to some extent, it also sets forth allegations that defendant breached its common-law duty through several actions or inactions involving how it chose to organize and run its workplace and how it trained and directed its workers. Those allegations of negligent conduct on the premises at issue do not depend, for their duty, on defendant’s status as possessor of the premises, and they are not foreclosed as a matter of law simply because defendant lacked that status.” It also agreed with plaintiff that defendant failed to raise its alternative argument in its motion for summary disposition and therefore waived it. Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g) & (j); Effect of an abusive partner; Comparing In re White & In re Dearmon; Failure to benefit from a case service plan; Best interests of the child; In re Gonzales/Martinez; In re Rippy
Holding that §§ (g) and (j) were met, and that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her rights were terminated on the basis of her toxic relationship with her abusive partner (the child’s father) and the fact she lied about the relationship. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that a statutory ground for termination was not met. It found this case was similar to White, where “the respondent had a history of inviting men with criminal backgrounds into her home and continued to do so during the case, which demonstrated that she did not benefit from her service plan.” Here, respondent’s “history of maintaining a relationship with her abusive partner continued throughout the case, which showed that she was unlikely to change this conduct in an effort to prevent domestic violence from occurring in her home with” the child. It also found this case was similar to Dearmon, because she “maintained contact with her abuser even after he was incarcerated, and also became impregnated by him again.” The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. The trial court found her “history of domestic violence and deception about her ongoing relationship with her abusive partner established” the child would not be safe in her care. It also found the child “became emotionally dysregulated and experienced diarrhea after parenting time visits with [respondent], and that his emotional and physical health improved when he did not have visits with” her. He also needed permanency and stability, which the foster family was providing.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); Reasonable efforts to reunify; Accommodations; Children’s best interests; Guardian ad litem (GAL)
The court concluded that respondent-mother could not show that the DDHS “failed to make accommodations that would have enabled her to obtain a more favorable outcome.” Also, §§ (a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j) existed and the trial court’s findings regarding the children’s (YZ and DZ) best interests were not clearly erroneous. Thus, it did not err by terminating respondents-parents’ parental rights. Although the “mother’s counsel twice indicated to the trial court that [she] would need services that accommodated her cognitive disability, [the mother], her counsel, and her [GAL] never provided any specific requests for accommodation.” Moreover, she “made no efforts to participate in services or to attempt to work with [the DHHS] toward reunification. Although multiple referrals were made for therapy, parenting classes, and psychological evaluations, [she] failed to complete the intake sessions.” She visited YZ only rarely. The DHHS’s “workers were unable to communicate effectively with” her. She argued that the DHHS “failed to help her understand what she needed to do to achieve reunification, but she does not specify what the workers might have done to aid her comprehension.” The court held that either respondent “was unwilling to cooperate with the reunification efforts, or her mental illness and impaired cognition were too severe to allow her to participate in or benefit from services.” Respondent-father challenged the trial court’s findings as to statutory grounds and best interests. As to § (a)(ii), the foster care supervisor testified that the “father’s last visit before the supplemental petition was filed in [3/23] took place in [3/22]. This exceeds the 91-day period provided by the statute.” Evidence also supported § (c)(i). “Although more than three years elapsed between the date that [the father] was adjudicated as a respondent in DZ’s case and the date of the termination hearing, and nearly three years elapsed in YZ’s case, [the father] failed to establish adequate housing, failed to complete parenting class, failed to undergo a psychological evaluation, and failed to visit the children with any regularity.” As to § (c)(ii), the DHHS “did not specify what other conditions arose after the trial court asserted jurisdiction over the children. However, a new condition arose when [the mother’s] parental rights to DZ were terminated, but [the father] continued to reside with her.” As to § (g), the father “was unable to provide an adequate home or consistent care.” And as to § (j), “the children would likely be harmed if placed in a physically unsafe home with parents who demonstrated no commitment to providing for their care. In consideration of the lengthy period of time that respondents were given to prepare for reunification, [the father’s] argument that he was not given enough time is without merit.” Finally, the trial court did not err in its best interests determination as he “showed mainly indifference to his sister’s efforts to facilitate a relationship between him and the children.” Affirmed.