Motion to suppress firearm evidence seized during a traffic stop; Applicability of the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement; Duration of the stop; United States v Williams; “Probable cause” to search defendant’s jacket

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the warrantless search of the car in which defendant-Peake-Wright was a passenger was not “unreasonably prolonged” by the 14-minute police search for information and that “the totality of the circumstances—including Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and his criminal history—gave the officers the ‘independent reasonable suspicion’” needed to continue detaining him. He was a passenger in a car driven by a person (M) with a suspended license. When defendant got out of the vehicle, he began acting “‘amped up’ and ‘freak[ed] out.’” The police handcuffed him but did not arrest him. A pistol was found in his jacket as an officer was removing it from the car. Defendant was indicted for FIP of a firearm. He argued that the evidence should be suppressed. The district court ruled the automobile exception applied where “Peake-Wright’s strange behavior and criminal history gave rise to probable cause to believe that his jacket contained evidence of a crime.” On appeal, the court first rejected his claim that the traffic stop “became unlawful” when the police extended it beyond what he considered to be a reasonable time for the initial stop based on M’s suspended license. It held that “Peake-Wright’s strange behavior during the stop gave rise to an independent reasonable suspicion that justified prolonging the stop.” Moreover, it held that this “reasonable suspicion did not dissipate prior to the search of his jacket.” The court noted that “[t]he police may continue a traffic stop ‘beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate the original cause for the stop’ only if the continued stop is ‘grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.’” The officers here “‘diligently pursued’” an investigation of M’s open arrest warrant, which took “approximately 14 minutes.” Further, a drug-sniffing dog’s failure to alert to the presence of drugs did not transform the stop into an unlawful seizure. The officers “had probable cause to pursue the search of Peake-Wright’s jacket. The dog’s failure to alert did not destroy that probable cause because the factors contributing to that determination did not point specifically to drug possession as opposed to the possession of other types of contraband, such as a weapon.” And several facts “gave rise to probable cause to believe that Peake-Wright’s jacket contained contraband.” His removal of his jacket after the stop (despite bitterly cold weather), his apparent attempts to distance himself from it, and the officers’ familiarity with his previous firearm history all combined to establish “probable cause to search the jacket, and the jacket alone.” The court affirmed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.