Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); Reasonable efforts to reunify; Accommodations; Children’s best interests; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court concluded that respondent-mother could not show that the DDHS “failed to make accommodations that would have enabled her to obtain a more favorable outcome.” Also, §§ (a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j) existed and the trial court’s findings regarding the children’s (YZ and DZ) best interests were not clearly erroneous. Thus, it did not err by terminating respondents-parents’ parental rights. Although the “mother’s counsel twice indicated to the trial court that [she] would need services that accommodated her cognitive disability, [the mother], her counsel, and her [GAL] never provided any specific requests for accommodation.” Moreover, she “made no efforts to participate in services or to attempt to work with [the DHHS] toward reunification. Although multiple referrals were made for therapy, parenting classes, and psychological evaluations, [she] failed to complete the intake sessions.” She visited YZ only rarely. The DHHS’s “workers were unable to communicate effectively with” her. She argued that the DHHS “failed to help her understand what she needed to do to achieve reunification, but she does not specify what the workers might have done to aid her comprehension.” The court held that either respondent “was unwilling to cooperate with the reunification efforts, or her mental illness and impaired cognition were too severe to allow her to participate in or benefit from services.” Respondent-father challenged the trial court’s findings as to statutory grounds and best interests. As to § (a)(ii), the foster care supervisor testified that the “father’s last visit before the supplemental petition was filed in [3/23] took place in [3/22]. This exceeds the 91-day period provided by the statute.” Evidence also supported § (c)(i). “Although more than three years elapsed between the date that [the father] was adjudicated as a respondent in DZ’s case and the date of the termination hearing, and nearly three years elapsed in YZ’s case, [the father] failed to establish adequate housing, failed to complete parenting class, failed to undergo a psychological evaluation, and failed to visit the children with any regularity.” As to § (c)(ii), the DHHS “did not specify what other conditions arose after the trial court asserted jurisdiction over the children. However, a new condition arose when [the mother’s] parental rights to DZ were terminated, but [the father] continued to reside with her.” As to § (g), the father “was unable to provide an adequate home or consistent care.” And as to § (j), “the children would likely be harmed if placed in a physically unsafe home with parents who demonstrated no commitment to providing for their care. In consideration of the lengthy period of time that respondents were given to prepare for reunification, [the father’s] argument that he was not given enough time is without merit.” Finally, the trial court did not err in its best interests determination as he “showed mainly indifference to his sister’s efforts to facilitate a relationship between him and the children.” Affirmed.