Involuntary mental-health treatment order; A person requiring treatment pursuant to MCL 330.1401(1)(c); In re Tchakarova; “Impaired judgment”; Inability to understand the need for treatment; A “substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm”; Proper procedures for ordering hospitalization; MCR 5.741(A); MCL 330.1469a(1)-(3); MCL 330.1470; Consideration of alternatives; Forced electroconvulsive therapy (ECT); MCL 330.1717(1); Power of attorney (POA)

The court held that petitioner established the requirements under MCL 330.1401(1)(c) by clear and convincing evidence and thus, the probate court did not err by issuing an order for involuntary mental-health treatment. It also rejected respondent’s claims that the probate court failed to follow the proper procedures and “to consider less invasive alternatives.” He did not challenge MCL 330.1401(1)(c)’s mental illness element but did challenge the other elements – “(1) that the person’s mental illness impairs his or her judgment such that he or she cannot understand that he or she needs treatment, and (2) that this impaired judgment ‘presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm’ to himself or herself or others in the near future.” As to the first, “respondent demonstrated delusions of grandeur, including that he could predict the outcomes of major football games, that he was reaching ‘third puberty,’ and that his diabetes and other medical conditions were effectively cured. [He] also generally demonstrated impaired judgment by ceasing to take his medication before being hospitalized and by electing to take unprescribed testosterone.” Thus, for purposes of MCL 330.1401(1)(c), he showed impaired judgment. Further, the evidence of his “noncompliance with his treatment plan and” his testimony about “his belief that he was cured supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s mental illness impaired his judgment such that he failed to understand his need for treatment.” As to the second element, the court concluded the evidence about his “diabetes, catatonia, and testosterone-usage all satisfy the statutory element that [his] impaired judgment presented a substantial risk of significant physical harm to himself in the near future.” In addition, it found that “the probate court followed the procedures laid out in MCR 5.741(A) because it received both a written report from a licensed social worker and oral testimony from respondent’s psychiatrist describing the type, extent, appropriateness, and adequacy of” the proposed treatment. It also followed the “proper procedures in MCL 330.1469a(1),” (2), and (3), as well as satisfied the requirements of MCL 330.1470. As to respondent’s “claim that the ordered treatment included forced ECT[,]” because his sister (who has medical POA) “would not consent to it, the probate court’s order could not force [him] to receive ECT.” Affirmed.