Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Voluntariness of a plea; MCR 6.302(A) & (C); Package-deal plea offers; People v Lamorand; In re Ibarra (CA); Evidentiary hearing to consider the totality of the circumstances
Considering the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea in the context of a package-deal requiring multiple defendants to agree to the offer for any one to receive the plea’s benefit, the court held that “where the record raises a question of fact about the voluntariness of such a plea,” an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. At the “hearing, the trial court must conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, applying the non-exhaustive Ibarra factors where relevant.” Finding a question of fact existed as to the voluntariness of defendant’s plea, the court remanded for such a hearing here. It reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, which had affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “A defendant’s plea is involuntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, their will was overborne such that the decision to plead was not the product of free will.” Considering Justice Kelly’s concurrence in Lamorand and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ibarra, the court agreed with Ibarra “that certain aspects of package-deal plea offers might pose a greater danger of inducing false pleas than individual plea offers because of the presence of extraneous factors.” But the court declined “to mandate that trial courts police the voluntariness of plea offers at the plea colloquy[.]” Rather, it concluded that, “absent special circumstances, a trial court need not engage in a specialized inquiry into the voluntariness of a package-deal plea offer before taking a plea[.]” As to the required review at such a hearing, “a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, as outlined by the non-exhaustive Ibarra factors, is preferable to the single-factor inquiry that the Court of Appeals adopted. It is of course relevant whether the prosecution has probable cause to prosecute the third parties in a package-deal plea offer—both the Court of Appeals and the Ibarra court agree on that point. However, the Ibarra opinion goes further in recognizing that other factors may also be relevant to this inquiry.” The court found the record here raised a fact question “as to whether defendant voluntarily waived his due-process rights. The plea colloquy transcript” showed that he “indicated a desire to go to trial that only changed after his twin brother stated that he wished to take the plea offer.” In addition, he “sought to withdraw his plea before sentencing and agreed with the trial court that the package-deal plea offer was coercive.” While the prosecution likely had probable cause to charge his twin, this did “not end the inquiry under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Further, [his] plea-hearing testimony does not directly contradict his claim” his plea was involuntary.Dissenting, Justice Zahra (joined by Justice Viviano) found that the majority opinion ignored “the combined wisdom of every federal court and adopts a test used by the California Supreme Court in different circumstances. Indeed, the majority opinion makes Michigan the first jurisdiction in the nation to require trial courts to conduct a second plea colloquy whenever a defendant who pleaded guilty in a joint plea alleges that his plea was involuntary merely because it was a part of a joint plea deal.” He believed “the existing plea-taking framework is sufficient,” and would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment.
Probation violation; Condition prohibiting marijuana use; Motion to dismiss; The Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA); People v Thue (concerning the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA)); MCL 333.27954(1)(a) (prohibiting operating motor vehicles under the influence of marijuana); Operating a vehicle while under the influence of marijuana (MCL 257.625(3)); The Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC)
Concluding the probation condition prohibiting defendant from using marijuana was lawful, the court held that he was “not entitled to protection from penalty under the MRTMA for violating” his probation terms. Thus, it affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss his probation violations. He was on probation after pleading guilty to violating MCL 257.625(3). He did “not dispute that the conviction was related to his use of marijuana, and that he was under the influence of marijuana while driving.” While on probation, he twice tested positive for marijuana, resulting in probation violations that he unsuccessfully moved to have dismissed. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s denial of his motion. Defendant relied on Thue, a case involving the MMMA. The court noted he overlooked the fact that in Thue, it found that the MMMA did not apply to recreational marijuana use and trial courts may impose probation conditions related to such use and “‘revoke probation for such recreational use as well as for marijuana use in violation of the MMMA.’” The court added that the “MRTMA was enacted in 2018, and Thue was decided in 2021. Although this statement was dicta, as the Court was only analyzing the matter in relation to the MMMA, it is clear that the Court believed that a difference exists between imposing conditions of probation prohibiting the use of medical marijuana and those addressing the use of recreational marijuana.” The court noted that while the “MRTMA provides that individuals cannot be directly penalized for recreational marijuana use, the law specifically prohibits the ‘operat[ion] . . . of any motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of marihuana[.]’ MCL 333.27954(1)(a). Here, defendant was not penalized simply for recreational marijuana use, which would certainly violate the MRTMA. Instead, the probation condition prohibiting him from using marijuana was a penalty imposed for violating MCL 257.625(3). Nothing in the MRTMA suggests that it was intended to supersede the” MVC, particularly not those portions “designed to protect the health and safety of the public.” The court further found that the probation condition “was rationally related to” defendant’s rehabilitation, as it addressed “the underlying substance use issue that led to his violation of MCL 257.625(3).”
Police witness testimony as to video evidence; MRE 701; People v Fomby; People v Drossart; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge the validity of a cell phone search warrant; Failure to object to the admission of photos of the victims & stipulating to the admission; Specific unanimity instruction
The court concluded that defendant failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted an officer’s testimony as to what was depicted in a video. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and his claim that the jury in his case was not required to render a unanimous verdict had no merit. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, fourth-degree arson, FIP, mutilation of a dead body, and felony-firearm. Defendant claimed the trial court erred in permitting a police witness (T) “to offer his interpretation about what was depicted in a video played for the jury.” The court held that T’s “testimony could help the jury discern the events depicted on the video.” Thus, it concluded that “the testimony was permissible under MRE 701.” As to whether the testimony invaded the province of the jury, defendant relied upon Drossart. But the court disagreed with his “position that an opinion that ‘went directly to the issue before the jury’ is the same as opining on” his guilt. Also, T’s “testimony did not invade the province of the jury if he was in a better position to see what the video depicted.” The court found that the “poor quality of the video weighed in favor of a ruling that [T’s] testimony was necessary,” and the fact he had repeatedly reviewed the “footage, including focusing on different aspects of the video as he re-watched it, put him in a better position than the jurors to see what the video depicted.” The court held that even “if the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony, that error does not require reversal.” It was clear “the jury was focused on reaching their own conclusions based on their perceptions of the video, and not merely based on [T’s] testimony, when deciding on defendant’s guilt.” Thus, the court could not say that it was “more probable than not that the error, to the extent there was one, affected the outcome of the trial.” Affirmed.
Rescission; Fraudulent inducement; Drivers in the household; Mutual & unilateral rescission; Inferring mutual rescission; Puffer v State Mut Rodded Fire Ins Co; Cheema v Progressive Marathon Ins Co (On Reconsideration) (Unpub); Innocent third-party doctrine; Unlawful taking; MCL 500.3113; Monaco v Home Owners Ins Co; Ahmed v Tokio Marine Am Ins Co; Whether Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest was binding
The court held as a matter of law that nonparty-Clementine “did not procure her insurance policy via fraudulent inducement because” defendant-insurer never asked her “to identify the members of her household and” she did not represent “to defendant that plaintiff did not reside with her and use her car.” It also concluded “that the rescission relied upon by defendant was not mutual and that the claimed basis for a unilateral rescission, i.e. fraud,” could not be shown. Further, “because there was no rescission, the innocent third-party doctrine” did into apply. “Finally, the fact that plaintiff operated the vehicle without a valid license does not constitute an unlawful taking pursuant to MCL 500.3113.” Clementine (plaintiff’s mother) “had an auto no-fault insurance policy through defendant. Unbeknownst to defendant, Clementine lived with plaintiff, and Clementine allowed plaintiff to drive her car. Plaintiff was in an accident and sought PIP benefits from defendant,” which sought to rescind the policy. The court held that defendant “failed to produce any evidence suggesting that Clementine made a false representation. Defendant’s application for insurance did not ask the applicant who lived with her and whether there were other drivers in the household.” Defendant emphasized “the following line in an unsigned copy of Clementine’s insurance application: ‘In making this application for insurance, it is understood that as a part of our underwriting procedure, an investigative consumer report containing driving record information may be obtained for each driver in the household.’ Simply put, this statement does not say what defendant wants it to say; it does not direct or ask the applicant to list the drivers in the household or even who lived in the household. A failure to provide information that is not requested does not constitute a misrepresentation, let alone fraud.” Because there was no evidence of a misrepresentation, defendant was not entitled to rescind the contract based on fraud. It alternatively argued that Clementine agreed to mutually rescind the policy by accepting a refund. The court concluded that “mutual rescissions must be based on proof that the insurer informed the insured that cashing the check would constitute a mutual rescission by which the insured would forfeit any right to dispute the lawfulness of the rescission.” Under the circumstances here, cashing the check was insufficient to mutually rescind the policy. As to whether plaintiff lawfully took the vehicle, the court found “that Monaco controls the issue and Swoope is not binding.” Reversed and remanded.
Priority for payment of PIP benefits; Cancellation notice; MCL 500.3020(1)(b); “Peremptory, explicit, & unconditional” requirement; Yang v Everett Nat’l Ins Co; 10-day-written-notice requirement; Nowell v Titan Ins Co; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
The court reversed an order granting summary disposition for third-party defendant-USA Underwriters (Underwriters) in this priority dispute as to the payment of PIP benefits to plaintiff-Harris and remanded for entry of summary disposition for defendant-Farmers. Harris “was allegedly injured while riding in a vehicle owned by her mother and ostensibly insured by Underwriters.” Underwriters contended the policy had been cancelled. Farmers was assigned Harris’s claim by the MAIPF. Farmers argued “that Underwriters’ cancellation notice did not comply with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) or prevailing law because it was not ‘peremptory, explicit and unconditional’ and the 10-day-written-notice requirement was not met; therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the cancellation notice was effective and Harris did not have insurance on the date of the” accident. The court agreed with both arguments. It found that “contrary to the trial court’s holding, the cancellation notice relied upon by Underwriters is invalid under MCL 500.3020(1)(b), and the automobile insurance policy issued to Harris by Underwriters remained in effect on” the date of the accident at issue here. Thus, “the trial court erred when it granted Underwriters’ motion for summary disposition and dismissed Farmers’ case against Underwriters.” Farmers also argued “that Underwriters’ cancellation notice did not comply with MCL 500.3020(1)(b) because it failed to satisfy the 10-day-written-notice requirement.” The court determined that although it did not have to consider this issue given its “conclusion that the cancellation notice was ineffective because it was not ‘peremptory, explicit, and unconditional,’ . . . the notice also did not comply with the 10-day-written-notice requirement.”
Zoning variances; Standing; MCL 125.3604(1); MCL 125.3606(1); “Party aggrieved” by a zoning decision; Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp; Special damages requirement; Tuscola Area Airport Auth v Michigan Aeronautics Comm’n; Beverly Hills Racquet & Health Club (BHC); Beverly Hills Zoning Board of Appeals (BHZBA)
The court held that while appellant-BHC lacked standing to challenge one of the two zoning variances at issue, it had standing to challenge the other. It also concluded the circuit court correctly rejected BHC’s arguments that two nonparties (the applicants) were not aggrieved persons who could seek a variance from the BHZBA. A planned childcare facility was involved in this dispute. The applicants successfully sought multiple zoning variances. After unsuccessfully objecting to the grant of the variances, BHC appealed to the circuit court, which ruled that BHC lacked standing to appeal. One of the variances at issue allowed “for a smaller-than-required outdoor play area” and the other allowed “closer proximity to another licensed childcare facility. While BHC lacks standing to challenge the play area variance, it has standing to challenge the proximity variance.” The court noted that BHC seemed “to abandon any challenge to the play area variance, focusing only on the proximity variance. Regardless,” the court concluded it clearly could not establish standing as to “this variance. BHC’s only claim of special damages is financial; BHC claims that granting the variances will cause them to lose business. We can discern no basis upon which to conclude that allowing the applicants to have a smaller outdoor play space would harm BHC’s business prospects.” But as to the proximity variance, the court found Tuscola “controlling, and the takeaway from Tuscola is that the Saugatuck Dunes test is a low bar.” The court determined that “the potential for harm to the health club requires smaller leaps of logic” than were required in Tuscola – “it is reasonable to infer that the presence of a facility across the street offering the same services as BH[C]’s facility would cause people who would otherwise patronize BH[C] to instead patronize the business across the street. The Tuscola decision suggests that even one parent dropping their kids across the street who would otherwise have used BH[C] is enough to establish special damages. BHC’s concerns might not ultimately warrant relief, but they were sufficient to support its status as an aggrieved party with a statutory right to appeal to the circuit court.” Reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits of BHC’s appeal and a determination of whether competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record supported the BHZBA’s decision.
Whether a condominium co-owner can maintain a premises liability action against the condominium association; Duty; The Condominium Act; Common-law principles; Whether a co-owner is a licensee or invitee; Special relationship; “The land of another”; Francescutti v Fox Chase Condo Ass’n
The court overturned Francescutti and concluded the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs-condo co-owners “could not maintain a premises-liability action against” defendant-condo association. Under the circumstances, the court determined that the injured “plaintiff was an invitee when he entered the condominium’s common area and that defendant owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him from dangerous conditions on the land.” Thus, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court. Plaintiffs own and reside in a condo unit that is part of a condo complex. The injured plaintiff “stepped out of his condominium and into a common area of the complex to throw garbage into a dumpster. Plaintiff walked down the complex’s sidewalk, which was covered in snow and ice.” He slipped and fell. The fall resulted in a brain injury. The issue before the court was “whether a condominium co-owner can maintain a premises-liability action against a condominium association when the co-owner was injured while using the condominium’s common elements.” The court concluded “that the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that a condominium co-owner is neither a licensee nor an invitee and thus is precluded from bringing a premises-liability claim against a condominium association simply because the condominium co-owner holds an interest in those common elements. The proper inquiry when considering the duty owed in a premises-liability action is who has possession and control over the land where a person was injured, not merely who owns the land.” The court held “that, when the master deed and bylaws governing a condominium complex provide that the condominium association is responsible for maintaining the common areas and the condominium’s co-owners lack possession and control over those common areas, a condominium co-owner using the condominium complex’s common areas and elements is an invitee. In such circumstances, a condominium association owes a condominium co-owner a common-law duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from dangerous conditions in the common areas.” Dissenting, Justice Zahra (joined by Justice Viviano) “would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding in Francescutti to the extent that a co-owner is neither a licensee nor an invitee.” He would also remand the “case to the trial court to determine whether any duty is owed to plaintiff by defendant under the Condominium Act or defendant’s bylaws.”
Auto negligence; The sudden emergency doctrine; White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Principle that the sudden emergency doctrine is an extension of the reasonably prudent person rule & is not an affirmative defense; Szymborski v Slatina; Principle that a driver has no duty to guard against or anticipate an unknown hazard; Briggs v Knapp
Holding that the issue concerning the sudden emergency doctrine raised by defendant in this case should be resolved by a jury, the court reversed the summary disposition award for defendant and remanded. Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor daughter (DM), sued defendant for injuries DM sustained when she was trying to cross a road on her scooter and was struck by defendant’s vehicle. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant based on the sudden emergency doctrine. On appeal, the court found summary disposition was inappropriate at this juncture. “[D]efendant admitted at her deposition that the weather was clear and sunny on the day of the collision. She conceded that she saw pedestrians in the center turn lane and the two girls on their scooters approaching the center turn lane as she drove in their direction. She commented that she had her ‘eye on the road’ and saw DM’s ‘scooter not stopping out of the corner of [her] eye.’” She explained “she was driving at the speed limit of 35 miles per hour, and she ‘swerved to the right to avoid hitting [DM] head-on.’” Her deposition testimony offered “ample support for plaintiff’s contention that an issue of material fact precludes an award of summary disposition” under the sudden emergency doctrine. In addition, “defendant’s admission that she saw the pedestrians and the two girls on scooters enter the center turn lane . . . as she was driving in their direction dictates that she had a duty to guard against and anticipate the hazard presented by those people in the center turn lane. Whether she breached that duty in a manner that establishes liability for negligence presents a question of fact for a jury, which can assess the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine in the course of deliberations.”
Premises liability; Slip & fall in a bathroom; Constructive notice; Duty owed to an invitee; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Breach; Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc; Conjecture & speculation; Libralter Plastics, Inc v Chubb Group of Ins Cos
The court held that the trial court properly granted defendant-store summary disposition of plaintiff’s premises liability action. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell in a bathroom at defendant’s store. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court’s analysis. “Plaintiff presented no evidence that the sink or toilet had previously leaked, or that there was any indication that the bathroom floor was otherwise of a condition that it would predictably pose a danger.” There was also “no evidence in the record that defendant had knowledge of any specific issue with the bathroom, whether in this particular incident or at any other time.” In addition, plaintiff failed to show that “the water had been present for so long that defendant should have been aware of it.” According to his “deposition testimony, he had not been in the store for long. For all that the record establishes, the water may have been on the floor for only 30 seconds before plaintiff fell, and there would be no basis to find that defendant would have discovered it with even frequent, thorough inspections.” Further, plaintiff, “who did not depose anyone in this case, did not meet his burden of showing a question of fact about defendant having constructive notice of the hazard.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii) & (j); Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Children’s best interests; In re White; In re Olive/Metts Minors
The court held that (1) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find a statutory basis for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction, (2) the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was warranted under §§ (b)(ii) and (j), and (3) terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in her children’s (G and P) best interests. The court first concluded “a rational jury could find that respondent failed to protect her child from a known risk of harm and, as a result, her child suffered serious injuries.” It determined that a “preponderance of the evidence indicated that [she] had failed to protect [P] from a known risk of harm. Respondent worked from home, and her husband was primarily responsible for the children’s care. [She] admitted to the police that she knew [he] was irritated and frustrated with [P’s] constant fussing. [She] acknowledged that, on [4/6/23], her husband had interrupted her several times throughout the day requesting additional help with” P. While she “took several breaks, she admitted that she did not provide her husband with all the help he requested.” That evening and into the early morning hours of 4/7/23, she “did not get up with [P] during the night, and it was undisputed that [her] husband violently shook [P] sometime in the early morning hours of” 4/7/23. Further, despite notice that morning “that there were medical issues related to the child’s eyes, respondent did not seek medical attention at that point.” In addition, evidence of earlier events was presented that could allow a trier of fact to infer she “had notice that the children were unsafe in her husband’s care.” The court also found that “the anticipatory-neglect doctrine furnished statutory grounds for jurisdiction over” G. As to termination, the evidence showed she “knowingly left a distressed five-month-old infant in the care of a person with diminished capacity who lacked the experience to care for an infant, and who was already frustrated with the baby.” Further, he had previously shown “he did not respond properly to the child’s needs, particularly when the child was persistently crying.” Clear and convincing evidence also “established a reasonable likelihood that the children would suffer injury or abuse if placed in respondent’s home. The most compelling evidence that [she] would be unwilling or unable to protect [them] from a known risk of harm was her continued relationship with her husband.” Affirmed.