Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii) & (j); Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Children’s best interests; In re White; In re Olive/Metts Minors

The court held that (1) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find a statutory basis for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction, (2) the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was warranted under §§ (b)(ii) and (j), and (3) terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in her children’s (G and P) best interests. The court first concluded “a rational jury could find that respondent failed to protect her child from a known risk of harm and, as a result, her child suffered serious injuries.” It determined that a “preponderance of the evidence indicated that [she] had failed to protect [P] from a known risk of harm. Respondent worked from home, and her husband was primarily responsible for the children’s care. [She] admitted to the police that she knew [he] was irritated and frustrated with [P’s] constant fussing. [She] acknowledged that, on [4/6/23], her husband had interrupted her several times throughout the day requesting additional help with” P. While she “took several breaks, she admitted that she did not provide her husband with all the help he requested.” That evening and into the early morning hours of 4/7/23, she “did not get up with [P] during the night, and it was undisputed that [her] husband violently shook [P] sometime in the early morning hours of” 4/7/23. Further, despite notice that morning “that there were medical issues related to the child’s eyes, respondent did not seek medical attention at that point.” In addition, evidence of earlier events was presented that could allow a trier of fact to infer she “had notice that the children were unsafe in her husband’s care.” The court also found that “the anticipatory-neglect doctrine furnished statutory grounds for jurisdiction over” G. As to termination, the evidence showed she “knowingly left a distressed five-month-old infant in the care of a person with diminished capacity who lacked the experience to care for an infant, and who was already frustrated with the baby.” Further, he had previously shown “he did not respond properly to the child’s needs, particularly when the child was persistently crying.” Clear and convincing evidence also “established a reasonable likelihood that the children would suffer injury or abuse if placed in respondent’s home. The most compelling evidence that [she] would be unwilling or unable to protect [them] from a known risk of harm was her continued relationship with her husband.” Affirmed.