Voluntariness of a plea; MCR 6.302(A) & (C); Package-deal plea offers; People v Lamorand; In re Ibarra (CA); Evidentiary hearing to consider the totality of the circumstances

Considering the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea in the context of a package-deal requiring multiple defendants to agree to the offer for any one to receive the plea’s benefit, the court held that “where the record raises a question of fact about the voluntariness of such a plea,” an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. At the “hearing, the trial court must conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, applying the non-exhaustive Ibarra factors where relevant.” Finding a question of fact existed as to the voluntariness of defendant’s plea, the court remanded for such a hearing here. It reversed the Court of Appeals judgment, which had affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “A defendant’s plea is involuntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, their will was overborne such that the decision to plead was not the product of free will.” Considering Justice Kelly’s concurrence in Lamorand and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ibarra, the court agreed with Ibarra “that certain aspects of package-deal plea offers might pose a greater danger of inducing false pleas than individual plea offers because of the presence of extraneous factors.” But the court declined “to mandate that trial courts police the voluntariness of plea offers at the plea colloquy[.]” Rather, it concluded that, “absent special circumstances, a trial court need not engage in a specialized inquiry into the voluntariness of a package-deal plea offer before taking a plea[.]” As to the required review at such a hearing, “a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, as outlined by the non-exhaustive Ibarra factors, is preferable to the single-factor inquiry that the Court of Appeals adopted. It is of course relevant whether the prosecution has probable cause to prosecute the third parties in a package-deal plea offer—both the Court of Appeals and the Ibarra court agree on that point. However, the Ibarra opinion goes further in recognizing that other factors may also be relevant to this inquiry.” The court found the record here raised a fact question “as to whether defendant voluntarily waived his due-process rights. The plea colloquy transcript” showed that he “indicated a desire to go to trial that only changed after his twin brother stated that he wished to take the plea offer.” In addition, he “sought to withdraw his plea before sentencing and agreed with the trial court that the package-deal plea offer was coercive.” While the prosecution likely had probable cause to charge his twin, this did “not end the inquiry under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Further, [his] plea-hearing testimony does not directly contradict his claim” his plea was involuntary.

Dissenting, Justice Zahra (joined by Justice Viviano) found that the majority opinion ignored “the combined wisdom of every federal court and adopts a test used by the California Supreme Court in different circumstances. Indeed, the majority opinion makes Michigan the first jurisdiction in the nation to require trial courts to conduct a second plea colloquy whenever a defendant who pleaded guilty in a joint plea alleges that his plea was involuntary merely because it was a part of a joint plea deal.” He believed “the existing plea-taking framework is sufficient,” and would affirm the Court of Appeals judgment.