Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Whether an employment contract barred equitable, quasi-contract claims; Implied-in-law contract; Set off from damages; Unjust enrichment; No cause of action; Fair market hourly rate; Reimbursement for money withheld from compensation; Chief executive officer (CEO); Approved service arrangement (ASA)
In this consolidated appeal, the court affirmed “the trial court’s orders finding an implied contract, declining to set off $322,911.32 from the amount that defendants were ordered to reimburse plaintiff, and dismissing defendants’ counterclaim.” It also affirmed the trial court’s fair-market-value determination as to plaintiff’s services but remanded “for the trial court to correct the amount of [his] damages award to $415,044.” The case arose after defendants acquired nonparty-Healthcare Midwest, of which plaintiff was formerly a shareholder. In Docket No. 366529, defendants first contended “the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that plaintiff’s equitable, quasi-contract claims were not barred by” his employment agreement. Because the authority granted to the CEO of Healthcare Midwest “did not extend to signing employment agreements on behalf of the individual physicians, and plaintiff neither signed nor approved” an agreement as to services referred to as BGS services, “the trial court did not err by finding that there was no express written agreement covering plaintiff’s BGS services.” Defendants also argued “that the BGS agreement qualified as an ASA because” it was described in an exhibit. The court found this argument was “barred by the facts supporting the trial court’s holdings.” Defendants next contended “that if plaintiff’s quasi-contract claims were not barred, then the trial court abused its discretion by not amending the judgment to set off from [his] damages award the amount that defendants had already paid [him] out of the compensation pool for night and weekend call.” The court could not “say that the trial court’s decision not to set off $322,911.32 from plaintiff’s damages award fell outside the range of principled outcomes.” It was also unpersuaded by defendants’ argument “that the trial court erred by concluding that they were not entitled to recover $240,500 that they mistakenly paid plaintiff for providing dayshift BGS services.” The court found that the basis of their “breach-of-contract claim is what plaintiff’s employment contract did not say rather than what it said.” They did not cite any “authority imposing such a duty or finding a breach of duty under such circumstances.” As to their unjust enrichment theory. the court held that the record supported that the trial “court did not err by entering a judgment of no cause of action.” In Docket No. 366530, plaintiff contended that it “erred by not awarding him a fair market rate of $212.71 an hour for his 7,656 hours of BGS services.” The court held that “the trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff did not establish that $212.71 is a reasonable hourly rate for BGS services.” The court concluded he did not establish “that the trial court clearly erred by determining that $181,468.88 provided fair market value for [his] provision of BGS services.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Other acts evidence of domestic violence; MCL 768.27c & 768.27b; Notice; Trustworthiness; People v Meissner; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC III; MCL 750.520d(1)(b); Penetration; People v Hunt; Domestic violence; MCL 750.81(2); “Assault” & “battery”; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 3; MCL 777.33(1)(d); Medical treatment; People v Maben; Scoring of OV 4; MCL 777.34(l)(a); Psychological injury; People v White; Scoring of OV 19
Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences but remanded for ministerial corrections to the PSIR. He was convicted of domestic violence and CSC III for physically and sexually assaulting his girlfriend. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 18 to 40 years for the latter, and 93 days in jail for the former. On appeal, the court rejected his arguments that (1) the trial court erroneously admitted other acts evidence, (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, and (3) he was entitled to resentencing. First, the prosecution properly provided notice of its intent to use the other acts evidence and there was no hearsay violation. And as to trustworthiness, the “victim was presented with the police reports to refresh her recollection of the prior instances of domestic violence, and then testified regarding their contents.” Further, the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Second, because one instance of sexual intercourse “was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution established all elements of one count of” CSC III, the court declined to review the trial court’s finding that the sexual intercourse in the bedroom also constituted CSC III. Similarly, “a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution established both elements of the charged offense of domestic violence.” Third, because there were no errors in the scoring of OV 3, OV 4, or OV 19, defendant was not entitled to resentencing, although remand was required for a ministerial correction to the SIR to reflect zero points for PRV 7. As to OV 3, the “victim was choked hard enough that she was struggling to breathe or verbally resist [defendant], and had bruises on her shoulder and neck, as well as scrape marks on her back.” As to OV 4, there was “plenty of evidence from the victim impact statement given at . . . sentencing showing the victim not only needed psychological treatment, but actively sought it.”
Admission of Snapchat photos; Eavesdropping; MCL 750.539a(2); “Private conversation”; MCL 750.539c; Consent; Provision of photos to police; MCL 750.539e; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Motion for a new trial; Interception of communications under the federal wiretapping statute; 18 USC § 2511(1)(a); “Intercept”; § 2510(4); Luis v Zang (6th Cir); “Wire communication”; § 2510(1); “Transfer”; § 2510(18); “Electronic communication”; § 2510(12); “Electronic storage”; § 2510(17)(A); Expert testimony; MRE 702; Right to present a defense; People v Carpenter; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Mandatory minimum sentence for CSC I; MCL 750.520b(2)(b)
The court held that the trial court did not err by admitting evidence obtained by defendant’s husband (W) from her Snapchat account, and thus, did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial on that basis. In addition, “defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection or file a meritless motion to suppress.” She was convicted on several charges related to explicit photos found on her Snapchat account. As relevant to this appeal, she received a 25-year minimum sentence for her CSC I convictions. On appeal, the court rejected her arguments that (1) the trial court erred by admitting the Snapchat photos because they were obtained as a result of W’s violation of Michigan and federal eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes, (2) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress them, and (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. The photos “were already saved to defendant’s Snapchat account when her husband found them, long after any conversation took place between defendant and” another man (S) “upon which one could have ‘eavesdropped.’” In addition, “MCL 750.539e does not apply to [W’s] provision of” photos and messages to the police. And even if W “had violated Michigan’s eavesdropping statutes, the consequences for such a violation would be criminal or civil liability for [W] as outlined in the statutes rather than suppression of the evidence in a criminal case against defendant.” As to the federal wiretapping statutes, W “did not ‘intercept’” any communication. “The Snapchat messages, by the time [he] accessed them, were saved to defendant’s Snapchat account, and were no longer subject to interception because the communication had ended and had become a part of ‘electronic storage’ under” § 2510(17). The court also rejected her claim that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony that could have helped the jury determine her intent, which violated her right to present a defense. The “proffered evidence would likely cause the jury to confuse the issue of whether [she] was a pedophile or had the personality traits of a pedophile with the pertinent issue of whether she intentionally engaged in the conduct depicted in the explicit pictures and,” as to the CSC II “counts, did so for a ‘sexual purpose’ or ‘sexual arousal or gratification.’” Her right to present a defense was not compromised. Finally, “the 25-year sentence provided for in MCL 750.520b(2)(b) is a mandatory minimum sentence.” Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence for a carjacking conviction; MCL 750.529a; People v Smith; “Or”; “Force”; Venue; People v Malone; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile motion for a directed verdict of acquittal; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 1; MCL 777.31(1)(c); MCL 777.31(2)(e); Reasonableness & proportionality; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; People v Posey; Defendant’s age
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s carjacking conviction and to establish venue. It also found that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after the prosecution rested. Further, it upheld the scoring of 15 points for OV 1 and determined that his within-guidelines sentence was not disproportionate. Thus, it affirmed his conviction and his sentence of 85 months to 30 years. The prosecution presented testimony from victim-B “establishing that the Bentley belonged to him and that he was looking to sell it. [B] testified that defendant looked at the Bentley and stated: ‘Oh, yeah, this is nice, I’m going to take this.’ Defendant then pointed a gun at [B], got into the Bentley, and drove away. The title to the Bentley was later found at a home where defendant was staying. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that [he] committed larceny.” The court further concluded that while “the prosecution was only required to prove either that defendant used force, violence, or a threat of force or violence, or that” he put B in fear, the evidence presented was sufficient “to prove both of those alternative elements. The prosecution’s evidence established that defendant used the threat of force or violence by pointing a gun at” B. The Michigan “Supreme Court has held that a defendant in a carjacking case can threaten force or violence by displaying a gun or pointing it at the victim.” Further, the evidence was sufficient to establish that he “used force while fleeing the scene, by striking [B] with the Bentley” – he was not required to injure him “to satisfy this element.” In addition, regardless of whether B “feared for his life when the gun was pointed at him, when defendant began to drive away, or at both times, his testimony was sufficient to establish this alternate element of carjacking.” In rejecting defendant’s venue argument, the court noted that the “prosecution provided the address of the parking lot where the crime was committed, including its location in the city of Troy. A reasonable jury could infer that the crime was committed in Oakland County because Troy is located completely within Oakland County.”
Admission of evidence under MCL 768.27a; Unfair prejudice; People v Watkins; Admission of evidence under MRE 404(b); Notice requirements; Joinder of cases; MCR 6.120; People v Gaines; Sentencing; Mandatory 25-year minimum for a CSC I conviction pursuant to MCL 750.520b(2); People v Benton; Correction of errors in the presentence investigation report (PSIR); Scoring of OV 11; Whether resentencing was required
The court rejected defendant’s challenges to the admission of evidence under MCL 768.27a and MRE 404(b) in his trial on CSC charges and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining his cases for trial. As to his sentencing, (1) his constitutional challenges to the 25-year mandatory minimum failed in light of Benton and (2) while OV 11 was erroneously scored, resentencing was not required because correcting the score would not change his minimum guidelines ranges. Thus, the court affirmed his CSC I, II, and III convictions in these consolidated cases and his sentences of 300 to 450 months for each CSC I, 60 to 180 months for each CSC II, and 78 to 180 months for CSC III. But it remanded for the ministerial task of correcting his PSIR and OV 11 score. He challenged the admission of testimony from his niece, DV. Applying the Watkins factors, the court noted that DV and the victims in these cases (VCV and VR), who were all “related to defendant, asserted that [he] sexually assaulted them while they were minors and were living in the same residence as defendant. [He] took advantage of moments when the victims were isolated to commit the sexual assaults, despite other family members living in the residence. The assaults occurred approximately in 2011 for VR, between 2014 and 2015 for DV, and spanning between 2009 and 2014 for VCV. No record evidence was presented that undermines the credibility of DV’s assertions, and DV’s testimony served to bolster VCV’s and VR’s testimonies as this matter amounted to a credibility contest with no other persons who witnessed the sexual assaults.” Thus, most of the Watkins factors favored admitting DV’s testimony under MCL 768.27a. The court added that while the testimony would clearly have been prejudicial, the effect of this “prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of DV’s testimony in providing further corroboration to VCV’s and VR’s testimonies.” Defendant’s challenge to the admission of testimony about his “alleged prior acts of domestic violence” also failed. As to joinder, while the cases involved “separate incidents, they represent a ‘series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.’” Further, the facts “were not complex; presented little potential for confusion; and the testimonies of VCV, VR, and DV would have been admissible” under MCL 768.27a in separate trials.
Constitutional challenge to the statute prohibiting using a weapon during & in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking (18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen; District of Columbia v Heller; United States v Greeno; United States v Rahimi; Article III standing to appeal the dismissal of an FIP charge; Claim the statute is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment; United States v Williams
Noting that it had not yet addressed the “merits of a post-Bruen Second Amendment challenge to § 924(c)(1)(A)’s constitutionality in a published decision[,]” the court held that defendant-Risner could not show that the statute “is unconstitutional in every application—a requirement to mount a successful facial challenge to the statute.” It also held that he lacked Article III standing to challenge the FIP statute, § 922(g)(1), as facially unconstitutional where that charge against him had been dismissed. Risner, who was indicted on drug and firearm charges, moved to have the firearm charges dismissed arguing that under Bruen, both the possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking statute and the FIP statute were facially unconstitutional. The FIP charge was dismissed as part of a plea agreement. Risner pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute meth and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Though the FIP charge was dismissed, he still challenged the constitutionality of the statute on appeal. Thus, the court considered whether he had Article III standing to raise this challenge. It saw “no collateral consequences resulting from the government’s dismissal of Risner’s § 922(g)(1) charge that may afflict him should he be unable to advance his constitutional challenge to that statute.” It would not have any “bearing on his guilty plea” and it was not likely he would be recharged. Thus, because he had no “‘personal stake’ in § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality,” he lacked standing to challenge it. Further, the court had already held that the statute is constitutional on its face in Williams. As for the statute prohibiting using a weapon during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, the court considered whether § 924(c)(1)(A)’s restriction was “consistent with ‘the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’” Using the methodology the Supreme Court employed in both Bruen and Rahimi, it held that it had “no reason to depart from Greeno’s holding that the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to the use of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.” The court concluded that because “§ 924(c)(1)(A) expressly prohibits the use of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime—an objectively unlawful purpose—and Risner admits to possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, § 924(c)(1)(A) lawfully applies to” him. It further found that the statute’s “prohibition against possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime fits comfortably within the history and tradition of gun regulation in this country.” Affirmed.
Action seeking foreclosure & monetary damages; Enforcement of delinquent assessments under condo bylaws; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Hearsay; Business record exception; MRE 803(6); Trustworthiness; Solomon v Shuell; Relevance; MRE 401; Credibility; MRE 608; Unclean hands; New Prod Corp v Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC; Attorney fees; MCL 600.2591; Conversion; Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc; Treble damages; MCL 600.2919a(1)(a)
The court held that the trial court did not err (1) by entering a judgment of no cause of action in plaintiff-condo association’s lawsuit seeking foreclosure and monetary damages against defendants-condo owners, or (2) by finding plaintiff had unclean hands. It also held that the trial court did not err by finding neither party was entitled to attorney fees, but did err by ordering plaintiff’s counsel to refund payments to defendants. Plaintiff sued defendants seeking foreclosure and monetary damages on the basis of unpaid monthly assessments, unpaid additional assessments, legal fees and costs, and interest for their two condos. The trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action and ordered plaintiff’s counsel to refund payments to defendants. It denied defendants’ request for treble damages and sanctions. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court’s verdict was contrary to the evidence, including the unambiguous language of the condo bylaws. It found that the trial court did not misapply the testimony of one witness or erroneously rely on another witness or the spreadsheet she compiled comparing plaintiff’s ledgers with defendants’ bank records. In addition, “the trial court was not required to accept the veracity of [the] ledgers because they were admissible under MRE 803(6).” Further, evidence of defendants’ timely payment history with another condo association was not irrelevant, and the trial court “properly assessed the credibility of the witnesses before it in finding whether defendants made timely payments and whether” plaintiff’s subsidiary’s records were untrustworthy. “[T]he evidence relied on by the trial court supported [its] ultimate decision, and the record” did not establish that it made a mistake. The court also found “no error in the trial court’s implicit holding that plaintiff” had unclean hands. “Plaintiff allowed defendants’ late fees and delinquency to increase for nine years without acting or notifying” them. And when it “finally acted, by seeking the most drastic remedy of foreclosure, defendants were disadvantaged by the extent of their delinquency and the difficulty of producing evidence of their payment history.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by finding the bylaws did not allow it to recover attorney fees and costs. But it agreed with its argument that the trial court erred by ordering its counsel to refund payments to defendants. It noted plaintiff’s “contractual right to collect attorney fees for pretrial proceedings was not triggered.” However, plaintiff’s counsel was not a party to this action and defendants failed to prove she received the funds. Finally, the trial court “did not err in denying defendants’ request for sanctions.” Reversed and remanded as to the payment refund order but affirmed in all other respects.
Reasonable reunification efforts; Child’s best interests
Concluding that (1) “the trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by finding that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify” respondent-mother and her child, KDG, and that (2) it did not err by finding that termination was in KDG’s best interests, the court affirmed. Specifically, she alleged “that the DHHS did not make such efforts after the [2/24] emergency removal until the termination hearing in” 5/24. The record did not support her claim. She “continued to receive services after KDG’s emergency removal. The DHHS created and updated a service plan for” her. She “was given referrals and scheduled appointments for outpatient therapy for her substance abuse and mental health issues. She received a referral for drug screening. She participated in parenting classes, and the DHHS provided her with biweekly parenting time.” The record showed that she “stopped participating in these services. Respondent missed 16 drug screens . . . and did not attend any therapy sessions after KDG’s emergency removal.” Also, her “caseworker was unable to verify respondent’s attendance at parenting classes. [She] was employed and possessed a vehicle and valid driver’s license. [She] does not explain what additional services the DHHS could have offered that would have altered the results of the termination hearing.” The record showed that she “was continuously provided with services, even after the goal was changed to adoption, yet she failed to avail herself of them. Therefore, the DHHS made reasonable efforts to provide services aimed at reunification, and respondent failed in her responsibility to participate in and benefit from them.”