Admission of Snapchat photos; Eavesdropping; MCL 750.539a(2); “Private conversation”; MCL 750.539c; Consent; Provision of photos to police; MCL 750.539e; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Motion for a new trial; Interception of communications under the federal wiretapping statute; 18 USC § 2511(1)(a); “Intercept”; § 2510(4); Luis v Zang (6th Cir); “Wire communication”; § 2510(1); “Transfer”; § 2510(18); “Electronic communication”; § 2510(12); “Electronic storage”; § 2510(17)(A); Expert testimony; MRE 702; Right to present a defense; People v Carpenter; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Mandatory minimum sentence for CSC I; MCL 750.520b(2)(b)

The court held that the trial court did not err by admitting evidence obtained by defendant’s husband (W) from her Snapchat account, and thus, did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial on that basis. In addition, “defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection or file a meritless motion to suppress.” She was convicted on several charges related to explicit photos found on her Snapchat account. As relevant to this appeal, she received a 25-year minimum sentence for her CSC I convictions. On appeal, the court rejected her arguments that (1) the trial court erred by admitting the Snapchat photos because they were obtained as a result of W’s violation of Michigan and federal eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes, (2) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress them, and (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial. The photos “were already saved to defendant’s Snapchat account when her husband found them, long after any conversation took place between defendant and” another man (S) “upon which one could have ‘eavesdropped.’” In addition, “MCL 750.539e does not apply to [W’s] provision of” photos and messages to the police. And even if W “had violated Michigan’s eavesdropping statutes, the consequences for such a violation would be criminal or civil liability for [W] as outlined in the statutes rather than suppression of the evidence in a criminal case against defendant.” As to the federal wiretapping statutes, W “did not ‘intercept’” any communication. “The Snapchat messages, by the time [he] accessed them, were saved to defendant’s Snapchat account, and were no longer subject to interception because the communication had ended and had become a part of ‘electronic storage’ under” § 2510(17). The court also rejected her claim that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony that could have helped the jury determine her intent, which violated her right to present a defense. The “proffered evidence would likely cause the jury to confuse the issue of whether [she] was a pedophile or had the personality traits of a pedophile with the pertinent issue of whether she intentionally engaged in the conduct depicted in the explicit pictures and,” as to the CSC II “counts, did so for a ‘sexual purpose’ or ‘sexual arousal or gratification.’” Her right to present a defense was not compromised. Finally, “the 25-year sentence provided for in MCL 750.520b(2)(b) is a mandatory minimum sentence.” Affirmed.