Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Juvenile sentencing; The trial court’s option to impose either a juvenile disposition, an adult sentence, or a blended sentence; People v Petty; Delayed sentence; MCL 712A.18(1)(o); Consideration of the rehabilitation-&-risk factors in MCL 712A.18i(3); MCL 712A.18i(7), (9), & (10); Assault with intent to rob while armed (AWIR)
The court held that the trial court did not err by sentencing respondent-juvenile to prison without first considering the rehabilitation-and-risk factors set forth in MCL 712A.18i(3) when he had violated probation. He pled no contest to AWIM and AWIR for shooting the victim (who became paralyzed) during an attempted sale of a Play Station. After he later admitted to two probation violations, the trial court sentenced him to prison. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by doing so without first considering the rehabilitation-and-risk factors set forth in MCL 712A.18i(3). First, “neither subsection (9) nor (10) references the rehabilitation-and-risk factors of subsection (3). This is in contradistinction to subsection (7), which does direct a trial court to consider the rehabilitation-and-risk factors of subsection (3) when performing a final review. Thus, when our Legislature intended for a trial court to consider those rehabilitation-and-risk factors at a particular stage of the proceeding, it explicitly said so.” Second, it is clear that the “Legislature considered it superfluous to direct a trial court to consider a juvenile’s progress toward rehabilitation and risk to society when that juvenile has, in fact, actually violated probation.” Although nothing precludes “a trial court from considering those factors when deciding whether to revoke probation and impose a sentence of imprisonment under subsection (10), there is likewise nothing requiring that” it do so. As such, the “plain language of MCL 712A.18i(10) permitted the trial court to revoke probation and impose sentence once it found that respondent committed a probation violation. Once a probation violation is established under subsection (9) or (10), the trial court need not consider the rehabilitation factors outlined in subsection (3) (or the additional factors under” subsection (7). And there was “no claim that the trial court failed to engage in review hearings prior to the combined probation-violation and review hearing, and it is clear from the record that the trial court was aware of the full context of respondent’s offenses and history. [He] acknowledges on appeal that [it] articulated the reasons for its sentence.” Affirmed.
Admission of a party-opponent; MRE 801(d)(2); Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC I; MCL 750.520b(1)(a) & (2)(b); “Sexual penetration” (MCL 750.520a(r)); CSC II; MCL 750.520c(1)(a) & (2)(b); “Sexual contact” (MCL 750.520a(q))
The court concluded that defendant did not establish outcome-determinative prejudice as to the admission of a detective’s opinion and that there was sufficient evidence to support his CSC I and II convictions. He argued “that he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial when the prosecution elicited testimony about his credibility, and the trial court allowed the admission of a piece of paper on which he drew a line on an honesty scale during his interrogation.” The court found that his “drawing on the honesty scale was admissible as an admission of a party-opponent.” And while it agreed “that the detective’s testimony following the honesty-scale evidence was erroneous,” it concluded the error was not outcome-determinative. The court concluded his “placement of the line on the piece of paper was an indication of how honest [he] himself felt that he was being in his discussion with the detective. This was an admission of a party-opponent and thus the piece of paper was admissible under MRE 801(d)(2).” The court noted that the “prosecution also elicited the detective’s opinion regarding the unusualness of where the defendant placed the line on the honesty scale.” By comparing his “actions to those of ‘someone who is being honest,’ the detective implied that defendant was not an honest person. This testimony invaded the province of the jury.” The court held that the “prosecution erred by asking the detective to comment on the unusualness of defendant’s conduct, and the trial court erred by admitting the detective’s opinion that [his] conduct indicated deception.” But he failed to establish outcome-determinative prejudice. Considering all “the evidence and testimony admitted at trial without the detective’s comment on the ‘unusualness’ of defendant’s self-assessment of honesty, we are not convinced that the result would have been different.” The court concluded that “there was substantial evidence of [his] guilt. Although plain error occurred, it did not affect the outcome of the proceedings and reversal is not warranted.” As to CSC I, it was undisputed that victim-AY “was under the age of 13 at the time of the offenses and defendant was older than 17. The evidence offered at trial was sufficient to prove that [he] sexually penetrated AY. AY testified that [he] placed his penis inside her vagina ‘[m]ore than once.’ AY further testified that [he] touched her buttocks with his penis ‘[m]ore than once’ and ‘sometimes it would go in; sometimes it would not.’ AY also testified that defendant put his mouth on her vagina. AY testified that the sexual abuse occurred during the time period that she lived with [him]. ‘The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.’” As to CSC II, “AY testified that sometimes defendant rubbed his penis near her vagina and buttocks. AY also testified that [he] used his hands to touch her buttocks and vagina. There was sufficient evidence produced at trial for the jury to find” him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of CSC II. Affirmed.
Prosecutor’s references to the “victim” during voir dire; MCL 750.520a(s); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile objection; Sufficiency of the evidence for CSC III under MCL 750.520d(1)(b) & CSC IV under MCL 750.520e(1)(b); Force or coercion; People v Green; Witness credibility; Mandatory minimum sentence for a CSC I conviction; Presumptive proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence; People v Posey
The court found that defendant failed to show any error as to the prosecutor’s references to the “victim” during voir dire and thus, his claim defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object also failed. It further held that there was sufficient evidence to support his CSC III and IV convictions. Finally, it rejected his claim that his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for CSC I was an abuse of discretion because it was disproportionate. Thus, it affirmed his convictions and sentences. As to the prosecution’s use of the word “victim,” the court noted that defense counsel also used this word “during voir dire to ask a similar question.” And it concluded the “prosecution’s single reference to one of the complainants as a ‘victim’ was appropriate because MCL 750.520a(s) provides that ‘“[v]ictim” means the person alleging to have been subjected to’” CSC. Defendant next argued there was insufficient evidence for his CSC III conviction because victim-TG “consented to the activity, there was no evidence of force or coercion, and TG was not a credible witness.” The court disagreed. While “there were some discrepancies in TG’s testimony, a reasonable juror could determine that force or coercion was used. . . . TG testified that he did not want [to] cuddle defendant and had made it clear to [him] numerous times that he did not like to do so. TG testified that he told defendant to stop while he was massaging him, that the oral sex was nonconsensual, and that he felt ‘cornered.’ TG’s credibility was a question for the jury.” Defendant made similar assertion as to his CSC IV conviction, which involved victim-CN. The court again disagreed. It first rejected his claim there was no evidence of a “sexual touching.” It noted that he “had been sharing sexually suggestive texts with CN, and defendant does not suggest that the touching was unintentional. [He] also groped CN’s buttocks after CN had told him that touching his penis made him uncomfortable, and after leaving, defendant texted CN, ‘Guess I got mixed signals.’ A jury may rely on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences as proof of the elements of a crime.” The court found the “jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s groping of CN’s penis and buttocks was done for a sexual purpose” and could also “determine that [he] used surprise to overcome CN to engage in sexual contact, which is sufficient to establish force or coercion.”
Lesser included offense jury instruction; MCL 768.32(1); People v Heft; Meth use as a lesser included offense; MCL 333.7404(2)(b); Sufficiency of the evidence; Possession of meth; Great weight of the evidence; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Brown
Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant's possession of meth conviction. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to reversal of his conviction because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the offense of meth use as a lesser included offense. Meth use includes an element that is not an element of meth "possession: that the defendant used" meth. This makes meth "use a cognate offense, and not a lesser included offense." The court also rejected his claim that the evidence was not sufficient to prove he possessed meth, noting the police found him with the meth, he admitted to them that it was his, and the woman (J) with whom he provided meth told police and testified she got it from him. "Despite contradictory testimony, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was enough evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that defendant possessed the" meth. The court next rejected his contention that his conviction was against the great weight of the evidence, noting that while "there was conflicting testimony, it was not so contradictory as to lose its probative value altogether." It further rejected his argument that the prosecution committed misconduct, noting the "prosecution used evidence in the record to highlight inconsistencies between defendant’s and [J's] testimony and the statements they made to police the day of their arrest. This did not suggest that the prosecution had personal knowledge that a witness was not credible. The prosecution was permitted to argue from the facts that defendant’s and" J's testimony was unworthy of belief. Finally, the court held that defense counsel was not "ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s evidence, for failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecution’s closing arguments, [or] for failing to poll the jury following the verdict."
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant for defendant’s residence; Probable cause; Whether a nexus between the home & any alleged drug activity was established; Probable cause when considering a “profit-type” drug trafficker; The “continual-and-ongoing-operations theory”; United States v McCoy; United States v Sumlin; United States v Sanders; Confidential informant’s (CI) credibility
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the denial of defendant-Simmons’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of his home, holding that the search warrant affidavit sufficiently detailed his ongoing drug trafficking and the likelihood that trafficking records would be found in the home. The officer who submitted the affidavit for the search warrant (S) and the police department vice unit conducted a months-long investigation of Simmons’s activities. After selling drugs to a CI, Simmons “would typically go from the buy to a house on Holly Street, enter briefly, and then continue to a home on Weatherwood Drive.” S concluded the Weatherwood house was Simmons’s primary residence and that he “was a profit-type trafficker[,]” rather than a “user-type.” S obtained search warrants for both houses. At the Weatherwood house, police discovered drugs, cash, handguns, ammunition, and cellphones. At the Holly Street house, they discovered drugs, a fake ID, and more guns and ammunition. Simmons was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances and other offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence from his Weatherwood home, arguing that the affidavit was not supported by probable cause where the government failed to establish a nexus between the house and any alleged drug activity. The district court denied the motion, and Simmons pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The court explained that when determining whether probable cause exists in a case involving a drug dealer, common sense would suggest that “when an individual is a suspect of a crime, his home will ‘often’ be a ‘likely place’ for him to keep the means, fruits, and evidence of his crime.” The court noted that it has found probable cause under the “continual-and-ongoing-operations theory” in drug cases involving profit-type traffickers “‘even when there is absolutely no indication of any wrongdoing occurring at that residence.’” It made clear that “a dealer’s status alone is not enough to” support a probable cause finding. “To support an allegation of ongoing drug dealing, the warrant affidavit must detail ‘recent, reliable evidence of drug activity’ and the place to be searched should be the dealer’s current residence.” The court found that the CI “was highly credible.” Additionally, S had surveilled the Weatherwood home and confirmed that it was Simmons’s residence. The court held that based on the CI’s controlled buys and S’s “assessment of Simmons based on those buys, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that a search of the Weatherwood home would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.”
Attempted Hobbs Act extortion & federal-program bribery; Sufficiency of the evidence of an explicit quid pro quo; McCormick v United States; Evans v United States; Whether the government constructively amended the indictment
The court held that the evidence construed in the government’s favor, even though it was mostly given by government employees, was enough to convict defendant-Sittenfeld of federal-program bribery and attempted Hobbs Act extortion. It also rejected his claim that his indictment was constructively amended. A jury found that Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati, Ohio council member, had solicited or accepted campaign donations in return for his support for a property development project. It convicted him of attempted Hobbs Act extortion and federal-program bribery, while acquitting him of other charges. On appeal, the court explained that under McCormick, “proof of a quid pro quo was a prerequisite to a conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act.” In Evans, the Supreme Court “directly answered whether ‘passive acceptance’ of a benefit—rather than an affirmative step toward fulfillment of the quid pro quo—sufficed . . . and answered yes for someone acting ‘under color of official right,’ at least where there was evidence that the official knew that the payment was in exchange for some official action.” Under Evans and McCormick, “the ‘inducement from the official is criminal if it is express or it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so interprets it.’” The court noted that it “rel[ies] on objective manifestations of intent to show a defendant’s subjective mindset.” It described the situation as Sittenfeld “accepting bogus bribes from pretend investors to aid a speculative development. But a jury could still convict him if he played along.” Contrary to his arguments, “after McCormick, the general rule remains unchanged: the government’s evidence need not rule out all reasonable, alternative hypotheses to guilt.” The court held that “explicit evidence” is not required. The government has to “prove a meeting of the minds between the parties and that the agreement must be unambiguous from their perspective. But the existence of that agreement is governed by the reasonable doubt standard and can be proved with circumstantial evidence.” The court determined that based “on all the evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Sittenfeld understood exactly what Rob was offering and agreed to accept a bribe . . . .” As to his claim that his indictment was constructively amended, while the court agreed there was some problems with the jury instructions, Sittenfeld had to “show more to establish a constructive amendment,” and he failed to do so. Affirmed.
Request for full driver’s license restoration; Grant of a restricted driver’s license with a breath alcohol ignition interlock device (BAIID) requirement; A Secretary of State (SOS) hearing officer’s authority; MI Admin Code, R 257.313(1)(a); Findings of fact & conclusions of law requirement; MCL 257.322(5); Circuit court review of a hearing officer’s decision; MCL 257.323(4)(a); Heimler v Secretary of State (Unpub); Operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI); Driver’s License Appeal Division (DLAD)
The court concluded that while “the scope of a circuit court’s review of DLAD decisions is limited, the circuit court” here did not apply the proper standards of review under MCL 257.323(4)(a)(iv) and (v). Thus, it vacated the order dismissing the case and remanded it to the circuit court for proper review of the SOS hearing officer’s decision. Plaintiff’s driver’s license was revoked in 2016 after two OWI convictions. In 2023, he requested full driver’s license restoration and had a hearing before an SOS officer in the DLAD. The hearing officer instead granted him a restricted license requiring him to operate a vehicle equipped with a BAIID. The court noted that “the administrative order specifically stated that ‘based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the record,’ the original license revocation had been modified and a restricted license was approved.” But the hearing transcript lacked “any statements of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Moreover, the record made by the hearing officer offered strong support for a finding that plaintiff’s alcohol abuse disorder remained under control and that the risk of him repeating alcoholic abusive behavior was low. Yet, the hearing officer generically ordered installation of” a BAIID. The court found that “plaintiff had a strong argument to present to the circuit court on appeal.” The circuit court stated that he “is ‘a good candidate’ to have his license fully restored” but found that it was “bound by published case law and it has ‘concern’ regarding its ‘appeal hearing powers’ pursuant to MCL 257.322.” The court held that MCL 257.323(4)(a)(iv) and (v) “clearly give a circuit court the power to set aside an administrative agency’s decision if it concludes that the hearing officer’s decision was ‘[n]ot supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record,’ or whether it was ‘arbitrary, capricious, or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion.’” Further, the circuit court erroneously stated “it was bound by the ‘published’ decision in Heimler” – that is in fact an unpublished opinion and not binding. The court noted that “courts may consider unpublished opinions for their instructive or persuasive value. . . . However, the circuit court did not use Heimler in a persuasive manner, but instead adamantly insisted that it is bound by it. Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, it did have the authority to review the hearing officer’s decision.”
Divorce; Classification of property as a separate asset; Distribution of separate property; MCL 552.401; Marital property distribution; Berger v Berger
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in classifying a parcel of real property (the northern farm parcel) as a separate asset and awarding it to defendant-ex-husband (Charlie). It also found no clear error in the distribution of the marital property except as to the parties’ household items and furnishings. The “trial court failed to clearly explain its decision to award Charlie the personal property that remained in the marital home[.]” Thus, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on that issue but otherwise affirmed the divorce judgment. As to the classification of the northern farm parcel, the court noted that while the parties had a joint interest in it, “Charlie acquired his interest in the Switzer farm before the parties married, members of the Switzer family encumbered the northern farm parcel in an attempt to discourage future conveyances, the parties never resided on the northern farm parcel, and Charlie performed the majority of the farm labor on the” parcel during the marriage. The issue thus became “whether the trial court clearly erred by declining to distribute the northern farm parcel as a separate asset.” Plaintiff-ex-wife (Christine) “testified that she contributed to the improvement of the” parcel in various ways. Charlie testified that she overstated her contributions. The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court inequitably awarded the northern farm parcel to Charlie. The record reflects that Charlie’s contributions to the northern farm parcel significantly outweighed Christine’s. And to the extent that the trial court based its determination on the credibility of the witnesses, it is entitled to special deference.” The court noted that “the parties agreed that they maintained separate bank accounts throughout all but the beginning of their marriage. And Charlie testified that he improved the northern farm parcel using funds from his personal bank account. He also stated that he made recent improvements to the northern farm parcel using funds he withdrew from his 401(k) retirement account.” The court further noted that they were each awarded their bank accounts and 401(k) retirement accounts. As to the marital property distribution, the court found that the “decision to award Charlie the property that remained in the marital home was a significant departure from a congruent distribution” that required explanation.
The No-Fault Act (NFA); Directed verdict; One-year-back rule; MCL 500.3145; A healthcare provider’s standing to pursue PIP benefits for attendant care services; Great weight of the evidence; Attorney fees & costs under MCR 2.405 & MCL 500.3148; Declining to award attorney fees under MCR 2.405 in the interest of justice
In these consolidated appeals arising from a third-party action under the NFA, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict on the issue of plaintiff-AdvisaCare’s standing to pursue PIP benefits for attendant care services provided to an individual (Carol) injured in a motor vehicle accident, vacated the award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148, and remanded but affirmed in all other respects. AdvisaCare also sought PIP benefits for attendant care services provided to a second person, Sandra. As to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict, defendant-Home-Owners first argued “the relation-back doctrine did not apply to” its 5/3/19 substitution for defendant-Auto-Owners and thus, “AdvisaCare could not recover PIP benefits for attendant care services rendered before” 5/3/18, with the result that its “entire recovery was barred by the one-year-back rule.” The court found that Home-Owners was “correct that its substitution for Auto-Owners did not relate back to [5/11/18], the date that AdvisaCare filed its complaint against Auto-Owners.” The court held that “the substitution of Home-Owners added a ‘wholly new and different party’ to the case, and the relation-back doctrine did not apply.” But it concluded “the fact that the relation-back doctrine did not apply was not dispositive.” The court determined that “the pertinent point of reference for application of the one-year-back rule was not Home-Owners’ substitution for Auto-Owners, but was instead the date of the assignment to Home-Owners.” Thus, it held that “the trial court did not err by rejecting Home-Owners’ argument that the one-year-back rule completely barred AdvisaCare’s recovery and denying Home-Owners’ motion for a directed verdict on this ground.” Home-Owners next argued that its motion for a directed verdict should have been granted “on the basis of AdvisaCare’s lack of standing.” Given that the record showed that it “acknowledged Sandra’s assignment and abandoned its challenge to the assignment’s validity, the trial court did not err by not directing a verdict in favor of Home-Owners on AdvisaCare’s claim for PIP benefits due for services rendered to Sandra.” As to Carol, Home-Owners claimed “there was no record evidence of an assignment executed by Carol at the time of trial and that it had raised the absence of an assignment for Carol in its affirmative defenses.” Home-Owners was correct. “AdvisaCare did not attach Carol’s assignment to its complaint, did not elicit testimony establishing that Carol had executed an assignment, and did not offer the assignment into evidence before or during trial. When the trial court ruled on Home-Owners’ motion for a directed verdict, there was no record evidence of the assignment that would have provided AdvisaCare with standing to maintain a direct cause of action for PIP benefits for services rendered to Carol.”
Condominium bylaw violations; Laches; Anti-waiver provision; Alterations to the exterior; Grass restoration; Nominal damages; Hideaway Valley Condominium Association (HVCA)
In this dispute over alleged condo bylaw violations, the court concluded that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ summary disposition motion “based on a finding that plaintiff’s failure to attend” an annual meeting of the condo association board “constituted unreasonable delay.” Also, the trial court erred in dismissing his claim based on the board’s failure “to enforce the deck-size restriction.” The court noted that in support of their laches argument, “defendants asserted that plaintiff should have been aware of other nonconforming decks but failed to take action against their owners. However, plaintiff testified that he was unaware of any other nonconforming decks within the development prior to initiating his lawsuit.” He further “indicated that defendants did not inform him of their intentions to expand the deck before the commencement of construction. Although the trial court appropriately accepted plaintiff’s testimony as credible when ruling on the” summary disposition motion, it “nonetheless concluded that [he] was not reasonably diligent in exercising his rights due to his absence from the annual meeting held on” 9/25/21. But the record did not show “that plaintiff would have been aware that the defendants’ deck extension would be addressed as an agenda item at the annual meeting. The topic was discussed during a board meeting on [9/10], and this discussion was documented in the meeting minutes, albeit without extensive detail. The emails sent” before the 9/25 “annual meeting did not address the deck or various deck sizes whatsoever.” This record established, “at a minimum, a genuine issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff would have realized the necessity of attending the annual meeting to object to defendants’ proposed deck extension.” The court also found the trial court’s reasoning in dismissing his claim based on lack of board enforcement of deck-size restrictions “was incorrect because the HVCA bylaws contain an anti-waiver provision, which means that the board’s inaction should not invalidate plaintiff’s claim.” While the trial court did not use the term “waiver” in its decision, it “ruled that enforcing the restriction against defendants would be unjust, especially since the HVCA board had allowed four other decks that did not conform to this restriction. This situation directly contradicts the anti-waiver clause included in the bylaws.” Thus, the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion “based on this reasoning.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Quiet title; Adverse possession; The 15-year limitations period; MCL 600.5829(1); Disseisin; Houston v Mint Group, LLC; Open, visible, & notorious possession; Notice; MCR 3.411(B)(2)(c); Leave to amend; MCR 2.116(I)(5); Futility; Bad faith; Acquiescence; Trespass
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to include factual allegations to support his adverse possession and trespass claims, but did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend his acquiescence claim. Plaintiff sought to quiet title to a disputed strip of land. His amended complaint asserted claims of adverse possession, acquiescence, and trespass. The trial court dismissed his claims, then denied his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by dismissing his claims without giving him the opportunity to amend to include additional facts to support his claims. The court agreed in part, finding that amendment would have been in the interest of justice. “The trial court did not err by concluding [plaintiff] failed to plead his adverse possession claim with sufficient specificity to establish the superiority of his claim to parcel B." However, all “the additional allegations sought to be added to the complaint reflect that [his] use and possession of parcel B was 'actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 years, hostile and under cover of claim of right.’” The proposed “amended complaint sets forth a viable claim for adverse possession and amendment would not be futile. Further, there has been no argument of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive by [plaintiff], failure to cure deficiencies by prior amendments, or undue prejudice” to defendant. His trespass claim was also viable as his proposed second amended complaint alleged that defendant “and his agents installed cameras and mowed the lawn on parcel B, which constituted an unauthorized direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object onto land that” plaintiff claimed an ownership right to. However, his acquiescence claim was meritless as he did not plead any facts as to a boundary line, allege “that the adjoining property owners treated a particular boundary line as the true property line,” or allege “that the adjoining property owners were mistaken about where the line between their property” was. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.