Admission of a party-opponent; MRE 801(d)(2); Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC I; MCL 750.520b(1)(a) & (2)(b); “Sexual penetration” (MCL 750.520a(r)); CSC II; MCL 750.520c(1)(a) & (2)(b); “Sexual contact” (MCL 750.520a(q))

The court concluded that defendant did not establish outcome-determinative prejudice as to the admission of a detective’s opinion and that there was sufficient evidence to support his CSC I and II convictions. He argued “that he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial when the prosecution elicited testimony about his credibility, and the trial court allowed the admission of a piece of paper on which he drew a line on an honesty scale during his interrogation.” The court found that his “drawing on the honesty scale was admissible as an admission of a party-opponent.” And while it agreed “that the detective’s testimony following the honesty-scale evidence was erroneous,” it concluded the error was not outcome-determinative. The court concluded his “placement of the line on the piece of paper was an indication of how honest [he] himself felt that he was being in his discussion with the detective. This was an admission of a party-opponent and thus the piece of paper was admissible under MRE 801(d)(2).” The court noted that the “prosecution also elicited the detective’s opinion regarding the unusualness of where the defendant placed the line on the honesty scale.” By comparing his “actions to those of ‘someone who is being honest,’ the detective implied that defendant was not an honest person. This testimony invaded the province of the jury.” The court held that the “prosecution erred by asking the detective to comment on the unusualness of defendant’s conduct, and the trial court erred by admitting the detective’s opinion that [his] conduct indicated deception.” But he failed to establish outcome-determinative prejudice. Considering all “the evidence and testimony admitted at trial without the detective’s comment on the ‘unusualness’ of defendant’s self-assessment of honesty, we are not convinced that the result would have been different.” The court concluded that “there was substantial evidence of [his] guilt. Although plain error occurred, it did not affect the outcome of the proceedings and reversal is not warranted.” As to CSC I, it was undisputed that victim-AY “was under the age of 13 at the time of the offenses and defendant was older than 17. The evidence offered at trial was sufficient to prove that [he] sexually penetrated AY. AY testified that [he] placed his penis inside her vagina ‘[m]ore than once.’ AY further testified that [he] touched her buttocks with his penis ‘[m]ore than once’ and ‘sometimes it would go in; sometimes it would not.’ AY also testified that defendant put his mouth on her vagina. AY testified that the sexual abuse occurred during the time period that she lived with [him]. ‘The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.’” As to CSC II, “AY testified that sometimes defendant rubbed his penis near her vagina and buttocks. AY also testified that [he] used his hands to touch her buttocks and vagina. There was sufficient evidence produced at trial for the jury to find” him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of CSC II. Affirmed.