Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Unemployment insurance benefits; Whether claimant was monetarily eligible; MCL 421.46; “Benefit year”; Wages paid; Whether the Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) has authority to seek judicial review of Unemployment Insurance Appeals Commission (UIAC) decisions; MCL 421.34; MCL 421.38; Waiver; Effect of the UIA’s failure to attend the hearing held before the administrative law judge (ALJ); MCL 421.33
The court held that (1) the UIA has the right to seek judicial review of UIAC decisions, (2) it did not waive its right to do so by failing to attend the hearing held before the ALJ, and (3) MCL 421.46 “specifies that the formula for establishing a benefit year requires a determination of the wages paid to the individual.” Thus, it concluded claimant-Schulmeyer’s wage history could not establish a benefit year and he was not monetarily eligible for unemployment benefits. The trial court affirmed the UIAC’s determination that Schulmeyer was monetarily eligible. The UIA appealed. Schulmeyer first argued that the UIA lacked the authority to seek judicial review of UIAC final determinations. “Based upon the plain language of MCL 421.34,” the court disagreed. It noted that “the UIA is statutorily defined as an interested party in matters before ‘a court’” and that the only limit on an interested party’s ability “to seek judicial review is that it must be conducted as provided in MCL 421.38.” In turn, there is no language in that statute “expressly prohibiting the UIA from appealing a UIAC decision.” As to Schulmeyer’s waiver argument, the “UIA is not statutorily required to attend hearings before an ALJ.” While MCL 421.33 “provides that if the appellant fails to appear or prosecute the appeal, then the proceedings may be dismissed[,]” no language in the statute indicates “that if the appellee fails to appear or defend its position that a default will be entered against the appellee that will preclude the appellee from challenging the factual findings or legal conclusions of the ALJ.” Thus, the court would “not read such a requirement into the statute.” As to the issue of Schulmeyer’s eligibility for benefits, to be monetarily eligible “a claimant must establish a ‘benefit year’ under MCL 421.46.” The method for establishing a benefit year stated in MCL 421.46(b)(1) was relevant here. The court found that “an interpretation of MCL 421.46(b) that considers the total wages earned” as opposed to wages paid “is contrary to the plain language of the statute.” Regardless of the UIA website’s apparent use of the terms interchangeably, the statutory formula “looks to when wages were paid, not when they were earned.” Considering Schulmeyer’s wages “in the quarters in which they were paid rather than” those in which they were earned, he could not establish a benefit year. Reversed and remanded.
Attorney fees; Indigency hearing; Michigan Indigent Defense Commission (MIDC) Act (MIDCA); MCL 780.991(3); “Local funding unit”; Equal protection; Abandoned issue
The court concluded that “it was not error for the trial court to assess [defendant-]Blank $850 in court-appointed attorney fees or to deny his request for an indigency hearing at the time.” Although it affirmed, it acknowledged “that this case exposes a potential conflict between the traditional statutory framework for assessing attorney fees, MCL 769.1k, and the MIDCA.” He pled guilty to CSC II, unlawful imprisonment, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He was ordered “to pay fees and costs, including $850 in attorney fees for his appointed counsel. The trial court denied [his] postconviction request for an evidentiary hearing regarding whether he was indigent[.]” Blank first argued “that the trial court’s assessment of $850 in court-appointed attorney fees was a reversible error because it failed to provide a factual basis to support that amount.” The court held that although “the trial court failed to provide a basis for that amount at Blank’s sentencing hearing, it made sufficient factual findings supporting the $850 assessment at the hearing on” his postconviction motion. Blank also argued “that the trial court’s denial of his request for an indigency hearing violated his due-process rights, equal-protection rights, MCL 780.991(3), and MIDC standards.” The court disagreed “for three reasons: (1) the trial court correctly concluded that [he] was not presently entitled to an evidentiary hearing on indigency; (2) the MIDC standards [he] cites do not apply to impose a different requirement on the circuit court; and (3) [he] has abandoned his equal protection argument.” Second, Blank argued “that the trial court did not comply with MCL 780.991(3) and the MIDC’s standards.” The court held that because he “has not established that the circuit court was the ‘appointing authority’ or the ‘local funding unit,’ [he] has not established that the MIDC standards he cites apply to the circuit court.”
Motion to dismiss a charge of making a threat of terrorism (MCL 750.543m); Constitutionality of the statute; Counterman v Colorado; People v Osantowski; People v Byczek; “Threat”; M Crim JI 38.4(3)
In an interlocutory appeal, the court held that MCL 750.543m is facially unconstitutional. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the charges of making a threat of terrorism and using a computer to commit a crime. The U.S. Supreme Court in Counterman “held that, in a true-threats case, ‘[t]he State must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.’” Defendant asserted that “MCL 750.543m is facially unconstitutional because it does not require the prosecution to prove that he acted recklessly—i.e. that he disregarded a substantial risk that his communication would be viewed as threatening violence—when he sent a social media message suggesting that he would ‘shoot up’ a school.” The court agreed. It noted that in Osantowski and Byczek it “interpreted MCL 750.543m as constitutional because it only applies to true threats.” But those cases were “silent as to whether the defendant’s general intent to communicate a true threat must be judged by an objective standard or by a subjective standard.” Thus, they did not resolve the issue here. While the prosecution directed it to M Crim JI 38.4(3), the court found that the language of the jury instruction “is not aligned with the Counterman standard, which requires the prosecution to show a defendant’s subjective intent, by at least a standard of recklessness.” It also noted that in “considering whether a statute is or is not constitutional, it is the words of the statute that must be examined, not the model jury instructions.” Reviewing the statute, the court held that it is facially unconstitutional because it contains no “language suggesting that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence[.]”
Sentencing; “Career-offender” enhancement (USSG § 4B1.1); Whether a prior drug conviction involving hemp could trigger the enhancement; “Time-of-conviction” rule; § 4B1.2; United States v Clark; Brown v United States; Substantive reasonableness challenge; Deference to a district court’s conclusions about the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors that matter most in a case; Appellate presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence
The court affirmed defendant-Drake’s 200-month drug-crime sentence, holding that the district court properly applied the “career offender” enhancement pursuant to the time-of-conviction rule. Drake was convicted of several drug offenses. His 200-month sentence was in the bottom half of his Guidelines range. It included a career-offender enhancement based on his prior marijuana conviction. Drake argued that this prior conviction was not the type of offense that could trigger the enhancement. The court noted that in determining “whether a state drug crime qualifies as a ‘controlled substance offense’ under § 4B1.2(b)’s definition, we apply the ‘categorical approach.’” In this case, a hypothetical defendant could have committed the state crime in question “by distributing hemp because Ohio’s definition of ‘marijuana’ included that substance back in 2016.” Thus, the court had to determine “whether this hemp crime falls within § 4B1.2’s definition of ‘controlled substance offense.’” This in turn depended “on the time that matters for § 4B1.2’s definition.” Drake asserted a time-of-sentencing approach applied, which “asks whether all the substances that could have supported his 2016 marijuana offense would fall within the federal and state drug schedules as they existed in 2023 when the district court sentenced him.” But the court previously held in Clark “that § 4B1.2 adopted a time-of-conviction rule[,]” which takes an “approach that asks whether all the substances that could have supported Drake’s state-law offense would have fallen within the federal and state drug schedules as they existed in 2016 at the time of his prior crime.” The court disagreed that the intervening Supreme Court decision in Brown required a different result, finding that “Brown’s footnote does not permit us to depart from Clark.” It also rejected Drake’s substantive reasonableness challenge to his sentence. The court deferred to the district court’s determinations as to which § 3553(a) factors mattered most here. And he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness given to his within-Guidelines sentence.
Sentencing; Motion for termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e)(1); District court discretion; United States v Atkin (Unpub 6th Cir); Whether “exceptionally good behavior” is necessary for early termination of supervised release; United States v Lussier (2d Cir)
The court held “that § 3583(e)(1) does not require a finding of exceptionally good behavior before a district court may grant a motion for early termination of supervised release, though such behavior” is relevant. Thus, it vacated the district court’s denial of defendant-Hale’s motion for an early termination of his supervised release and remanded for reconsideration. Hale pled guilty in state court to aggravated sexual battery. He later pled guilty in federal court to traveling out of state and “failing to update his sex-offender registration in Tennessee as required under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act[.]” He was sentenced to 15 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release. He violated his release conditions by consuming alcohol. Almost three years later, he unsuccessfully moved for early termination of supervised release, arguing that despite the alcohol misstep, he had complied with all his requirements. On appeal, the court explained that a district court has the discretion under § 3583(e)(1) to terminate supervised release after one year “‘if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.’” In Atkin, the Sixth Circuit held that “‘[e]arly termination of supervised release is a discretionary decision that is only warranted in cases where the defendant shows changed circumstances—such as exceptionally good behavior.’” Relying on Atkin, the district court concluded that even though Hale’s behavior had been “’admirable,’” it was “‘far from exceptional’” and did not justify early termination. The court agreed “with Hale that Atkin did not correctly state the legal standard when it said that early termination of supervised release is ‘only warranted’ upon a showing of ‘exceptionally good behavior.’” The statutory text provides that a district court is “to determine whether early release ‘is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice,’ in addition to certain § 3553(a) factors. The text does not make ‘exceptionally good’ conduct an absolute prerequisite to relief.” The court found that the district court appeared, “understandably, to have read our unpublished caselaw to require a showing of ‘exceptionally good’ behavior as a threshold to relief[.]”
Divorce; Spousal support; MCL 552.23; Woodington v Shokoohi; Fault; Denman v Denman; Sparks v Sparks; Reasonableness; Division of marital property; Marital estate; Korth v Korth; Marital assets; MCL 552.19; Cunningham v Cunningham; Separate assets; Consideration of fault in the division of marital property; Washington v Washington
The court held that the trial court did not err in its property division and award of spousal support for defendant-ex-wife. The trial court classified the parties’ home as marital property but awarded plaintiff-ex-husband the value of his premarital interest in the property. It also awarded each party their personal effects, retirement accounts, and life insurance benefits. It then divided the remainder of their marital equity in the home, awarded the home to defendant, and ordered her to pay plaintiff $40,000 within four months or the home would be sold. Finally, it awarded defendant $400 per month in spousal support for a period of two years. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding defendant spousal support based in part on erroneous factual findings. “The trial court’s finding that [plaintiff] was primarily at fault for the parties divorce was supported by the record.” In addition, “[i]n evaluating the spousal-support factors, the trial court found that the 17-year length of the parties’ marriage, [defendant’s] unequal earning ability, the amount of property awarded to the parties, [defendant’s] need for support and [plaintiff’s] ability to pay support, the parties’ present situation, the parties’ prior standard of living, and the general principles of equity all favored” defendant. The support award was not unreasonable. The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by classifying the parties’ home as marital property and abused its discretion by awarding it to defendant. “The evidence reflects that the parties did not treat the home as [plaintiff’s] separate property, and that the parties both contributed to the care and improvement of the home with marital assets. Further, the trial court identified [plaintiff’s] interest in the property before the parties’ marriage and treated it as separate property.” Moreover, given “the evidence of the parties’ contentious relationship toward the end of their marriage and [plaintiff’s] frustration with the frequency in which [defendant] babysat her grandchildren, the trial court did not” err by finding plaintiff “could possibly become agitated by living in close proximity to” defendant’s family. Finally, in light of defendant’s “estimated monthly income and estimated monthly expenses, the [trial] court appropriately found that she would be unable to support herself in her prior standard of living without the marital home.” Affirmed.
Claim to the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP) for personal protection (PIP) benefits; Whether the decedent was an “occupant” of a vehicle; Rohlman v Hawkeye-Sec Ins Co; Security requirement; Exclusion from benefits under MCL 500.3113(b); The parked vehicle exception (MCL 500.3106(1)(a)); Stewart v State; Whether the manner in which the vehicle was parked created an unreasonable risk; Wright v League Gen Ins Co; A stalled car; Williams v Allstate Ins Co
The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff-estate’s “decedent should have maintained security on his car” but it reversed the ruling as to whether he was an occupant of it at the time of the collision. And it remanded for further analysis as to whether it was parked in a way that created an “unreasonable risk using the Stewart factors.” He was struck and killed after his car stalled in the middle of the road. Plaintiff sought PIP benefits from the MACP. The trial court found “there were three issues: (a) whether decedent was a pedestrian, (b) whether the car was required to have security, and (c) whether the parked vehicle exception applied.” It concluded he “was not a pedestrian, the car was required to have security, and [it] was parked in a way that created unreasonable risk such that the parked vehicle exception did not apply.” Thus, it granted the MACP summary disposition. The court concluded the trial court erred in determining “there was no genuine dispute of fact that decedent was not a pedestrian.” Rather, the opposite was “true—there is no genuine dispute of fact that [he] was not an occupant of a vehicle at the time of the accident.” But the court agreed with the MACP that because his “car was involved in the collision and was uninsured,” he was excluded “from PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(b).” However, the court noted that “if the vehicle involved in the collision was a ‘parked vehicle,’ it may still be entitled to PIP benefits” under the parked vehicle exclusion in MCL 500.3106(1)(a). This statute contains an exception to the exclusion for when a “vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.” The MACP contended that this applied here. In Stewart, the Michigan Supreme “Court considered the ‘manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked’ to determine whether [it] ‘poses an unreasonable risk.’ . . . In addition, and seemingly for the first time in the parked car jurisprudence, the Court also considered the ‘purpose’ of the vehicle being parked in a potentially risky manner.” It was clear the trial court here “considered the ‘manner, location, and fashion’ of decedent’s vehicle and not the purpose or explanation as to why [it] was parked in such a way.” Given this incomplete analysis, “it must determine under the proper standard whether” a genuine dispute of material fact exists “as to whether decedent’s car was parked in a way that caused unreasonable risk.”
Assessment on a “transient facility” under the Community Convention or Tourism Marketing Act (CCTMA); Whether the CCTMA requires “that a combination of buildings be contiguous or in a single location”; MCL 141.872(n); “Assessment district”; MCL 141.872(b); “Contiguous”; Notice; Pi-Con, Inc v AJ Anderson Constr Co; MCL 141.875(5); MCL 141.873(7)
Because “the plain language of the CCTMA does not require that a combination of buildings be contiguous or in a single location, and plaintiff substantially complied with the CCTMA’s notice requirement,” the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition, denying defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, and directing that it “pay assessments, interest, delinquency charges, costs, and attorney fees under” the CCTMA. Defendant first asserted that “it does not own or manage a ‘transient facility’ under the CCTMA.” Specifically, it contended “that the statutory definition of ‘transient facility’ is unambiguous and refers only to buildings in a single location.” The court concluded that nothing in the MCL 141.872(n) “definition or in the text of the CCTMA as a whole suggests that the Legislature intended to limit the definition of ‘transient facility’ to a combination of buildings that must be contiguous, and defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.” The court found that reading “this language in light of the statute’s context and overall purpose, the obvious conclusion is that dormitories, schools, hospitals, and nursing homes were excluded simply because they are unrelated to tourism.” Defendant’s claim “that the CCTMA’s definition of ‘assessment district’ supports its proposed definition of ‘transient facility’” likewise failed. Thus, the court held that “read in combination, § 5(5) and § (3)(7) simply require that the owners of transient facilities receive notice sent to a transient facility, and do not define ‘transient facility.’” The court found that because “the plain language of the CCTMA does not require that ‘transient facilities’ be located on a single property or in a single location, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant was required to pay assessments under the act.” Defendant also argued “that even if it was considered a manager of a ‘transient facility,’ assessments could not be levied against it before the date plaintiff mailed the marketing program notice by certified mail” (4/28/22). The trial court held that under Pi-Con, “strict compliance was not required, and because it was undisputed that defendant had actual notice, compliance with the statute was satisfied.” The court agreed.
Interpreting a restated trust; Ambiguity; Trust reformation; Stay of proceedings; Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC)
The court concluded that the probate court erred in holding “that the 2012 restated trust was ambiguous, requiring further interpretation.” It also erred in deciding appellee-Kystad’s petition for instructions as to real estate after the court imposed a stay of proceedings. Thus, the court reversed the order interpreting the restated trust and vacated the probate court’s opinion and order as to the petition for instructions. “For the language to be ambiguous, it would have [to] support two different meanings: (1) that the numerator of the fraction for determining the value of the Family Trust is the amount that will be able to pass free of estate tax when the settlor dies; or (2) that the numerator is the amount that would pass free of estate tax if the settlor died at the time the trust was executed. Even if the future-tense meaning of ‘shall’ were disregarded in favor of the mandatory/must meaning, Article III would still derive the numerator from ‘the largest value . . . that can pass free of the federal estate tax.’” There was “no language in the 2012 restated trust that fixes the numerator as the value that would pass free of the federal estate tax if [the decedent] died in 2012.” Thus, the language supported “only the first meaning.” The probate “court erred in finding ambiguity and in resolving the issue in” appellee-MUSC’s favor. Appellants next argued “that reformation of the 2012 restated trust was improper under MCL 700.7412 and MCL 700.7415. While these issues were raised in the proceedings below, the probate court did not specifically consider them, because it found the 2012 restated trust ambiguous.” Given that the court’s opinion reversed that conclusion, it remanded “this issue to the probate court for a decision on whether reformation is appropriate.”