Assessment on a “transient facility” under the Community Convention or Tourism Marketing Act (CCTMA); Whether the CCTMA requires “that a combination of buildings be contiguous or in a single location”; MCL 141.872(n); “Assessment district”; MCL 141.872(b); “Contiguous”; Notice; Pi-Con, Inc v AJ Anderson Constr Co; MCL 141.875(5); MCL 141.873(7)

Because “the plain language of the CCTMA does not require that a combination of buildings be contiguous or in a single location, and plaintiff substantially complied with the CCTMA’s notice requirement,” the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition, denying defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, and directing that it “pay assessments, interest, delinquency charges, costs, and attorney fees under” the CCTMA. Defendant first asserted that “it does not own or manage a ‘transient facility’ under the CCTMA.” Specifically, it contended “that the statutory definition of ‘transient facility’ is unambiguous and refers only to buildings in a single location.” The court concluded that nothing in the MCL 141.872(n) “definition or in the text of the CCTMA as a whole suggests that the Legislature intended to limit the definition of ‘transient facility’ to a combination of buildings that must be contiguous, and defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.” The court found that reading “this language in light of the statute’s context and overall purpose, the obvious conclusion is that dormitories, schools, hospitals, and nursing homes were excluded simply because they are unrelated to tourism.” Defendant’s claim “that the CCTMA’s definition of ‘assessment district’ supports its proposed definition of ‘transient facility’” likewise failed. Thus, the court held that “read in combination, § 5(5) and § (3)(7) simply require that the owners of transient facilities receive notice sent to a transient facility, and do not define ‘transient facility.’” The court found that because “the plain language of the CCTMA does not require that ‘transient facilities’ be located on a single property or in a single location, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant was required to pay assessments under the act.” Defendant also argued “that even if it was considered a manager of a ‘transient facility,’ assessments could not be levied against it before the date plaintiff mailed the marketing program notice by certified mail” (4/28/22). The trial court held that under Pi-Con, “strict compliance was not required, and because it was undisputed that defendant had actual notice, compliance with the statute was satisfied.” The court agreed.