Claim to the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP) for personal protection (PIP) benefits; Whether the decedent was an “occupant” of a vehicle; Rohlman v Hawkeye-Sec Ins Co; Security requirement; Exclusion from benefits under MCL 500.3113(b); The parked vehicle exception (MCL 500.3106(1)(a)); Stewart v State; Whether the manner in which the vehicle was parked created an unreasonable risk; Wright v League Gen Ins Co; A stalled car; Williams v Allstate Ins Co

The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff-estate’s “decedent should have maintained security on his car” but it reversed the ruling as to whether he was an occupant of it at the time of the collision. And it remanded for further analysis as to whether it was parked in a way that created an “unreasonable risk using the Stewart factors.” He was struck and killed after his car stalled in the middle of the road. Plaintiff sought PIP benefits from the MACP. The trial court found “there were three issues: (a) whether decedent was a pedestrian, (b) whether the car was required to have security, and (c) whether the parked vehicle exception applied.” It concluded he “was not a pedestrian, the car was required to have security, and [it] was parked in a way that created unreasonable risk such that the parked vehicle exception did not apply.” Thus, it granted the MACP summary disposition. The court concluded the trial court erred in determining “there was no genuine dispute of fact that decedent was not a pedestrian.” Rather, the opposite was “true—there is no genuine dispute of fact that [he] was not an occupant of a vehicle at the time of the accident.” But the court agreed with the MACP that because his “car was involved in the collision and was uninsured,” he was excluded “from PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(b).” However, the court noted that “if the vehicle involved in the collision was a ‘parked vehicle,’ it may still be entitled to PIP benefits” under the parked vehicle exclusion in MCL 500.3106(1)(a). This statute contains an exception to the exclusion for when a “vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.” The MACP contended that this applied here. In Stewart, the Michigan Supreme “Court considered the ‘manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is parked’ to determine whether [it] ‘poses an unreasonable risk.’ . . . In addition, and seemingly for the first time in the parked car jurisprudence, the Court also considered the ‘purpose’ of the vehicle being parked in a potentially risky manner.” It was clear the trial court here “considered the ‘manner, location, and fashion’ of decedent’s vehicle and not the purpose or explanation as to why [it] was parked in such a way.” Given this incomplete analysis, “it must determine under the proper standard whether” a genuine dispute of material fact exists “as to whether decedent’s car was parked in a way that caused unreasonable risk.”