Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging violation of a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care; Qualified immunity; Jurisdiction; Gross negligence claim under Michigan law; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407; “The proximate cause”; Robinson v City of Detroit (MI); Burwell v City of Lansing
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over defendant-Green-Hernandez’s assertion of qualified immunity on plaintiff-Gillman’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to provide a pretrial detainee (Miller) with adequate medical care. But it found that it did have jurisdiction over Green-Hernandez’s claim to governmental immunity as to plaintiff’s Michigan gross negligence claim, and it concluded the record showed that her “conduct was not the single most direct cause of Miller’s injuries.” Miller was arrested and booked into defendant-City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility. She “informed facility staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal in about a day.” She did so, but in spite of her constant vomiting, no one at the jail sought medical care for her, including “Green Hernandez, one of the employees responsible for monitoring the City’s pretrial detainees on the day of Miller’s death.” Plaintiff, Miller’s husband, sued for failure to provide medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment and for gross negligence under Michigan law. Green-Hernandez moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim and governmental immunity as to the state-law claim. The district court denied the motion in both respects. On appeal, the court first considered her qualified immunity defense. “Green-Hernandez’s arguments on appeal fail to construe the record in the light most favorable to Gillman, and she has failed to adequately concede the material facts, as she must to invoke our jurisdiction.” Thus, her claim for qualified immunity was based on “critical factual disputes,” and as a result, the court dismissed that part of her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But it held that it had jurisdiction over her claim for governmental immunity under Michigan law on the pendent state law gross negligence claim. It found that the record established a dispute of material fact whether her failure to seek medical care for Miller evinced “a ‘substantial lack of concern’ for” her condition. However, the court held that “a reasonable jury could not conclude that the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death was Green-Hernandez’s failure to seek medical care in response to Miller’s vomiting. Rather, the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death was her ingestion of fentanyl.” Thus, it reversed “the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity, and” remanded.
Resentencing of a defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed when he was 16; Errors in the presentence investigation report; Retention of jurisdiction; Scope of appeal
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the last sentence of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81506 in the 5/6/24 edition), remanded the case to that court, and directed it to retain jurisdiction while remanding to the trial court. “By declining to retain jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals risked depriving the defendant of review of his proportionality claim. Although [he] would be permitted to claim an appeal of right if the trial court decides that the errors in the presentence investigation report do not warrant resentencing, . . . he would not be permitted to renew his proportionality challenge because ‘the scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand.’” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Mootness; People v Richmond; Motion to suppress; Probable cause; People v Ulman
The court held that the trial court erred by granting defendant-Bragg’s motion to suppress because the omissions from the affidavits used to secure search warrants of his cell phone, vehicle, house, and cell phone data were not material and did not impact whether there was probable cause to grant the search warrants. Bragg and defendant-Bell were arrested in relation to the robbery of a cell phone store. The trial court found that the officers who drafted the affidavits to obtain the search warrants “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, omitted material facts from the affidavits when they noted the vehicle seen in surveillance footage was dark-colored instead of green, and that this omission would have impacted whether there was probable cause to grant the search warrants.” The trial court “quashed the search warrants and excluded the fruits of those warrants. [It] then granted motions to dismiss the case without prejudice in each docket.” On appeal, the court first rejected defendants’ argument that the prosecution’s appeal was moot because it circumvented the rules as to interlocutory appeals by acquiescing to the dismissal of the case. “Although the prosecution recognized that it would have a difficult time meeting its burden without the admission of the suppressed evidence, the record is clear that the prosecution did not file a motion for dismissal, nor did it stipulate to dismissal. Declining to contest the motion to dismiss is not equivalent to affirmatively agreeing to dismiss the case.” The court then concluded the trial court erred by granting Bragg’s motion to suppress because it erred by “finding that the affiant intentionally and knowingly omitted information about the one video clip showing him saying the vehicle may have been green.” And even if “the affiant intentionally and recklessly omitted the possibility that the suspect vehicle was green, the omission was not material to the finding of probable cause.” The trial court clearly erred by finding “defendants met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, either inserted false material into the affidavits or omitted material information from the affidavits, and that the false material or omitted material was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Reversed and remanded.
Insanity defense; MCL 768.20a; Requirement that a defendant cooperate with a criminal-responsibility evaluation; People v Hayes; Use of videoconferencing for the evaluation; MCR 6.006; MCR 2.407; “Proceeding”; Motion to appoint substitute counsel; “Good cause”; People v McFall
The court held that defendant’s lack of cooperation with a criminal-responsibility evaluation “warranted preclusion of his insanity defense.” It further concluded there was no indication that such an “evaluation is similar to the types of proceedings to which MCR 6.006 applies[.]” Finally, it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for appointment of substitute counsel. Thus, the court affirmed his first-degree premeditated murder convictions. He asserted that “his failure to cooperate with a criminal-responsibility evaluation should be excused.” But the court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by barring defendant from presenting an insanity defense under” the circumstances. The record indicated “that the psychologist had seen defendant twice before for other evaluations, and defendant had previously refused to participate in an evaluation over teleconferencing software and had been taken for an in-person evaluation. When the psychologist attempted to conduct the criminal-responsibility evaluation at issue over teleconferencing software, she saw defendant through the camera, and she introduced herself. [He] then looked at the camera, did not respond verbally, stayed in the room for ‘all of five minutes,’ then asked to be let out and left the room. The psychologist was not able to complete the interview. After the hearing, the trial court determined that defendant knew who the psychologist was and chose to walk out and not cooperate. These facts support the trial court finding.” As to the use of videoconferencing for the evaluation, the court found that “the trial court was not required to presume that defendant was entitled to be present in person for his criminal-responsibility evaluation.” Turning to the denial of his motion for substitute counsel, the court concluded the trial “court’s determination that defendant was engaged in ‘nothing but gamesmanship,’ and that his attorneys had performed their constitutional duties, is supported by the record.”
Other acts of domestic violence; Balancing test under MRE 403; MCL 768.27b; People v Watkins; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to admission of an unredacted PPO; Failure to object to prosecutor’s arguments; Failure to adequately advise during negotiations; Remote participation in sentencing hearing
The court held that because the probative value of the other acts "evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27b.” Also, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, as he “failed to establish that his remote participation in the sentencing hearing affected his substantial rights, he is not entitled to resentencing.” Defendant challenged “the trial court’s admission of evidence that he committed acts of domestic violence in addition to those supporting the criminal charges against him.” He contended that the trial court erred in its “ruling by failing to employ the balancing test prescribed by MRE 403.” The court found that the evidence as to “defendant’s previous act of domestic violence showed that defendant had a propensity to physically attack family members out of anger by punching them and kicking down doors.” The court noted that despite “the manifest significance of the other-acts evidence, defendant faults the trial court for failing to properly weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. To decide whether such relevant evidence should be excluded because of its prejudicial effect, a trial court should consider the” factors in Watkins. The court held that “the trial court did not apply the MRE 403 balancing test in a formal manner, but the record establishes that the trial court considered and then rejected defense counsel’s argument regarding the prejudicial nature of the evidence.” It did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27b because the probative value “was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” Affirmed.
Respondeat superior; Assault & battery; Hamed v Wayne Cnty; Negligent hiring, retention, & supervision; Brown v Brown
The court concluded the trial court erred by denying defendants-Jagu and Patel’s’ summary disposition motion because (1) “plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact” as to the assault-and-battery claim, and (2) their claims of negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision also failed. Thus, it reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting Jagu and Patel summary disposition. This case stemmed from two incidents of sexual assault by Jagu’s employee, defendant-Babu-Rao, against plaintiffs-Cummings and Turrentine at a hotel. The central issue was whether Patel (Jagu’s owner) “knew or should have known, before the sexual assault of Turrentine, that Babu-Rao committed similar conduct in the past and had the propensity to act in accordance with assaultive conduct.” Defendants claimed “that Patel lacked any such knowledge, the sexual assault of Turrentine by Babu-Rao was not foreseeable, and no liability should attach to defendants for” Babu-Rao’s actions. The court found that they could not “be vicariously liable for the assault and battery against Turrentine because the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Patel was aware of Babu-Rao’s assault of Cummings beforehand. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs rely on [witness-J’s] testimony indicating that Patel knew that Babu-Rao had committed improper sexual advances about 15 years beforehand at another hotel, the record does not indicate when Patel became aware of that.” Thus, J’s testimony failed “to establish a genuine issue of material fact for vicarious liability regarding the assault against Turrentine.” Defendants were entitled to summary disposition on the assault-and-battery claims. As to the claims of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, they contended “the facts in this case are similar to those in Brown, where our Supreme Court held the defendant employer was not liable for its employee’s rape because the employee ‘did not commit prior acts that would have put his employer on notice of [the employee’s] propensity to commit rape’” given that “the employee ‘had no prior criminal record, no history of violent behavior, and certainly no history indicating that he harbored a propensity to commit rape.’” Here, there was “no evidence establishing a factual dispute whether defendants were aware of Babu-Rao’s sexual assault of Cummings, or of his other alleged sexual improprieties. Although ‘[k]nowledge of an employee having actually committed another rape would justify anticipating that the employee would reoffend, if the employer had good reason to know of the prior crime[,]’” in this case there was “no evidence to suggest defendants knew about Babu-Rao’s sexual assault of Cummings or others before Babu-Rao’s sexual assault of Turrentine.”
Termination; Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Gonzales/Martinez; Relative placement; In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights. Their rights were terminated on the basis of abuse, poor parenting skills, and improper supervision. On appeal, the court rejected their argument that termination was not in the children’s best interests. As to respondent-mother, it noted that “the trial court’s consideration of the relative placement was sufficient to meet the requirements of Olive/Metts.” It also “did not err in finding that the relative placement was outweighed by other factors favoring termination.” She was not benefiting from her service plan, and “the children were all doing well in their foster placements, which had each agreed to adopt the child in their care.” In addition, the children required extra care and attention that she could not provide. “The trial court did not err in finding that the children’s need for permanency and stability outweighed the relative placement in this case.” As to respondent-father, his substance abuse diminished his parenting skills, which he already lacked, and the children’s “placements offered each child stability, permanency, and finality that [he] could not offer.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Combined adjudication & dispositional hearing; Plain error review; In re Mota; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); Child’s best interests
The court held that while the trial court plainly erred in consolidating the adjudication trial and the dispositional hearing, respondent-father was not entitled to reversal because his substantial rights were not affected. Further, (1) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, (2) termination was supported under § (b)(i), and (3) it was in his child’s (JM) best interests. As to the combined trial and hearing, the court noted the “trial court relied on evidence that was supported by the record to justify both the exercise of jurisdiction over JM and the termination of” respondent’s rights. Thus, although it “committed ‘procedural errors in conducting the adjudicative and dispositional phases of the case,’” they did not affect respondent’s “substantial rights or the outcome of the lower-court proceedings. If the trial court had conducted the adjudication first and then turned to the dispositional hearing, the abundance of evidence presented at the consolidated hearing would have supported the exercise of jurisdiction over JM and then the termination of” respondent’s rights. The court next determined that the DHHS “clearly made reasonable efforts toward reunification.” Respondent contended “that if more efforts had been made to address his substance abuse,” an incident that occurred in 10/23 would not have happened. “But the foster-care worker testified that respondent[] ‘always denied’ his drug use.” She also denied that he “ever indicated to her that he had any substance-abuse issues or that he wanted help with his substance abuse.” While he was provided many opportunities to participate in services, “he lost access to them because of his own actions, which ultimately led to his incarceration.” As to § (b)(i), there was sufficient evidence “presented in the trial court to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that JM would suffer a life-threatening injury in the foreseeable future if she were in” respondent’s care, and the trial court did not err in finding that termination was proper under this subsection. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding this was in JM’s best interests. It “found that she was doing well in her foster placement and her mother was working toward possible reunification with her.” It further determined that most of the evidence showed respondent “failed to protect JM and she was at a substantial risk of harm if returned to” him. Affirmed.