Insanity defense; MCL 768.20a; Requirement that a defendant cooperate with a criminal-responsibility evaluation; People v Hayes; Use of videoconferencing for the evaluation; MCR 6.006; MCR 2.407; “Proceeding”; Motion to appoint substitute counsel; “Good cause”; People v McFall

The court held that defendant’s lack of cooperation with a criminal-responsibility evaluation “warranted preclusion of his insanity defense.” It further concluded there was no indication that such an “evaluation is similar to the types of proceedings to which MCR 6.006 applies[.]” Finally, it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for appointment of substitute counsel. Thus, the court affirmed his first-degree premeditated murder convictions. He asserted that “his failure to cooperate with a criminal-responsibility evaluation should be excused.” But the court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by barring defendant from presenting an insanity defense under” the circumstances. The record indicated “that the psychologist had seen defendant twice before for other evaluations, and defendant had previously refused to participate in an evaluation over teleconferencing software and had been taken for an in-person evaluation. When the psychologist attempted to conduct the criminal-responsibility evaluation at issue over teleconferencing software, she saw defendant through the camera, and she introduced herself. [He] then looked at the camera, did not respond verbally, stayed in the room for ‘all of five minutes,’ then asked to be let out and left the room. The psychologist was not able to complete the interview. After the hearing, the trial court determined that defendant knew who the psychologist was and chose to walk out and not cooperate. These facts support the trial court finding.” As to the use of videoconferencing for the evaluation, the court found that “the trial court was not required to presume that defendant was entitled to be present in person for his criminal-responsibility evaluation.” Turning to the denial of his motion for substitute counsel, the court concluded the trial “court’s determination that defendant was engaged in ‘nothing but gamesmanship,’ and that his attorneys had performed their constitutional duties, is supported by the record.”