Mootness; People v Richmond; Motion to suppress; Probable cause; People v Ulman

The court held that the trial court erred by granting defendant-Bragg’s motion to suppress because the omissions from the affidavits used to secure search warrants of his cell phone, vehicle, house, and cell phone data were not material and did not impact whether there was probable cause to grant the search warrants. Bragg and defendant-Bell were arrested in relation to the robbery of a cell phone store. The trial court found that the officers who drafted the affidavits to obtain the search warrants “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, omitted material facts from the affidavits when they noted the vehicle seen in surveillance footage was dark-colored instead of green, and that this omission would have impacted whether there was probable cause to grant the search warrants.” The trial court “quashed the search warrants and excluded the fruits of those warrants. [It] then granted motions to dismiss the case without prejudice in each docket.” On appeal, the court first rejected defendants’ argument that the prosecution’s appeal was moot because it circumvented the rules as to interlocutory appeals by acquiescing to the dismissal of the case. “Although the prosecution recognized that it would have a difficult time meeting its burden without the admission of the suppressed evidence, the record is clear that the prosecution did not file a motion for dismissal, nor did it stipulate to dismissal. Declining to contest the motion to dismiss is not equivalent to affirmatively agreeing to dismiss the case.” The court then concluded the trial court erred by granting Bragg’s motion to suppress because it erred by “finding that the affiant intentionally and knowingly omitted information about the one video clip showing him saying the vehicle may have been green.” And even if “the affiant intentionally and recklessly omitted the possibility that the suspect vehicle was green, the omission was not material to the finding of probable cause.” The trial court clearly erred by finding “defendants met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, either inserted false material into the affidavits or omitted material information from the affidavits, and that the false material or omitted material was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Reversed and remanded.