Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging malicious prosecution in violation of the First Amendment; The court’s jurisdiction; The collateral-order doctrine; Timeliness of an appeal; Consideration of exhibits attached to a motion to dismiss; FedRCivP 12(b)(6); Applicability of the “central-to-the-claim” exception to the “four corners” rule; The “public records” exception; Whether plaintiff plausibly stated a claim that would overcome a qualified immunity defense; Whether plaintiff plausibly alleged that his political speech was the “but-for cause” of the harmful action against him; Whether the complaint alleged the violation of “clearly established law”; Reichle v Howards
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-Blackwell plausibly pled that defendants (referred to as the City Officials) “sought to prosecute him in retaliation for his” political speech without probable cause. It also rejected defendants’ “premature efforts to bolster their defense with outside-the-complaint evidence.” After Blackwell criticized defendant-Nocerini, the city manager, she “complained about him to the police. Two officers convinced a prosecutor to charge Blackwell with stalking.” He was acquitted and brought this action against her and the officers. On appeal, the court first determined that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and that defendants’ appeal was timely. Local Rule 7.1(h)(2)(A) allowed them “to move for reconsideration of” the non-final order denying their motion to dismiss. The court noted that it “will continue to treat a properly filed motion under this local rule like any other ‘time tolling’ motion for reconsideration. . . . For non-final orders that a party may appeal under the collateral-order doctrine, these motions delay the running of the 30-day clock until the district court disposes of them.” As to the merits, defendants argued the district court erred by refusing to consider the exhibits they attached to their motion to dismiss: the police report; Nocerini’s timeline of events; and the criminal complaint against Blackwell. The court disagreed. Given that Blackwell’s claim did “not depend on” the exhibits (he disputed the statements in them), defendants could not rely on the “‘central-to-the-claim’ exception to our normal motion-to-dismiss framework.” The court further found it was “not clear that two of the exhibits (the police report and timeline) even qualify as ‘public records’ subject to judicial notice at the pleading stage.” In any event, defendants did “not want to use the exhibits for a narrow purpose to confirm some undisputed fact[.]” Instead, they sought to use them “to establish the ‘truth’ about what” defendants-Strong and Carter learned in their investigation, and those facts were “‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” The court held that Blackwell’s complaint stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim to overcome defendants’ qualified immunity defense. They contended he did not plausibly allege that his criticisms were the but-for cause of the stalking charge. The court found that under “the complaint’s version of events, no ‘“reasonable and prudent” person’ would believe that any of Blackwell’s three alleged actions qualified as harassment.” In addition, it “would have been ‘obvious’ to any reasonable officer that the three incidents that allegedly led the City Officials to pursue charges against Blackwell did not establish probable cause that he had engaged in stalking.” Affirmed.
Parental indemnification agreement; Woodman v Kera, LLC; Whether a contract violates public policy; Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate & Debt Fund II, LLC v Park St Group Realty Servs, LLC; MCL 700.5109
Noting it was bound by Woodman’s holding as to Michigan’s common law and public policy, the court concluded it was clear that the parental indemnification agreement at issue was “intended to limit a child’s ability to sue [defendant-]Auburnfly for injuries caused by Auburnfly’s negligence.” Thus, it rejected Auburnfly’s argument that the contract did not violate public policy. Third-party defendant-Knaack’s child, MK, was injured while participating at an event at Auburnfly’s adventure park. After this suit was filed, alleging negligence and other claims, “Auburnfly filed a third-party complaint against Knaack, seeking to enforce” a participant agreement she had signed and compel her to indemnify and hold it harmless for MK’s injuries. Knaack successfully moved for summary disposition. The Michigan Supreme Court held in Woodman “that ‘the Michigan common law rule is clear: a guardian, including a parent, cannot contractually bind his minor ward.’” Auburnfly argued the contract here bound it and the parent, not a minor child. “On its face, defendant is correct—MK is not explicitly a party to the contract, nor does [it] state that MK has waived any of her rights.” But in determining whether there is a public policy violation, the court considers “the ‘nature and substance’ of” a parental indemnification agreement in context. Children “require a representative party to sue on their behalf.” Here, as in many cases, this “is the child’s parent. Accordingly, by requiring the parent to indemnify the negligent party, the parent would bear the financial burden of any judgment obtained in litigation on the child’s behalf. Moreover, even if the child brought suit through a representative, the child’s material situation would almost certainly not be improved by winning the lawsuit, if the ultimate source of payment was the child’s parent. In the vast majority of cases, a parent or child in that position simply would not bring the litigation, which effectively results in the limitation of the child’s rights.” The court added that, “even if a parental indemnification agreement did not result in a de facto limitation or waiver of a child’s rights, such an agreement, if enforceable, would result in Auburnfly not being liable for injuries it negligently caused to children.” In MCL 700.5109, the Legislature has “provided a limited exception to the common law of Michigan by allowing preinjury liability waivers by parents on behalf of their children, but only for specific entities, and not for liability for damages caused by negligence.” Affirmed.
Breach of contract based on COVID-19 online alternatives instead of in-person college education & services; Tuition & fees; Express contract; Mutual assent; Implied-in-fact contract; Discovery; Room & board; Abandoned issue; Unjust enrichment; Motion to amend; Futility
The court held that the trial court’s decision to dismiss the breach of contract as to tuition and unjust enrichment claims was not erroneous. The case originated from defendant-WSU’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff-Paymon argued “that the trial court erred by concluding that there was no evidence of contracts for exclusively in-person instruction or particular types of student services, and dismissing her breach of contract claims on those grounds.” As to her express contract claim, “there was no evidence of any written or oral expression showing that WSU had ever made a promise to provide exclusively in-person instruction under all circumstances in exchange for tuition or any particular type of student services (on campus or otherwise) under all circumstances in exchange for fees.” Paymon did “not cite any language in any of the documents in the record evidencing such promises.” There was “no evidence that an express contract exists containing a promise by WSU that it would exclusively provide in-person instruction, or any specific types of services, under all circumstances.” Paymon did “not even appear to seriously claim that an express contract existed.” She had to “provide some evidence from which an inference of WSU’s offer to provide such specific types of instruction and services could be made.” The court held that without “evidence of an offer by WSU, there could be no mutual assent and thus no implied-in-fact contract.” It concluded that “Paymon failed to provide such evidence, and the trial court’s decision to dismiss the breach of contract claims related to tuition and fees was not erroneous.” Affirmed.
Breach of contract claims related to payment of college tuition/fees & room/board; Use of remote teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic; Allen v Michigan State Univ; Express contract; Implied-in-fact contract; Unjust enrichment claims; Effect of the existence of an express contract; Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ
The court concluded there was no evidence of an express contract containing a promise by defendant-NMU “to exclusively provide in-person instruction or any specific types of services under all circumstances.” Plaintiff-Simmons’s implied-in-fact contract claim also failed given NMU’s “express written indication that courses were subject to change[.]” Likewise, NMU was properly granted summary disposition of her breach of contract claim related to room and board based on the clear and unambiguous language of the parties’ express written contract. The existence of that contract supported summary disposition of her unjust enrichment claim as to room and board. And she failed to show “that NMU’s retention of tuition and fees was unjust.” Plaintiff sought “partial refunds for tuition, fees, and room-and-board payments. She argued that NMU’s responses to the COVID-19 pandemic deprived her of the full educational experience and benefits she had paid for.” The court noted the “central question in this appeal revolves around the existence of either express or implied contracts that would clarify whether tuition payments were intended to cover only in-person instruction. Additionally, there is a question of whether the associated fees were designated to provide access to particular services available on campus.” As to her express contract claim, plaintiff failed to direct the court “to any evidence in the record showing that NMU ever made an express promise to provide exclusively in-person instruction under all circumstances or any types or forms of services on campus.” As to her implied-in-fact claim, the court found that even “assuming there is a general implied right to receive education and services in exchange for tuition and fees . . . there is no legal authority supporting the contention that such an implied right extends to the precise manner of instructional delivery or type of service[.]” As to her room and board claim, the housing contract contained “a provision stating that NMU ‘is not liable for failure to perform an obligation under this Agreement in the event that such failure is caused by or due to acts or regulations of public authorities . . . epidemic . . . or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of [NMU].’” The court also found that the trial court properly granted NMU summary disposition of her unjust enrichment claims. Affirmed.
Motion to set aside juvenile adjudication; People v Butka
On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Butka, the court vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to set aside his juvenile adjudication of CSC III and remanded. The “trial court largely rested its decision to deny [his] motion on the basis of the victim’s opposition to it.” The court found that it appeared “that the trial court did what the Michigan Supreme Court stated that it could not do: give the victim a veto power that frustrated the underlying purpose of the act and deprived defendant of a meaningful opportunity to have his application considered on the merits.” It also concluded that “to the extent the trial court relied on the victim and her opposition as constituting the ‘public welfare,’ such a determination was improper under Butka. It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion on the basis of the victim’s opposition to it.” Unlike in Butka, however, this case did “not involve a sufficiently developed record to decide as a matter of law whether defendant has established the elements necessary to reach a decision on the merits. Given the state of the record, the trial court should decide the issue, in light of Butka, in the first instance and give the parties the opportunity to present their arguments and any additional evidence.”
Right to present a complete defense; Evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop; Whether defendant was entitled to present witnesses; The trial court’s refusal to view video evidence; Relevance; Credibility assessments; Reasonable suspicion
The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense when it refused to (1) allow him to call witnesses at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress evidence or (2) watch requested videos. The trial court denied the motion and he entered a conditional guilty plea to CCW, FIP, and felony-firearm. After finding what appeared to be drugs during a traffic stop, police discovered “drug paraphernalia in the car as well as a firearm under the driver’s seat, which defendant confessed belonged to him.” The court noted that “the officers’ testimonies about the events of the traffic stop were, at times, inconsistent. Their recollections of the route they took when following defendant were different, and they both acknowledged that, after stopping [him], they told him he failed to stop at three stop signs—not two. Further, neither mentioned the expired registration to [him]. But” they both testified they saw him “speeding and failing to stop at two stop signs, and that the registration of the car [he] was driving was expired. The trial court heard this testimony, which included the officers’ inconsistencies. Thus, [it] was not required to hear from defendant or his witness about these inconsistencies, because they were readily apparent from the officers’ testimonies.” In addition, it “is the officer’s perception, not defendant’s version of the facts, that contributes to the determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed.” As a result, “neither defendant’s testimony, nor the testimony of any proposed witness, would be relevant to this determination.” Thus, in this circumstance “he did not have the right to present witnesses” and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court “in precluding him from doing so.” As to the videos, it was undisputed that they did “not show the time at which the officers claimed to see defendant speeding. While there were some slight discrepancies in [their] recollections, and an acknowledged error in the police report, there is nothing in the record or the video that would have caused the trial court to find the officers’ testimonies unbelievable. Because this testimony sufficiently supported the officers’ reasonable suspicion,” there was no indication the trial court would have changed its ruling “had it watched the videos.” Affirmed.
Applications for asylum & withholding of removal under the Immigration & Nationality Act (8 USC §§ 1158 & 1231(b)(3)); Finding that there was no “nexus” between the harm to petitioners & their family membership; Sebastian-Sebastian v Garland; Whether petitioners’ due process claim was “unexhausted”; Whether their argument about a particular social group (PSG) of “Guatemalan female children without parental protection” was reviewable; Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
In this amended opinion (see eJournal # 82359 in the 10/4/24 edition for the original opinion), the court again held that the BIA’s determination there was no nexus between the harm to petitioners and their family membership was inconsistent with the court’s precedent, which does not require asylum applicants to prove “animus” to satisfy the nexus requirement. But petitioners’ arguments as to due process and their proposed PSG of “Guatemalan female children without parental protection” were unreviewable where they were not raised before the BIA. In the amended opinion, the court removed one sentence and a case citation and made a minor word change. Its holding and rationale were unchanged.