Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging malicious prosecution in violation of the First Amendment; The court’s jurisdiction; The collateral-order doctrine; Timeliness of an appeal; Consideration of exhibits attached to a motion to dismiss; FedRCivP 12(b)(6); Applicability of the “central-to-the-claim” exception to the “four corners” rule; The “public records” exception; Whether plaintiff plausibly stated a claim that would overcome a qualified immunity defense; Whether plaintiff plausibly alleged that his political speech was the “but-for cause” of the harmful action against him; Whether the complaint alleged the violation of “clearly established law”; Reichle v Howards

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-Blackwell plausibly pled that defendants (referred to as the City Officials) “sought to prosecute him in retaliation for his” political speech without probable cause. It also rejected defendants’ “premature efforts to bolster their defense with outside-the-complaint evidence.” After Blackwell criticized defendant-Nocerini, the city manager, she “complained about him to the police. Two officers convinced a prosecutor to charge Blackwell with stalking.” He was acquitted and brought this action against her and the officers. On appeal, the court first determined that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and that defendants’ appeal was timely. Local Rule 7.1(h)(2)(A) allowed them “to move for reconsideration of” the non-final order denying their motion to dismiss. The court noted that it “will continue to treat a properly filed motion under this local rule like any other ‘time tolling’ motion for reconsideration. . . . For non-final orders that a party may appeal under the collateral-order doctrine, these motions delay the running of the 30-day clock until the district court disposes of them.” As to the merits, defendants argued the district court erred by refusing to consider the exhibits they attached to their motion to dismiss: the police report; Nocerini’s timeline of events; and the criminal complaint against Blackwell. The court disagreed. Given that Blackwell’s claim did “not depend on” the exhibits (he disputed the statements in them), defendants could not rely on the “‘central-to-the-claim’ exception to our normal motion-to-dismiss framework.” The court further found it was “not clear that two of the exhibits (the police report and timeline) even qualify as ‘public records’ subject to judicial notice at the pleading stage.” In any event, defendants did “not want to use the exhibits for a narrow purpose to confirm some undisputed fact[.]” Instead, they sought to use them “to establish the ‘truth’ about what” defendants-Strong and Carter learned in their investigation, and those facts were “‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” The court held that Blackwell’s complaint stated a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim to overcome defendants’ qualified immunity defense. They contended he did not plausibly allege that his criticisms were the but-for cause of the stalking charge. The court found that under “the complaint’s version of events, no ‘“reasonable and prudent” person’ would believe that any of Blackwell’s three alleged actions qualified as harassment.” In addition, it “would have been ‘obvious’ to any reasonable officer that the three incidents that allegedly led the City Officials to pursue charges against Blackwell did not establish probable cause that he had engaged in stalking.” Affirmed.