Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Breach of contract & unjust enrichment claims related to payment of college tuition & fees; Use of remote teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic; Room-&-board breach of contract claim; Effect of the existence of an express contract; Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ
The court held that defendant-WMU was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff-Garland’s tuition and fee-based contract claims arising from the use of remote teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic. It was also entitled to summary disposition of her unjust enrichment claims because there were express contracts governing the matters of tuition and fees, and room and board. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying WMU’s summary disposition motion and remanded for the entry of summary disposition in WMU’s favor “on all of Garland’s claims, except for the room-and-board breach-of-contract claim.” She contended “WMU violated its contractual obligations by (1) failing to deliver live, in-person instruction in a physical classroom as stipulated in exchange for her tuition and (2) not providing several unspecified ‘services’ despite her payment of various additional fees.” While she failed to “include the referenced contract in her complaint, she states that WMU holds it. In response, WMU attached the Financial Responsibility Agreement to its motion for summary disposition. WMU claims that this contract governs the agreements between the parties regarding the educational instruction and services to be provided in exchange for tuition and fees.” It contended that the agreement did “not guarantee in-person instruction or any specific level of services.” The court determined that “WMU met its burden to support its motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by supplying the relevant contract showing that the specific terms alleged by Garland did not exist and that she therefore could not establish a fundamental element of her claim. . . . The burden then shifted to Garland to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and since she would have had the burden of proof at trial on the dipositive issue whether the contractual term existed, she could not merely rely on allegations and denials to survive summary disposition.” The court noted that she did not “provide evidence that WMU had made any contractual promises to deliver only in-person instruction or specific services in return for tuition and fees.” The court found that the “trial court erred by essentially reversing the relevant burdens in deciding the motion.”
Breach of contract & unjust enrichment claims based on a university’s moving classes online during the COVID-19 pandemic; Express contract vs implied-in-fact contract; McInerney v Detroit Trust Co; Unjust enrichment; Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-Ferris State University and its Board of Trustees (collectively, FSU) summary disposition of plaintiff-student’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Plaintiff alleged she was deprived of the benefit of in-person instruction and student activities for which she had paid tuition and fees when defendants moved all classes online and cancelled on-campus activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by finding there was no evidence of contracts for exclusively in-person instruction or particular types of student services and dismissing her breach of contract claims on these grounds. “There is simply no evidence that an express contract exists that contains a promise by FSU that it would exclusively provide in-person instruction under all circumstances.” And assuming “without deciding that there was an implied-in-fact contract generally agreeing to exchange tuition for educational instruction, the reservation of rights language” in FSU’s course catalog “makes clear that there was no offer—and thus no meeting of the minds—regarding any particular format for providing educational instruction. That conclusion is sufficient to resolve this issue on appeal.” Because there was no evidence of the contractual term plaintiff claimed “was breached regarding tuition and in-person instruction, FSU was entitled to summary disposition on” her contract claim as to tuition. And because she did not demonstrate “that further discovery ‘stands a fair chance of uncovering factual support for the opposing party’s position,’ summary disposition was not premature.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred by dismissing her unjust enrichment claims as to tuition and fees. “Considering that the changes were necessitated by an unexpected global pandemic, that FSU still provided the essence of what it had intended to provide—educational instruction and various services for students—throughout the pandemic, that the fees continued to fund staff and maintenance expenses in accordance with the ordinary general purpose of the fees, and that there was no evidence of any agreement to provide education and services in any particular format, it is not inequitable or unjust for FSU to retain the tuition and fees it collected. FSU was entitled to summary disposition on these unjust enrichment claims.” Affirmed.
Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D); Good cause or actual prejudice; Guidance on how to craft a sentence when a single count of felony-firearm had multiple options for the underlying felony; People v Smith; Application of the felony-firearm statute; MCL 750.227b; People v Clark; Retroactivity; People v Vansickle; People v Motten; Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; People v Gardner
The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. In 2013, he was convicted of AWIM, felonious assault, domestic violence, and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him to 280 to 560 months for each AWIM, 1 to 2 years for each felonious assault, 93 days for domestic violence, and 2 years for felony-firearm. His sentence for felony-firearm was to be served consecutive to each of the other 11 sentences. The trial court denied his motion for relief from judgment, and the court denied leave, but the Supreme Court remanded for the court “to ‘address whether the defendant’s felony-firearm sentence was improperly ordered to be served consecutive to all of his other felony conviction sentences.’” On remand, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence for felony-firearm consecutive to each of his felony convictions instead of a single predicate felony. As in Smith, because “the jury did ‘not explicitly find that’ defendant committed AWIM ‘with a firearm, the felony-firearm sentence cannot be consecutive with the sentence for’ AWIM.” As such, “the judgment of sentence must be amended to indicate that the sentence for felony-firearm is to be served consecutive to one of the five counts for felonious assault.” In addition, “the general rule of retroactive application does not help the prosecution because Smith did not create a new rule.” And because “there was no new rule, Smith applies retroactively.” Defendant was entitled to relief from judgment because (1) the “first prong of ineffective assistance [was] established because Clark was decided more than a decade before defendant’s initial appeal, and there was no valid strategic reason not to raise a meritorious appellate argument,” and (2) the “second prong of ineffective assistance [was] established because the failure to raise the issue resulted in this Court’s affirmance of an invalid sentence.” The fact that the sentence was “invalid also establishes actual prejudice pursuant to MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv).” Reversed and remanded.
Action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) & the Open Meetings Act (OMA); Formal denial of a FOIA request; MCL 15.235(5)(b); Hartzell v Mayville Cmty Sch Dist
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-township summary disposition as to the individual plaintiff’s (Jaye) FOIA requests, or by rejecting plaintiffs’ OMA claim. Jaye submitted a FOIA request to defendant seeking several documents. Plaintiff-citizens group (Triple Dippers) later filed a legal action claiming violations of the FOIA and the OMA, seeking declaratory relief. On appeal, the court rejected Jaye’s argument that defendant violated the FOIA by not responding to two of his FOIA requests with a denial and certification that the records did not exist. It noted that defendant did not ignore the “FOIA request; rather, it provided the records that it considered responsive. Hartzell does not support the claim that a public body violates FOIA simply by supplying records, instead of certifying that the requested records do not exist, based on the requester’s (1) disagreement with the public body’s determination of the records’ responsiveness and (2) claim that the records do not exist.” As to Jaye’s OMA claim, he contended that the minutes from the meeting at issue “inadequately reflected the board’s decisions regarding the ratification of attorney retainer agreements. This new argument is entirely different from the original OMA claim in Jaye’s amended complaint, which focused on [defendant’s] procedures for approving bill payments and the board meetings that took place” previously. Affirmed.
No-fault auto insurance; Bodily-injury liability coverage; MCL 500.3009; Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Espinoza-Solis; Effect of a policy’s household exclusion provision
In this case arising from a fatal auto accident, the court found that its holding in Espinoza-Solis compelled the conclusion that, under MCL 500.3009, the liability limits here were $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants-estates in this declaratory judgment action brought by plaintiff-insurer. At issue was “whether a household exclusion provision in a no-fault automobile insurance policy’s bodily-injury liability coverage language limits coverage under MCL 500.3009 to $250,000, as” asserted by defendants, or to $50,000 as plaintiff contended. The court noted the issue here was similar to that in Espinoza-Solis. While the coverage issue in that case involved an insured’s noncooperation and this case involved the household exclusion, this distinction did “not affect the ultimate conclusion.” The court clearly held in Espinoza-Solis “‘that the statutorily required minimum residual liability insurance for policies issued after [7/1/20], is $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, pursuant to MCL 500.3009(1)(a) and (b), unless the proper steps are followed to exercise the option of selecting a lower coverage amount under MCL 500.3009(5).’” There was no indication here that the insureds opted “for the lower coverage amount.”
A social worker’s duty to report suspected child abuse under the Child Protection Law (CPL); MCL 722.623(1)(a); Damages for failure to report the abuse; MCL 722.633(1); Whether the CPL requires a “mandatory reporter” who abuses a child to report that abuse; Right against self-incrimination; In re Blakeman; Kassey S v City of Turlock (CA App); Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); Governmental immunity; Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
Addressing an issue of first impression in Michigan, the court held that requiring a mandatory reporter who abuses a child to report that abuse would violate that individual’s right against self-incrimination. As such, it found that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-social worker (Aboulhosn) summary disposition of plaintiff-guardian’s claims that Aboulhosn violated the CPL by not reporting that he sexually assaulted IS (a legally incapacitated individual) in a school bathroom. It also held that the trial court did not err by granting Aboulhosn summary disposition of plaintiff’s gross negligence claim. But it found that the trial court did err by dismissing plaintiff’s remaining claims. Plaintiff sued defendants alleging negligence, gross negligence, assault and battery, NEID, and IIED. She also specifically alleged a CPL violation against Aboulhosn. On appeal, the court found that “[r]equiring a mandatory reporter who abuses a child to report that abuse would clearly incriminate the mandatory reporter and subject him or her to criminal prosecution.” As such, “requiring such a disclosure falls foul of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” And to the extent that “MCL 722.623(1)(a) compels such a disclosure, it is unconstitutional.” Thus, plaintiff “cannot maintain a claim for relief against Aboulhosn based upon MCL 722.623(1)(a).” The trial court’s dismissal of this claim was proper. The court also rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of the gross negligence claim because it was properly pleaded, noting that “no amount of artful pleading can transform the claim for intentional misconduct by Aboulhosn into a claim for gross negligence.” Finally, as to the remaining claims, the court found that although Aboulhosn directed it “to documentary evidence and testimony that very strongly suggest[ed] IS’s allegations of abuse lack[ed] credibility, it is the duty of the trier of fact to evaluate his credibility and resolve the factual disputes between IS’s testimony and the evidence presented by Aboulhosn.” The trial “court’s decision to grant summary disposition because it found Aboulhosn’s evidence to be more credible was improper.” Affirmed as to the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for violation of the CPL and gross negligence, but reversed as to dismissal of the remaining claims, and remanded.
Duty to trim or remove a tree that struck a power line
The court held that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant-Consumers “did not owe plaintiff a duty to trim or remove the tree whose branch struck the power line.” Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Consumers but affirmed as to defendant-McGinn. “A tree on McGinn’s property lost a branch in a storm, and the branch struck a power line operated by Consumers.” The focal point was “whether it was foreseeable that this tree would drop a branch on this line.” The court concluded that because “of the history of outages caused by trees on McGinn’s property, . . . Consumers had a duty to take proactive remedial measures to prevent this accident.” It also concluded that “the history of trees damaging power lines at this location created a duty to prevent future damage, and there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Consumers breached this duty.” Plaintiff focused primarily on Consumers and failed “to put forth a particularly well developed argument regarding McGinn.” The evidence suggested “that McGinn consistently reported issues with the power lines to Consumers, and he did not have a duty to go any further than that.”
Tax foreclosure sale proceeds; Exclusivity of MCL 211.78t’s procedures; In re Petition of Muskegon Cnty Treasurer for Foreclosure; In re Petition of Barry Cnty Treasurer for Foreclosure; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Unjust enrichment; Harsh-&-unreasonable-consequences exception; Constitutional claims; Due process; Takings claim; Notice; Authority under MCL 600.2301; Statutory deadline; Applicability of the wrongful death saving provision
Based on Muskegon Treasurer, the court again concluded “that the Legislature intended MCL 211.78t as the exclusive mechanism for claiming and recovering remaining proceeds, that the statutory scheme for recovering remaining proceeds satisfied procedural due process, that claimants’ substantive due-process challenges are unavailing, and that [they] do not have a compensable takings claim because the Legislature provided a means for them to recover remaining proceeds; they simply failed to take advantage of it. The trial court did not err by declining to” disregard the statutory deadline “or by determining that the wrongful death saving provision did not toll the deadline for the claimant-Estates.” Thus, the court affirmed the order denying their motions to disburse remaining tax foreclosure proceeds. They contended, among other things, “that MCL 211.78t is permissive[.]” They insisted that the statutory language “does not evince the Legislature’s intent to exclude other claims and remedies to recover surplus proceeds.” The court addressed identical claims in Muskegon Treasurer, and “held, for reasons that we need not repeat, that the Legislature intended MCL 211.78t as the exclusive mechanism for claiming and recovering remaining proceeds.” Claimants conceded that the court was “bound by the principle of stare decisis to follow that holding.” But they urged it “to issue a conflicting opinion under MCR 7.215(J)(2) on the basis that Muskegon Treasurer overwhelmingly relied on caselaw involving plaintiffs who had a claim of entitlement.” It declined to do so. Contrary to claimants’ claim, the court “based its analysis of the issue on the text of the statute, not on the cases that claimants identify in their brief.” The court found that claimants’ “failure to address the actual basis of this Court’s holding does not support the issuance of a conflicting opinion.” Claimants also asserted “that they can recover remaining proceeds through a claim of unjust enrichment.” They were mistaken. The “Legislature has made clear that MCL 211.78t provides the exclusive means to recover remaining proceeds; therefore, claimants cannot recover remaining proceeds through a claim of unjust enrichment.” They further asserted “that the harsh-and-unreasonable-consequences exception should apply to prevent enforcement of the July 1 notice deadline and the resulting loss of their remaining proceeds.” They conceded in a reply brief that the court rejected this claim in Muskegon Treasurer, but they contended that the analysis there “was flawed for the reasons stated in claimants’ main brief. Their argument in their main brief, however, is the same argument” rejected in Muskegon Treasurer.