Breach of contract & unjust enrichment claims related to payment of college tuition & fees; Use of remote teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic; Room-&-board breach of contract claim; Effect of the existence of an express contract; Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ

The court held that defendant-WMU was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff-Garland’s tuition and fee-based contract claims arising from the use of remote teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic. It was also entitled to summary disposition of her unjust enrichment claims because there were express contracts governing the matters of tuition and fees, and room and board. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying WMU’s summary disposition motion and remanded for the entry of summary disposition in WMU’s favor “on all of Garland’s claims, except for the room-and-board breach-of-contract claim.” She contended “WMU violated its contractual obligations by (1) failing to deliver live, in-person instruction in a physical classroom as stipulated in exchange for her tuition and (2) not providing several unspecified ‘services’ despite her payment of various additional fees.” While she failed to “include the referenced contract in her complaint, she states that WMU holds it. In response, WMU attached the Financial Responsibility Agreement to its motion for summary disposition. WMU claims that this contract governs the agreements between the parties regarding the educational instruction and services to be provided in exchange for tuition and fees.” It contended that the agreement did “not guarantee in-person instruction or any specific level of services.” The court determined that “WMU met its burden to support its motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by supplying the relevant contract showing that the specific terms alleged by Garland did not exist and that she therefore could not establish a fundamental element of her claim. . . . The burden then shifted to Garland to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and since she would have had the burden of proof at trial on the dipositive issue whether the contractual term existed, she could not merely rely on allegations and denials to survive summary disposition.” The court noted that she did not “provide evidence that WMU had made any contractual promises to deliver only in-person instruction or specific services in return for tuition and fees.” The court found that the “trial court erred by essentially reversing the relevant burdens in deciding the motion.”