Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Justiciability; Freedom of association; Heitmanis v Austin (6th Cir); The political-question doctrine; House Speaker v Governor; An entity’s validly promulgated bylaws as a binding contract between the entity & its members; Conlin v Upton; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Standing; Applicability of quo warranto; Entry of a permanent injunction; Bylaws interpretation & application
The court held that under the undisputed facts, the Michigan Republican State Committee’s members held a valid special meeting and properly removed defendant-Karamo as the State Committee’s chairperson. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs summary disposition in this dispute over control over the State Committee. The court first determined that the “trial court plainly had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory judgment and the enforcement of the State Committee’s bylaws to the extent that the bylaws applied to the parties.” Next, it found that the “trial court’s decision to allow plaintiffs to proceed with their claims did not violate Karamo’s freedom of association or the freedom of association of the State Committee or any” of its members. “The State Committee adopted its own criteria for membership in its bylaws and established how persons become members, remain members, and are removed as members. The bylaws also established the manner by which its various members participate in the association; they identified the rights and duties for its members. The trial court’s decision to allow plaintiffs’ claims to proceed did not alter any of these internal structures; rather, [it] simply recognized that—absent application of some other doctrine governing justiciability—it had the authority to resolve a membership dispute consistent with the State Committee’s bylaws.” The court additionally concluded “the trial court properly applied the test from House Speaker and determined that the dispute at issue was justiciable under the political-question doctrine. There is no law that commits intraparty disputes in a political association to a coordinate branch of government. Further, a court is not precluded from resolving purely legal disputes among the members of a political party.” The court noted that the “complaint and request for relief in this case also did not require the trial court to make a policy determination or resolve a policy dispute.” It further determined that the State Committee’s “bylaws are a binding contractual agreement that gives individual members rights and obligates them to certain duties, which can be enforced by a court sitting at law or in equity.” Based on the complaint’s allegations, “the case was justiciable.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in interpreting and applying the bylaws. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Upward departure from the guidelines; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Lampe; Considering conduct twice; MCL 769.34(3)(b); Operating while intoxicated (OWI)
Concluding the trial court “abused its discretion by failing to provide adequate reasoning to support its departure sentence[,]” the court held that defendant’s sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate. He pled no-contest to OWI causing death. His guidelines range was 29 to 57 months. The trial court sentenced him to 120 to 180 months. It “noted several sentencing considerations that were in defendant’s favor. It acknowledged [his] limited criminal history, as well as his remorse and ‘good heart,’ and that he was not an evil person. But, it nevertheless imposed the maximum sentence permitted by law. It reasoned that a departure was justified to punish defendant for drinking and driving, taking the victim’s life, and causing the victim’s family severe emotional trauma. The record fully supports these findings.” However, the court noted “that these same considerations were already accounted for in defendant’s guidelines range. Specifically,” OV 3 was scored at 50 points “because he killed the victim while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.” In addition, OV 5 was scored at 15 points “due to the serious psychological injury he caused to the victim’s family.” The court concluded the “trial court’s decision to consider this conduct twice—for both the scoring of the guidelines and its departure sentence—violated MCL 769.34(3)(b) . . . because the trial court did not provide any reasoning suggesting ‘that the characteristic[s] ha[d] been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.’” Thus, the court held that the trial court erred in imposing “a departure sentence solely based on facts already considered by the guidelines.” Further, it found that the trial court’s “generalized considerations about the sentencing offense are not grounded in the specific conduct of this offender. Indeed, they could presumably be used to justify a departure sentence for any offender being sentenced for this offense, rendering the guidelines meaningless.” Vacated and remanded for resentencing.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to statements about defendant’s “jail history”; People v Wallen; Trial strategy; Prejudice; Confidential informant (CI)
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of delivery of meth after selling meth to two CIs, who testified that one of them knew defendant beforehand because he “did a little time” with him. Defense counsel did not object. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the statements about his “jail history.” The CIs’ “inadvertent, vague, nonspecific references to defendant being in jail did not unduly prejudice defendant.” This was “particularly true in light of the other evidence presented at trial, which was more than sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.” Defendant failed to show “that, had counsel objected, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for limiting defendant’s testimony; A criminal defendant’s right to testify in his or her defense; People v Spaulding; Trial strategy; People v Horn; Prejudice; Due process right to present a defense; Plain error review
The court held that even if defendant’s counsel’s conduct fell below the objectively reasonable standard for presenting a defense, he was not prejudiced by it. He was convicted of felony murder, FIP, and felony-firearm, second offense, for shooting and killing the victim, who was working at a check cashing store. On appeal, he argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because, “when he chose to testify in his own defense, his trial counsel barely asked him any questions. Assuming without deciding that this conduct fell below the objectively reasonable standard for presenting a defense,” the court concluded that defendant failed to show that it prejudiced him. “We accept the possibility that there may have been valid reasons for defense counsel’s limited questions. Given the incriminating DNA results, counsel may have made a strategic decision to avoid questioning [defendant] further on the DNA evidence to avoid drawing further attention to it or avoiding a credibility problem. If so, defense counsel’s refusal to question [him] on this point would have been professionally reasonable.” In addition, “defense counsel’s limited questioning could have been an imperfect attempt to comply with” MRPC 3.3 and 4.1, which “prohibit counsel from knowingly eliciting false testimony.” The court also rejected his claim that “his due process right to present a defense was violated by the trial court ruling that he was precluded from testifying further.” Assuming without deciding that an error occurred and it was plain, he again failed to establish prejudice. There “was multifaceted, high-confidence evidence of” his guilt, including DNA evidence, direct eyewitness testimony implicating him as the shooter, and circumstantial evidence. Affirmed.
Zoning violations; Private nuisance per se & private nuisance in fact; Cleveland v Hath; Standing; Sakorafos v Lyon Charter Twp; Effect of a local zoning ordinance; MCL 125.3407; Applicability of Unger v Forest Home Twp; Evidence of special damages; Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ; Evidence of sufficient harm; Attorney fees & costs; MCL 600.2591(1) & (3)(b); Manchester Township Zoning Ordinances (MTZO)
In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court erred in granting defendant-Ashkay Island, LLC summary disposition of plaintiff-Pigeon’s private nuisance claims based on standing. It also vacated the award of attorney fees and costs to Ashkay as premature because, given its reversal of summary disposition, Ashkay was “not yet the prevailing party.” The case concerned Ashkay’s use of an island located within a lake (Iron Mill Pond) in a township. “Ashkay owns the island and another parcel of real property abutting Iron Mill Pond. Pigeon owns multiple parcels of real property abutting Iron Mill Pond, including his primary residence.” The parties have been involved in prior ligitgation. Pigeon filed this action in 2022. “Here, the question of standing relates to the damages or harm associated with Pigeon’s two related claims: (1) private nuisance per se, and (2) private nuisance in fact.” He contended that a local zoning ordinance, MTZO § 18.09, provided “a legal cause of action and thus confers standing on him under the principles set forth in Lansing Sch.” The court agreed. The ordinance provides that the “‘Township Board, the Township Zoning Administrator, the Township Building Inspector, the Board of Appeals, the Attorney of the Township, or any owner or owners of real estate within the district in which such building, structure or land is situated may institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions, proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove any said unlawful construction, maintenance or use.’” While Ashkay contended MTZO § 18.09 violates MCL 125.3407, the court found no conflict between them. It added that “even without relying on MTZO § 18.09, Pigeon has standing because he has presented evidence of special damages.” The evidence supported a finding that his “interests are detrimentally affected in a manner distinct from that of the public generally. Ashkay’s maintenance of structures lacking the required access poses an increased danger resulting from a fire or release of toxic material. Its activities could also be viewed as diminishing the rural character of the lake, which is part of a rural agricultural zoning district, thereby harming Pigeon’s aesthetic interests.” The court further held that he offered “evidence of sufficient harm to maintain a cause of action for a private nuisance in fact.”
Termination at the initial dispositional hearing; MCL 712A.19a(2); “Aggravated circumstances”; MCL 722.638(1)(a); Reasonable reunification efforts; Effect of efforts in a prior case
The court held that the trial court erred in (1) relying on the reasonable reunification efforts made in a prior “case to find that reasonable efforts were made in this” one and (2) concluding “this case could proceed to termination at the initial disposition” given that there were no aggravating circumstances. Thus, it vacated the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights and remanded. The court found that the trial court’s analysis was “flawed in two significant ways. First, [it] applied the incorrect framework when ordering termination of respondent’s parental rights. Second, [it] made substantive errors of law concluding: (a) that reasonable efforts were made; and (b) that termination was proper at the initial dispositional phase.” As to the framework issue, its analysis suggested “it misunderstood the process for termination of parental rights at the initial disposition.” The court noted that in “referencing the terms ‘reasonable efforts’ and ‘aggravated circumstances,’ the trial court found that reasonable efforts were established and that an exception existed. But if an exception existed, reasonable efforts are irrelevant and unnecessary.” Its analysis displayed “a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal framework to be applied to petitions seeking termination at the initial disposition.” In addition, it “erroneously relied on the reasonable efforts expended in the 2016 case to find that reasonable efforts were made” here. While the DHHS made reasonable efforts in that case that resulted in reunification, it filed a new case here “that asserted similar allegations. The trial court’s misplaced reliance on the efforts made in 2016 in this case is contrary to the Legislature’s directive that, unless an exception exists, ‘[r]easonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases[.]’” The DHHS “could not use the reasonable efforts made in the 2016 case to bypass the statutory requirement that reasonable efforts to reunify the family must be made in all cases.” As to the trial court’s conclusion it could proceed to termination at the initial disposition, none of the “six circumstances that permit a court to find that ‘aggravated circumstances’ exist” were alleged here. And the “trial court was not authorized to consider whether statutory grounds for termination existed under [§] (j), because reasonable efforts had not yet been made in this case.”
Termination of parental rights; Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. His rights were terminated on the basis of his sexual abuse of the half sibling of two of his children. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that termination was not in the children’s best interests. “The trial court acknowledged that respondent had a bond with each of the children, but found” he posed a risk to them based on his conduct. It found he was “‘so lacking in insight, maturity, guidance and judgment, that he [was] not in a position to parent. These deficits in parenting ability’” outweighed the bonds that were present. The trial court also recognized that the children were placed with “non-respondent mothers, but concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.” In addition, experts opined that it might take one to two years to reduce the risk he posed to the children, but, in the meantime, they “would be expected to wait, in limbo. As the trial court recognized, that time frame is ‘a considerable period of time to wait to see if [respondent] changes.’” Their need for permanence and stability outweighed any bond that may have existed with respondent. “The children cannot wait in limbo for positive changes to potentially manifest.”
Reformation of a trust; MCL 700.7415; Effectuating the decedent’s intent; A mistake of law; Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co; Limited-liability company (LLC)
The court held that the probate court did not err in (1) reforming the trust at issue where there was sufficient evidence that doing so would effectuate the decedent’s intent and (2) determining decedent made a mistake of law. At the time of his death, decedent’s trust held real property in Michigan and Indiana, and a membership to an LLC. The court concluded there “was ample evidence to support the probate court’s finding that decedent intended for appellee to inherit the Michigan properties[,]” including the handwritten notes of one of his estate planners taken during her initial meeting with him. In addition, “decedent executed the Trust, which includes a provision leaving the Trust’s membership shares of the LLC to appellee, on the same day he signed the LLC’s Operating Agreement, which provided that the initial capital contribution to the LLC was the Michigan properties. Third, the estate planner who took the notes . . . and appellee, both of whom the probate court found to be credible, testified that decedent consistently stated his intent to leave the Michigan properties to appellee, and never talked about bequeathing it to anyone else. Appellants presented no evidence to impeach the testimony or otherwise refute this evidence.” While they were correct that appellee had the initial burden to present evidence of decedent’s intent, she “did, and it was then appellants’ burden to rebut this evidence, which they did not.” They instead contended “that decedent’s actions were all part of an elaborate ruse to trick appellee—and apparently his own estate planner as well—into believing she would inherit the Michigan properties so that she would continue to provide him with assistance.” The court found that even if it “were to consider this argument to be reasonable, it is not supported by the evidence.” The probate court also found decedent “believed that signing the Operating Agreement, without fully organizing the LLC, was sufficient to give the Michigan properties to appellee. Testimony from both of [his] estate planners indicated that they believed the Michigan properties could and would be transferred to the LLC after decedent’s death. Given the testimonies of the estate planners, the probate court did not clearly err in finding that decedent, working off of the advice of his estate planners, made a mistake of law.” Affirmed.