Termination at the initial dispositional hearing; MCL 712A.19a(2); “Aggravated circumstances”; MCL 722.638(1)(a); Reasonable reunification efforts; Effect of efforts in a prior case

The court held that the trial court erred in (1) relying on the reasonable reunification efforts made in a prior “case to find that reasonable efforts were made in this” one and (2) concluding “this case could proceed to termination at the initial disposition” given that there were no aggravating circumstances. Thus, it vacated the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights and remanded. The court found that the trial court’s analysis was “flawed in two significant ways. First, [it] applied the incorrect framework when ordering termination of respondent’s parental rights. Second, [it] made substantive errors of law concluding: (a) that reasonable efforts were made; and (b) that termination was proper at the initial dispositional phase.” As to the framework issue, its analysis suggested “it misunderstood the process for termination of parental rights at the initial disposition.” The court noted that in “referencing the terms ‘reasonable efforts’ and ‘aggravated circumstances,’ the trial court found that reasonable efforts were established and that an exception existed. But if an exception existed, reasonable efforts are irrelevant and unnecessary.” Its analysis displayed “a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal framework to be applied to petitions seeking termination at the initial disposition.” In addition, it “erroneously relied on the reasonable efforts expended in the 2016 case to find that reasonable efforts were made” here. While the DHHS made reasonable efforts in that case that resulted in reunification, it filed a new case here “that asserted similar allegations. The trial court’s misplaced reliance on the efforts made in 2016 in this case is contrary to the Legislature’s directive that, unless an exception exists, ‘[r]easonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases[.]’” The DHHS “could not use the reasonable efforts made in the 2016 case to bypass the statutory requirement that reasonable efforts to reunify the family must be made in all cases.” As to the trial court’s conclusion it could proceed to termination at the initial disposition, none of the “six circumstances that permit a court to find that ‘aggravated circumstances’ exist” were alleged here. And the “trial court was not authorized to consider whether statutory grounds for termination existed under [§] (j), because reasonable efforts had not yet been made in this case.”