Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Federal preemption; Foster v Foster (Foster II); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant program; 44 CFR § 80.9(c); The Stafford Act (duplication of disaster benefits); 42 USC § 5155(a) & (c); Standing to bring an action in the state court; § 5157; Benefits related to a specific disaster loss & benefits related to mitigating the risk of future damage; Breach of contract; The merger doctrine; Parol evidence; First to breach; Unclean hands; Laches; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1); Personal knowledge of disputed facts in the case; Sanctions; MCR 1.109(E)
The court held that plaintiff-Township’s breach of contract claim related to defendant-Lammers’ agreement to sell his flood-prone residential property to the Township under a FEMA grant program was not preempted by federal law. While it rejected most of his arguments challenging the grant of summary disposition for the Township, it agreed that the trial court erred in deciding the case as a matter of law. But it rejected his judicial bias claim and his challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the Township as a sanction. The Township sought repayment for the amount that its “grant was reduced because of Lammers’ alleged receipt of duplicative benefits as provided by” § 80.9(c). He argued that the Township lacked standing to pursue its claim due to federal preemption, asserting that under § 5157, “such an action can only be brought by the attorney general in a federal district court.” However, the court did “not believe that this provision forecloses a state breach-of-contract action brought by a subrecipient for damages it allegedly suffered under a sales agreement entered with a third-party seller.” It noted that “when the Township sought reimbursement and later filed suit, FEMA had already reduced its award to the Township because of the duplication of benefits, as required by” § 80.9(c). Further, the case involved “the distinct harm to the Township for Lammers’ refusal to refund duplicate benefits after FEMA reduced the Township’s grant award.” Thus, the court found that § 5157 did “not provide a federal forum for the type of” contract breach action at issue, and the state circuit court had jurisdiction over the case. As to the breach of contract claim, the court concluded “the requirement that Lammers return duplicative funds was not merged and extinguished by the warranty deed.” But in light of the evidence, it determined a question of fact existed as to whether he “received duplicate benefits as necessary to support the Township’s claim. By premising its decision on the fact that a duplication occurred concerning the totality of Lammers’ insurance proceeds, the trial court implicitly rejected [his] credibility and decided a disputed factual issue. This is improper when deciding a motion for summary disposition.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Sentencing; Consideration of refusal to admit guilt; People v Yennior; Exercise of the right to trial; People v Jackson
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part and vacated in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 80921 in the 1/29/24 edition), vacated defendant’s sentence, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The court held that the trial court plainly erred in sentencing “defendant based, at least in part, on her refusal to admit guilt and her insistence on proceeding with the trial.” The prosecution conceded this on appeal. The court reversed “the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court did not plainly err by sentencing the defendant based, at least in part, on her refusal to admit guilt and her insistence on proceeding with trial.” In addition, it vacated the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the scoring of “defendant’s offense variables and the proportionality of her sentence.” It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing; MCR 6.310; People v Guyton; Whether there was a defect in the plea-taking process; People v Warren; Voluntariness of the plea; MCR 6.302(A); Correction of the PSIR
Holding that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. But it remanded for entry of an order directing that the references to his being arrested for CSC “in entry No. 8 on p. 6 of the [PSIR] be redacted consistent with the plea agreement.” He pled guilty to unlawful imprisonment, assault by strangulation, and AWIGBH after an incident in which he barricaded the victim in her garage and assaulted her. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 40 years for each conviction. It denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In a prior appeal, the court denied leave for lack of merit in the grounds presented. But the Supreme Court remanded for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea should have been denied, albeit for different reasons. The trial court erred by finding “the parties did not agree to strike references to defendant’s arrest for [CSC] from the criminal history section of the PSIR . . . because the plea agreement explicitly provided that all references to [CSC] would be redacted from the PSIR, except those contained in the victim impact statement.” In addition, because “the plea agreement was that all reference to defendant being arrested for or committing CSC would, except for any such reference in the victim impact statement portion of the PSIR, be redacted, that portion of entry No. 8 should have been as well.” And although “neither party has cited to any authority that precludes the court from redacting this information, the governing statute seems to permit the redaction.” Because the parties “agreed that any references to defendant being arrested for or otherwise charged with CSC were to be redacted, any such information would be irrelevant if contained within the report.” As such, on remand, the trial court “shall enter an order that the information quoted above from entry No. 8 be redacted. At that point, defendant’s plea will not have been illusory as he will have received the full extent of the agreement.”
Joint trial; MCL 768.5; MCR 6.121(C) & (D); People v Hana; Motion for a directed verdict; Larceny from a person (MCL 750.357); Intent; Self-defense; MCL 780.972
The court held that defendant failed to show “clearly, affirmatively, and fully that his substantial rights were prejudiced without separate trials[.]” Further, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the larceny from a person charge and on the basis of self-defense. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions of larceny from a person, felonious assault, and felony-firearm. His trial was held jointly with a codefendant (B), who “was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree murder and” AWIM. Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a separate trial. On appeal, the court concluded “there was clearly judicial efficiency in trying the cases together. Holding separate trials for [B] and defendant would have required presenting almost all of the same witnesses and exhibits, which would have been a significant drain on the parties’ resources.” In addition, it found “there was little potential for confusion or prejudice stemming from the complexity or nature of the evidence, particularly when the trial court gave ample instructions to the jury that only [B], and not defendant, was charged with murder.” The court further noted both their “defenses involved claims of self-defense. Therefore, defendant failed to show that the tension between his and [B’s] defense was so strong that the jury would have had to believe one defendant at the expense of the other.” The court also determined that “the trial court properly instructed the jury, multiple times, to consider each defendant separately.” Thus, it concluded reversal was unwarranted. As to his motion for a directed verdict, the court noted that “the question of intent was for the jury to decide.” In addition, it could “reasonably be inferred from the testimony presented that defendant intended to deprive” one of the individuals involved in the incident (H) “of his gun permanently.” Several witnesses testified “about the events concerning defendant taking the gun. After defendant suddenly took the gun from [H], several people told” him to return it. But he kept it in his possession. Finally, the “jury, who was also able to see the surveillance footage, was in the best position to make credibility determinations and, here, the jury determined that defendant was not acting in self-defense.”
Requests for admission; MCR 2.312(A) & (B); Radtke v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone; Judicial admissions; The trial court’s discretion; Oral motion; MCR 2.119(A)
Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant-Medallion Management summary disposition based on requests for admission, the court vacated and remanded. Plaintiff sued for injuries he sustained when defendants-Henrickses’ dog bit him on Medallion Management’s premises, where he and the Henrickses lived. The trial court ultimately granted summary disposition for Medallion Management on the basis of its requests for admission, which it held must remain admitted because plaintiff failed to move for leave to file late responses. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to analyze the merits of his argument that he was entitled to file late responses to the requests for admission. The court found remand was required for further consideration. The trial court “reasoned ‘the deemed admissions must remain admitted’ because plaintiff never ‘moved [it] for permission’ to ‘file late responses[.]’” Plaintiff claimed this was “error because he complied with MCR 2.119(A), and” the court agreed. At the hearing on Medallion Management’s summary disposition motion, “plaintiff made an oral motion. Plaintiff’s counsel stated: ‘I request that the Court allow our late answers to [the] request[s] for admission so this case may be decided on the merits.’ Because the motion was made during a hearing, it did not have to be in writing. The trial court should have considered the merits of plaintiff’s arguments. By holding that it lacked discretion, the trial court abdicated its duty to consider the matter, which necessarily resulted in an abuse of discretion.”
Third-party no-fault action seeking noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(1); Governmental immunity; The motor-vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; Whether summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7); Pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity; Mack v City of Detroit; Whether summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10); Careless or negligence operation of a vehicle; MCL 257.626(b)
The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendant-city’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was no genuine dispute of material fact that defendant-bus driver (Farmer), a city employee, was not at fault for the accident. Plaintiff-Robinson sued defendants seeking noneconomic damages for injuries he sustained when his car was hit by a city bus. The trial court denied the city’s motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the court rejected the city’s argument that because plaintiff failed to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity, his claim should be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7). It noted that although the city was correct that plaintiff’s complaint was devoid of any mention of governmental immunity, his pleaded claim fit “within an enumerated statutory exception to government immunity.” However, the court found that the trial court erred by denying summary disposition for the city under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because the video footage clearly showed plaintiff was at fault for the accident. “Given how well documented the accident is, there can be no genuine dispute of fact that Farmer did not operate the bus in a careless and negligent manner in violation of MCL 257.626(b).” In addition, she “drove at a slow and steady speed and was not given enough time to maintain a safe, clear distance between the bus and Robinson’s vehicle under MCL 257.627(1) because Robinson quickly cut her off. From the video footage, it is clear that Farmer’s conduct bore no causal connection to the accident, and” thus, plaintiff’s injuries. “And having produced no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude Farmer violated the Michigan Vehicle Code,” plaintiff’s claim against the city should be dismissed. Reversed and remanded.
Quiet title action; Delivery of a deed; Comparing Thatcher v Wardens, etc, of St Andrew’s Church of Ann Arbor, Loomis v Loomis, & Cook v Sadler; Consideration of actions taken on the property in determining whether title was effectively transferred; Haasjes v Woldring; Personal representative (PR)
Holding that the deeds at issue “were considered delivered based on the parties’ intent and subsequent actions[,]” the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Ivan Malnar on plaintiff-Ritter’s claim to quiet title. The case arose “from a decades-long dispute in ownership over a 40-acre parcel of land” referred to as the West 1/2. Ritter was the PR of the estate of Matt Malnar. Ivan and Ritter’s father, Raymond, were two of Matt’s children. Multiple quitclaim deeds were involved. Ritter contended “the probate court erred in concluding that delivery occurred because the deeds were returned to” a title company (Delta Abstract & Title) “as an escrow agent, which was ineffective to convey title.” Unlike the probate court, the court proceeded “with the understanding that Delta Abstract & Title retained all of the executed and notarized deeds.” It concluded the facts here were most like those of Thatcher, Loomis, and Sadler, “where the deed was executed and kept in the hands of a third party but considered delivered nonetheless, and the grantee acted as if they owned the property.” As in Sadler, the deed from Raymond and his wife “Suk was placed beyond their control.” A deed drafted by an attorney (H) was sent to them “in 1990 with directions to execute it and return it to his office. The deed did not” initially reach them due to a “change of address, so it was resent to them in” 1994. They executed and notarized it on 2/18/94. “The bottom of the deed stated, ‘When Recorded Return To: Ivan Malnar’ although [H] was to receive it on Ivan’s behalf. Raymond and Suk ‘reserved no dominion or control’ over the deed because, although [H] did not remember ever receiving the deed, and assumed Delta Abstract & Title was holding it as an escrow agent, the deed’s final destination was in a storage warehouse belonging to Delta Abstract & Title where it was not discovered until 2021.” The court noted that “the deed transferred the property unconditionally to Ivan.” As to behavior and actions as evidence of delivery, “Ivan paying taxes on the property, and erecting buildings on the property, just like Edwin in the Sadler case did, ‘gives color to the claim that an understanding between him and [Matt] that he should have’ the West 1/2 as his own.” The court also affirmed the “denial of summary disposition to Ritter on Ivan’s counterclaim because whether Ivan had title” by adverse possession was moot.