Federal preemption; Foster v Foster (Foster II); Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant program; 44 CFR § 80.9(c); The Stafford Act (duplication of disaster benefits); 42 USC § 5155(a) & (c); Standing to bring an action in the state court; § 5157; Benefits related to a specific disaster loss & benefits related to mitigating the risk of future damage; Breach of contract; The merger doctrine; Parol evidence; First to breach; Unclean hands; Laches; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1); Personal knowledge of disputed facts in the case; Sanctions; MCR 1.109(E)

The court held that plaintiff-Township’s breach of contract claim related to defendant-Lammers’ agreement to sell his flood-prone residential property to the Township under a FEMA grant program was not preempted by federal law. While it rejected most of his arguments challenging the grant of summary disposition for the Township, it agreed that the trial court erred in deciding the case as a matter of law. But it rejected his judicial bias claim and his challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the Township as a sanction. The Township sought repayment for the amount that its “grant was reduced because of Lammers’ alleged receipt of duplicative benefits as provided by” § 80.9(c). He argued that the Township lacked standing to pursue its claim due to federal preemption, asserting that under § 5157, “such an action can only be brought by the attorney general in a federal district court.” However, the court did “not believe that this provision forecloses a state breach-of-contract action brought by a subrecipient for damages it allegedly suffered under a sales agreement entered with a third-party seller.” It noted that “when the Township sought reimbursement and later filed suit, FEMA had already reduced its award to the Township because of the duplication of benefits, as required by” § 80.9(c). Further, the case involved “the distinct harm to the Township for Lammers’ refusal to refund duplicate benefits after FEMA reduced the Township’s grant award.” Thus, the court found that § 5157 did “not provide a federal forum for the type of” contract breach action at issue, and the state circuit court had jurisdiction over the case. As to the breach of contract claim, the court concluded “the requirement that Lammers return duplicative funds was not merged and extinguished by the warranty deed.” But in light of the evidence, it determined a question of fact existed as to whether he “received duplicate benefits as necessary to support the Township’s claim. By premising its decision on the fact that a duplication occurred concerning the totality of Lammers’ insurance proceeds, the trial court implicitly rejected [his] credibility and decided a disputed factual issue. This is improper when deciding a motion for summary disposition.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.