Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 404(b); Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Threat against a witness; Consciousness of guilt; People v Sholl
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the prosecution’s motion to admit some of its proffered other acts evidence, but did abuse its discretion as to the rest of it. Defendant was bound over on charges of first-degree home invasion, felonious assault, interference with electronic communications causing injury, and malicious destruction of personal property, for entering his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and assaulting her. On appeal, the court agreed in part with the prosecution’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to admit the proffered other acts evidence because it was relevant under MRE 401. “[T]he trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the portion of the telephone conversation where he communicated the threat to the complainant was irrelevant.” However, it “did not abuse its discretion by concluding that [defendant’s] comment to a third party that the complainant would be ‘fucked’ when he was released from jail was irrelevant. The comment confirms [his] intent to harm the complainant when he was released from jail; however, because it was not communicated to the complainant, it was not relevant to the matters at issue in this case.” In addition, a letter defendant wrote to the complainant tended “to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt, which renders the letter relevant. Indeed, his consciousness of guilt is clearly reflected by the fact that he apologized to her for what had occurred.” As such, the trial court “abused its discretion when it determined that the entire letter was irrelevant.” Further, “unlike the letter and the phone call through a third party, both of which were relevant to show consciousness of guilt, the call log is not relevant for any purpose.” Thus, the trial court “did not abuse its discretion by holding that a call log was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible.” It also did not abuse its discretion by excluding a particular sentence from the letter, but it did not “apply MRE 403’s balancing test to the balance of the letter, nor did it apply it to the portion of the phone conversation where” defendant threatened the complainant. The court noted the trial court was “in the best position to make a determination under MRE 403 as to each piece of evidence.” Therefore, it declined “to rule in the first instance whether the evidence satisfies or does not satisfy MRE 403’s balancing test. And, because the evidence may not be admitted under MCL 768.27b or MRE 404(b) unless it first satisfies MRE 403’s balancing test . . . , although the evidence is relevant, it is not yet clear whether it is admissible.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Expert qualifications; MRE 702; Lack of opposing expert; Failure to interview & call certain additional witnesses; Failure to offer into evidence a photo of a showerhead; Hearsay; Great weight of the evidence
Concluding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, the court affirmed his convictions of CSC I and CSC II. Defendant argued that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make additional efforts to disqualify expert-C under MRE 702. The court held that because it has determined that C’s “testimony, at least under circumstances like those in this case, does not constitute improper vouching and is admissible under MRE 702, it would have been futile for defense counsel to make further efforts to disqualify [C] as an expert or exclude his testimony.” Defendant next argued “that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the possibility of consulting or presenting an expert to rebut” C’s testimony. The court concluded that counsel “had sound strategic reasons for pursuing a strategy of discrediting the victim instead of engaging in a battle of the experts, and defendant has not established a reasonable probability that this strategy affected the results of the proceedings against him.” Defendant also argued that “counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and call certain additional witnesses and for failing to offer into evidence a” photo of a showerhead. The court determined that “the value of this proposed testimony and evidence would have been minimal at best, and potentially harmful, and counsel was not ineffective for not presenting it.” Finally, defendant argued that counsel “should have challenged [the victim’s adult family friend’s] testimony concerning two statements by [the victim] that he contends were inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay.” The court concluded that reversal was “not required; one statement was technically inadmissible hearsay, but any objection would have likely hurt defendant more than helped, and the other was clearly admissible under an exception to the prohibition against hearsay evidence.”
Divorce; Property division; Sparks v Sparks
Holding “that the trial court’s departure from a roughly congruent division of the assets was not inequitable” given the record, the court affirmed the parties’ divorce judgment. Defendant-ex-husband (David) asserted “the trial court’s property award resulted in him receiving only 36.89 % of the marital estate while” plaintiff-ex-wife (Rhonda) received 63.11 %. The court noted that he “was awarded the marital home and its associated debt, the solar panels and their associated debt, the off-road vehicle and its associated debt, his vehicle and its associated debt. Although the total debt on those assets was not insignificant, the trial court found that David would be free to liquidate the assets that he was awarded in order to pay off the associated debts and receive a ‘fresh start’ free of those debts.” The court found that it “is not inequitable to award the party receiving substantial and valuable marital assets the debts associated therewith.” In addition, the record reflected “that much of the remaining marital debt that was awarded to David was accumulated as a result of David’s lengthy history of imprudent spending.” Pursuant to Sparks, one of the factors “a court may consider when determining how to equitably divide marital property, including debts, is the ‘contributions of the parties to the marital estate.’” As a result, the trial court “properly considered David’s substantial contributions to the accumulation of the marital debt.” He did not challenge this finding on appeal. It appeared “that at least some of the debts that he now complains were inequitably assigned to him were for improvements to the marital home, which he was awarded during the divorce. The [trial] court’s decision to hold the parties responsible for their own respective debts left David responsible for $37,249 in debt, consisting of a credit card with a balance of $13,369, his PayPal account with a balance of $6,603, his home improvement loan with a balance of $17,159 of debt, and a second credit card with a balance of $118. In turn, Rhonda was left with credit card debt of $16,523. To equalize the division of the debts, [she] was ordered to transfer $50,000 from her retirement account to David’s retirement account.” The court was “not left with a firm conviction that the” trial court’s property division was inequitable.
Trespass & nuisance action; Private nuisance; Cloverleaf Car Co v Phillips Petroleum Co; Public nuisance; MCR 3.601(A); “Unreasonable interference”; A trial court’s authority to try jury-trial & bench-trial claims in the same proceeding; MCR 2.509(C) & (D); MCR 2.517(A); Res judicata; Adair v Michigan
The court held that the trial court erred by finding plaintiffs’ trespass claim was barred by res judicata and that they had not properly followed the procedure for pursuing their public nuisance claim. Plaintiffs sued defendant-Consumers Energy for trespass and nuisance after defendant replaced utility poles on the easement it had over their property (on which they operate a public-use airport and mine gravel). They claimed the higher poles and wires might present a danger to aircraft. They also sought compensation for sand and gravel. While this case was pending, defendant filed a separate condemnation suit against plaintiffs concerning a small area on which some of the newly installed equipment was placed, which was resolved by stipulated dismissal. On appeal in this case, the court held that the trial court erred by neglecting to address plaintiffs’ claim of private nuisance. “Plaintiffs’ complaint pleaded a single nuisance claim. Within that claim, they asserted that the poles constituted both a public and private nuisance. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiffs’ claim included private nuisance.” The trial court “also acknowledged the existence of a private nuisance claim, and questioned whether that claim was subject to MCR 3.601(A)[.]” Defendant acknowledged that “private nuisance claims were not covered by that rule. Yet the trial court relied on MCR 3.601(A) to dismiss plaintiffs’ nuisance claim in its entirety.” The language of MCR 3.601(A) “makes clear that the application of the rule is restricted to actions ‘to abate public nuisances.’” As such, “it had no bearing on plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim, so the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiffs’ nuisance claim in its entirety based on MCR 3.601. The trial court did not make findings concerning the evidence presented on the elements of either type of nuisance before dismissing the action on the ground that the public nuisance claim was procedurally deficient.” Thus, remand was required as to this claim. As to the public nuisance claim, “the trial court could have asked the jury to resolve any factual issues, and then [it] could have decided whether to award equitable relief. The trial court erred by granting a directed verdict to defendant and dismissing plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim on procedural grounds.” Remand was also required as to this claim. Finally, the court found that “the damages plaintiffs sought for sand and gravel compensation in this case were not the same as those sought in the condemnation” action, and thus, were not barred by res judicata. Reversed.
§ 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Assistance of an attorney; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
The court concluded that respondent-father had not shown that the trial court plainly erred by finding the DHHS offered reasonable reunification services, nor had he shown the DHHS violated the ADA when it terminated his parental rights. Also, § (c)(i) existed. Finally, it concluded that he “had not established that the trial court erroneously deprived him of the assistance of an attorney.” The court held the DHHS “provided numerous services to prevent the removal of the children from respondent’s home and the termination of his parental rights.” He challenged only the mental-health services the DHHS provided. He first asserted that the trial court erred by finding the DHHS “made reasonable efforts toward reunification when a psychologist’s recommendation regarding the content of therapy was not followed.” He did “not provide any substantive argument regarding how the services that [his therapist, L] actually provided were not reasonable or appropriate under the circumstances.” Although L “did not explain to respondent that his sudden anger might be the result of ‘neurological deficits,’ his notes and his testimony show that he was helping respondent develop appropriate strategies to recognize and cope with such deficits.” The DHHS also referred respondent to a facility, “where he could have undergone a mental-health assessment and received individual therapy and medication if necessary. Respondent consistently refused to take advantage of the mental-health services that petitioner repeatedly offered him to address the mental-health barriers to reunification with his children, insisting, without verification, that he had been to [the facility], had been told that he did not need their services, and had ‘passed’ several mental-health exams.” He did “not establish on appeal that he would have participated and fared better if other mental-health services had been offered.” Also, the court held given his “refusal to participate in services or to provide documentation or releases showing that he had already participated in services, his lack of insight regarding why his children were in temporary foster care, and his failure to progress to unsupervised parenting time, there seemed ‘no reasonable likelihood that the conditions [would] be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child[ren]’s age[s].’” Thus, it found that “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights” under § (c)(i). Affirmed.
Exercise of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); Plea to the allegations in a petition; MCR 3.971(D); Plea withdrawal; Children’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Atchley
The court held that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over both the petitions at issue, and did not plainly err in accepting respondent-father’s “no-contest plea because it was made knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily.” Further, the record supported its finding that terminating his parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the termination order. He asserted the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction as to “the supplemental petition for permanent custody, as opposed to finding jurisdiction only for the original petition for temporary custody filed by DHHS.” The court disagreed. Both petitions “included identical factual allegations that respondent had sexually abused” one of the children (S). The trial court properly informed him “of his advice of rights and of the possible dispositional outcomes of each petition: that [he] would be ordered to complete a service plan or that he could face termination of his parental rights. [He] was expressly informed that his plea was only for jurisdiction and had nothing to do with disposition. Further, [he] was aware that a dispositional hearing on statutory grounds and best interests, that could result in termination, would take place the next day. The trial court relied on the factual allegations to which respondent pled to support its finding of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b). Whether [he] believed he was pleading no contest to the allegations of one petition or the other was irrelevant, because it was the allegations to which he pled, and the allegations that supported the trial court’s establishment of jurisdiction were the same for both petitions. Once [its] jurisdiction over the children and respondent’s parental rights was established, it had the power to move into the dispositional phase and determine whether termination” was appropriate. The court also found he failed to show “any plain error in the plea-taking process that warrants withdrawal of his plea.” As to the children’s best interests, the trial court found S’s “testimony detailing respondent’s sexual abuse to be credible[.]” It also heard testimony that S has panic attacks and both children “were diagnosed with mental health disorders. There was testimony that neither child has a bond with respondent, who they have not had contact with for more than three years. The trial court properly determined” they deserved stability and permanence, which they would not have absent termination.