§ 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Assistance of an attorney; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

The court concluded that respondent-father had not shown that the trial court plainly erred by finding the DHHS offered reasonable reunification services, nor had he shown the DHHS violated the ADA when it terminated his parental rights. Also, § (c)(i) existed. Finally, it concluded that he “had not established that the trial court erroneously deprived him of the assistance of an attorney.” The court held the DHHS “provided numerous services to prevent the removal of the children from respondent’s home and the termination of his parental rights.” He challenged only the mental-health services the DHHS provided. He first asserted that the trial court erred by finding the DHHS “made reasonable efforts toward reunification when a psychologist’s recommendation regarding the content of therapy was not followed.” He did “not provide any substantive argument regarding how the services that [his therapist, L] actually provided were not reasonable or appropriate under the circumstances.” Although L “did not explain to respondent that his sudden anger might be the result of ‘neurological deficits,’ his notes and his testimony show that he was helping respondent develop appropriate strategies to recognize and cope with such deficits.” The DHHS also referred respondent to a facility, “where he could have undergone a mental-health assessment and received individual therapy and medication if necessary. Respondent consistently refused to take advantage of the mental-health services that petitioner repeatedly offered him to address the mental-health barriers to reunification with his children, insisting, without verification, that he had been to [the facility], had been told that he did not need their services, and had ‘passed’ several mental-health exams.” He did “not establish on appeal that he would have participated and fared better if other mental-health services had been offered.” Also, the court held given his “refusal to participate in services or to provide documentation or releases showing that he had already participated in services, his lack of insight regarding why his children were in temporary foster care, and his failure to progress to unsupervised parenting time, there seemed ‘no reasonable likelihood that the conditions [would] be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child[ren]’s age[s].’” Thus, it found that “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights” under § (c)(i). Affirmed.