Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Motion for JNOV; Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a “disability” under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA); MCL 37.1103(d); Request for accommodation; Causal connection; Disparate treatment; Retaliation; Motion for a new trial; Limitation of the testimony of plaintiff’s recent treating therapist; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Judicial misconduct; Attorney misconduct; Attorney fees; Macomb Correctional Facility (MCF)
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-employer’s motion for JNOV as to plaintiff’s failure-to accommodate and disparate-treatment claims. Also, he established “a sufficient causal connection between discriminatory animus and any adverse employment actions.” While the court found that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for JNOV as to retaliation, appellate relief was not warranted “because the error was harmless when plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate and disparate-treatment claims were properly submitted to and decided by the jury.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and the court upheld the attorney fee award. Plaintiff (a corrections officer) suffers from PTSD after being injured while intervening in a prisoner fight involving a mentally ill inmate (G). Defendant claimed that his PTSD does not qualify as a disability under the PWDCRA. The court held “that the jury could have accepted that plaintiff’s PTSD significantly restricted his ability to perform a broad range of corrections jobs because plaintiff could encounter [G]—his PTSD trigger—in nearly any capacity at MCF and several other facilities.” It concluded “a reasonable jury could have found that plaintiff’s PTSD substantially limited the major life function of working by significantly restricting plaintiff’s ability to perform a wide range of jobs and was unrelated to his ability to perform the duties of a corrections officer with an accommodation.” Defendant also argued that it was entitled to JNOV as “to plaintiff’s failure-to accommodate claim because plaintiff never requested an accommodation.” The court determined that “a reasonable jury could have found that plaintiff requested an accommodation under the PWDCRA.” In addition, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could infer that defendant had a discriminatory motive, at least with respect to” one disciplinary incident. “By the time defendant was investigating those allegations, plaintiff had submitted paperwork confirming that his absence from work was medically necessary as a result of his PTSD.” Affirmed.
Title IX; Discrimination based on sexual orientation & gender identity in educational activities & programs that receive federal assistance; Bostock v Clayton Cnty; Enjoining enforcement of documents issued by the Department of Education (DOE); Likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims; Article III standing to challenge the documents; “Proprietary interest” standing; “Sovereign interest” standing; “Procedural rights” standing; Reviewability; Legal consequences; 34 CFR §§ 100.7(a), (d), 100.8(a), & (c); Whether Title IX provides an adequate alternative remedy making review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) inappropriate
In this interlocutory appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s order enjoining the implementation in the plaintiffs-States of defendant-DOE’s Title IX documents that provide the DOE would fully enforce Title IX to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in educational activities and programs that receive federal assistance. The court concluded the States were likely to succeed on their claim that the documents are unlawful where they were not subject to notice and comment. In this pre-enforcement action, 20 States challenged the DOE’s issuance of three documents (referred to as the Documents) that state the DOE would fully enforce Title IX to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in educational activities and programs that receive federal assistance. The States sought to block enforcement of the Documents, arguing that they were unlawful under the APA where they did not go through notice and comment. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, and the government filed an interlocutory appeal. The court first held that the States had standing to sue under the “proprietary interest” theory. It found that they established they would suffer “imminent” injury, that the injury was “traceable to the Documents[,]” and that it would “be redressed by a favorable ruling enjoining the enforcement of the Documents against them.” The court additionally found that they had standing under the “sovereign interest” theory and that they had “a substantial likelihood of standing under a procedural-rights theory.” It rejected the DOE’s argument that the Documents could not be reviewed as “‘final’ agency action,” determining they bound the DOE “to a legal position and create legal consequences.” The court noted “States will risk losing their federal funding if they continue to run their educational institutions in accordance with their own laws and policies. . . . This is a ‘severe’ penalty.” The court also rejected the arguments that “Title IX provides an adequate alternative remedy” to APA review and that “Title IX precluded pre-enforcement challenges to agency action.” Thus, the court held that that the States’ claims were reviewable given that this was a “final agency action where there is no other adequate remedy at law, and Title IX does not preclude this APA pre-enforcement suit.” It further concluded that the States were “likely to succeed on their claim that the Documents amount to a legislative rule and therefore must be set aside.”
Motion to suppress in-custody police statements; Voluntariness; People v Cipriano; Sentencing; Consecutive sentences under MCL 750.520b(3); Justification; People v Norfleet; Proportionality
Holding that there was no evidence the police violated defendant’s due process rights during his interview, the court concluded the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress his confession. It further held that the trial court had discretionary authority under MCL 750.520b(3) to impose consecutive sentences for his CSC I convictions and that it did not plainly err in doing so. Finally, the court found that his “sentence was proportional to the offender and his offense.” As to his challenge to the admission of his police statements, the court first determined that he “failed to establish that police officers obtained his confession through a promise of leniency or that such a promise caused him to confess his wrongdoings.” He did not present “any factual support for any promise or suggestion of leniency from police officers.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, “the trial court noted that defendant was 37 years old, intelligent, well educated, articulate, and did not suffer from any intellectual disabilities. Aside from some traffic stops, [he] had no unusual or antagonistic contacts with the police. The trial court stated that the length of [his] questioning, which lasted approximately 90 to 120 minutes, was not long in the grand scheme of things.” As to the length of his detention, the trial court found that he “was not detained per se, and the amount of time that defendant was questioned was relatively brief. The parties do not dispute that police officers advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Although [he] was hungry, there was no indication that he was injured, in ill health, deprived of any required medical attention, or sleep deprived. There was no indication that [he] requested any food or drinks from” officers during the interview. Finally, as to his intoxication, the court noted that he “described the interview room, confirmed that he was given his Miranda warnings, and confirmed that the interview constituted a friendly conversation. Consequently, defendant’s ability to comprehend where he was and what occurred was consistent with the police detective’s account of the interview.” The court concluded there was “not ‘the slightest evidence that the defendant’s confession was involuntarily extracted.’” The officers informed him “of his Miranda rights, and there is no evidence of coercion on” their part. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey; People v Boykin
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that defendant’s 210 to 480-month sentence for his armed robbery conviction was reasonable and proportionate. He was also convicted of AWIGBH, CCW, and felony-firearm. His minimum guidelines range for the armed robbery conviction was 126 to 210 months. He argued that his sentence was disproportionate because he did not have any “prior felony convictions, and the circumstances did not justify a sentence at the top of the guidelines range.” The court disagreed. While he emphasized “that he received the harshest possible sentence available under the guidelines, that only means that he received the harshest recommended sentence within the class of offenders with a like background who committed an offense of comparable seriousness. The mere fact that defendant did not have any prior felony convictions does not itself demonstrate that a sentence at the high end of the guidelines is disproportionate.” In sentencing him, the trial court also considered his alcoholism. Further, it was clear from the record “that the trial court considered defendant’s reformation potential, the protection of society, discipline, and deterrence,” before determining “that the seriousness of the offense warranted a lengthy sentence. The trial court clearly articulated why defendant deserved a sentence at the top of the guidelines. Defendant decided to commit an armed robbery, discharged his firearm, and shot the victim in the face. The victim lived but sustained serious injury and permanent loss of vision in one eye. The victim spoke at the sentencing hearing and detailed how the quality of his life drastically diminished after this tragic incident. The victim had to undergo lengthy rehabilitation and ultimately lost his job.” The court upheld the trial court’s sentence in light of “the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender[.]” Affirmed.
Due process; Prosecution’s failure to produce text messages involving one of the victims; Statement that defendant made to a victim during a break in the trial; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Exclusion of prior accusations; Discovery of a victim’s juvenile history; Sentencing; Consecutive sentencing; MCL 752.797(4); Proportionality
The court held that defendant was not denied his right to due process because the trial court did not (1) abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy for the alleged discovery violation and (2) err in denying his motion for a mistrial on the basis the defense was not notified of a statement defendant had made to victim-EC during a trial break. He also was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Further, his constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence that one of the victims had accused another church member of sexual assault. He was also not denied his due process right to a fair trial when the trial court refused to allow discovery of victim-CD’s “juvenile history or the use of any juvenile adjudication of CD for impeachment.” Finally, the court upheld his sentences. He was convicted of CSC II and IV, aggravated indecent exposure, disseminating sexually explicit matter to a minor, and using a computer to commit a crime. He was sentenced to 5 to 15 years for each CSC II conviction and to 16 to 24 months for each of the other convictions. “The sentence for using a computer to commit a crime was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentences for the other six convictions, which are to be served concurrently to one another.” The case arose out of defendant’s sexual abuse of multiple boys. He argued, among other things, that his “right to due process was violated by the prosecution’s failure to provide certain text messages involving CD until the third day of trial and that the trial court failed to fashion a suitable remedy for the alleged discovery violation.” The court noted that the “prosecution did not provide defendant with text messages that CD’s mother shared with the police until the third day of trial. The text messages included communications involving CD’s mother, CD, and defendant. The police report reflected that CD’s mother had provided the text messages to the police.” Defendant did “not dispute that the police report had been provided to the parties. But the text messages themselves were not provided to the parties until the third day of trial. When defense counsel brought this matter to the trial court’s attention on the third day of trial, the trial court afforded defense counsel an hour and a half to review the text messages. Defense counsel did not suggest that this was insufficient time. Moreover, the text messages concerned CD, who was the victim only with respect to the aggravated indecent exposure charge. CD did not testify until the fourth day of trial, and the trial court indicated that CD’s mother could be recalled on the fourth day of trial.” The court concluded that the “trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy for the alleged discovery violation.” Further, defendant “failed to establish that he was denied access to any material or exculpatory evidence.” Affirmed.
Petition to terminate a child’s guardianship; MCL 700.5209(2); The law of the case doctrine; Designation as a “full” rather than “limited” guardianship; Motion for reconsideration
Holding that the trial court did not err in denying respondent-father’s petition to terminate his child’s guardianship, the court affirmed. This was the second appeal in the case. The “child’s mother filed for a limited guardianship placement plan for the child. At that time, the child’s biological father was unknown. In 2015 during a period of incarceration, testing established respondent as the child’s biological father. Later in 2015,” the child’s maternal aunt was appointed as her guardian and continued to be her guardian. Respondent asserted here that “the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider that he was excluded as a party when the guardianship placement plan was issued.” The court disagreed, noting that in the prior appeal, it rejected his challenge based “on his exclusion from the original petition and the guardianship placement plan[.]” The court concluded in the prior appeal that his “omission from the original petition and any failure to participate in a limited guardianship placement plan had no bearing on the trial court’s determination of the child’s best interests, MCL 700.5209(2)(b), despite any form order language.” The court was bound by that determination. Thus, “the trial court properly denied the petition to terminate the guardianship under the circumstances.” Respondent further contended the trial court erred in “designating the guardianship as ‘full’ rather than ‘limited’ on the order denying his petition to terminate the guardianship.” The court determined that this challenge did not entitle him to appellate relief. While the “trial court plainly erred” in doing so, the error did not “require reversal because it did not affect respondent’s substantial rights.” Finally, his procedural challenge related to the proof of service for the guardian’s annual reports did “not alter the substance of the trial court’s denial of the petition to terminate the guardianship; that a termination of the 12-year-old ward’s guardianship at that time would adversely impact the child’s mental health.”
The court’s jurisdiction; MCR 5.801(A)(1) & (2); Final orders; Whether certain issues could be raised in this appeal; Whether the claim of appeal should be treated as a granted application for leave to appeal; Request for sanctions for a vexatious appeal
Concluding the issues raised by appellant-former trustee (Mark) were not properly before it, the court affirmed the order at issue in this appeal. He appealed as of right a 9/8/21 order allowing the first and final account of the second successor trustee, “allowing the payment of $4,600 in fiduciary fees, and directing the release of the remaining assets of the Trust pursuant to a schedule of distributions.” But what he challenged on appeal was “a variety of other final orders that are outside of the proper scope of this appeal” including a 2/14/20 order removing him “as trustee, ordering a surcharge, and ruling that” the appellee (Valeria) was not entitled to damages based on her breach of fiduciary duty claim. Also involved was a 12/14/20 order determining the surcharge amount and a 1/4/21 “order denying Mark’s motion for sanctions. Mark failed to file a timely claim of appeal from any of these final orders . . . .” Valeria argued the court lacked jurisdiction as to the issues Mark raised on appeal, essentially asserting they were not properly before it because they did not concern the 9/8/21 order but rather related “to earlier final orders from which Mark could have filed a timely appeal, but did not.” The court concluded it had jurisdiction as to the 9/8/21 order and any issues related to this order. But Mark did not raise any issues concerning that order. The court addressed why each of the issues he raised stemmed “from some other final order from which he failed to file a timely claim of appeal.” It determined that the 2/14/20 order “disposed of all the claims and adjudicated the rights and liabilities of all the parties with respect to the issues in Valeria’s 2015 civil action.” Further, in that opinion and order “the probate court removed Mark as trustee and decided to surcharge him. The surcharge was quantified in the [11/25/20] opinion and [12/14/20] order. Also, both the [2/14/20] order and the [12/14/20] order decided fee requests and were thus final for that additional reason.” The court declined his invitation to “treat his claim of appeal as a granted application for leave to appeal.” It noted that “a delayed application would have been untimely when he filed his claim of appeal[.]” Finally, it denied Valeria’s “‘request for appellate sanctions without prejudice.’”
Liability as an independent medical evaluation (IME) examiner; Distinguishing Granados-Moreno v Facca (Unpub); Tortious interference with a contract; Civil conspiracy; Michigan Insurance Company (MIC)
The court held that plaintiffs’ claim against defendant-Burkhardt should have been dismissed “because, as an IME examiner, he was not liable to an examinee for damages resulting from the conclusions he reached or reported.” It also found the trial court erred by denying defendants summary disposition “on plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference with a contract because plaintiffs failed to establish the elements” of the claim. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim should be “dismissed because plaintiffs failed to prove a separate, actionable tort as the basis of the conspiracy.” This case arose from an underlying no-fault case for medical benefits. As to the claim against Burkhardt, the trial court and plaintiffs relied on Granados-Moreno but the court found the citation to that case unconvincing. “The duties imposed upon Burkhardt and the relationship between Burkhardt and” plaintiffs’ decedent (Richard) were “the same regardless whether the claim is for negligence, medical malpractice, or tortious interference. Burkhardt is not liable for the conclusions that he reached after the IME and reported to MIC.” Thus, the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary disposition. As to the breach of contract claim, “plaintiffs failed to present any evidence to establish a breach of the contract or ‘nonperformance of the contract’ between Richard and MIC.” Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants’ motions for summary disposition.
Hearsay; Evidence of a prior termination case; Judicial notice; Procedures & findings in removing a child & placing the child into foster case; Waiver; Ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on representation by different attorneys; Child’s best interests
The court rejected respondent-mother’s claim that the trial court improperly considered hearsay evidence as to a prior termination case. As to the child’s (LLG) removal and placement into foster care, the ex parte order to take LLG into protective custody “and respondent’s consent were sufficient to satisfy the factual criteria necessitating placement.” Further, she was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating her parental rights was in LLG’s best interests. Respondent first alleged “that, at the termination hearing, the trial court improperly considered hearsay evidence addressing the prior termination case and made unfounded assumptions about her barriers and services in that case.” Respondent asserted it “did not rely on admissible evidence addressing the termination of” her rights to another child, DLH, in Ottawa County. Yet, it appeared “the trial court acquired the Ottawa County family court records to take judicial notice of the proceeding.” Specifically, on 3/16/22, it “ordered DHHS and all other treating or supervising agencies to release their records to it, the attorneys of record, and the parties. These entities were to provide all information related to the children and parents. This order included, but was not limited to, medical treatment, substance abuse, mental health, counseling, and education records.” The record did not indicate that DHHS failed to comply with the order. In addition to the trial “court’s order requiring record disclosure of respondent’s other proceedings, there was testimony offered at the termination hearing addressing the Ottawa County family court case.” Specifically, her “sister-in-law testified that she adopted respondent’s child, DLH, after respondent’s parental rights were terminated.” Respondent’s foster-care worker, W, “testified that she had knowledge about the termination case involving DLH, which began in 2019. [W] also testified that, as in this case, one of respondent’s barriers was substance abuse, and many of the services provided to [her] in the case involving DLH were the same as those provided in this case. When asked by respondent’s counsel why she did not think respondent should have more time to engage in services given LLG’s young age, [W] testified that respondent was offered services since 2019 to address the same barriers, but [she] did not benefit from services to overcome her substance abuse.” Respondent failed “to address the court order to DHHS requiring disclosure of [her] other proceedings or the admissibility of [W’s] testimony. Moreover, there was no objection to either the court order or the testimony. And, the Michigan Rules of Evidence did not apply to the termination hearing because termination did not occur at the initial dispositional hearing or a hearing on a supplemental petition asserting different circumstances.”