Motion for JNOV; Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a “disability” under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA); MCL 37.1103(d); Request for accommodation; Causal connection; Disparate treatment; Retaliation; Motion for a new trial; Limitation of the testimony of plaintiff’s recent treating therapist; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Judicial misconduct; Attorney misconduct; Attorney fees; Macomb Correctional Facility (MCF)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-employer’s motion for JNOV as to plaintiff’s failure-to accommodate and disparate-treatment claims. Also, he established “a sufficient causal connection between discriminatory animus and any adverse employment actions.” While the court found that the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for JNOV as to retaliation, appellate relief was not warranted “because the error was harmless when plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate and disparate-treatment claims were properly submitted to and decided by the jury.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and the court upheld the attorney fee award. Plaintiff (a corrections officer) suffers from PTSD after being injured while intervening in a prisoner fight involving a mentally ill inmate (G). Defendant claimed that his PTSD does not qualify as a disability under the PWDCRA. The court held “that the jury could have accepted that plaintiff’s PTSD significantly restricted his ability to perform a broad range of corrections jobs because plaintiff could encounter [G]—his PTSD trigger—in nearly any capacity at MCF and several other facilities.” It concluded “a reasonable jury could have found that plaintiff’s PTSD substantially limited the major life function of working by significantly restricting plaintiff’s ability to perform a wide range of jobs and was unrelated to his ability to perform the duties of a corrections officer with an accommodation.” Defendant also argued that it was entitled to JNOV as “to plaintiff’s failure-to accommodate claim because plaintiff never requested an accommodation.” The court determined that “a reasonable jury could have found that plaintiff requested an accommodation under the PWDCRA.” In addition, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could infer that defendant had a discriminatory motive, at least with respect to” one disciplinary incident. “By the time defendant was investigating those allegations, plaintiff had submitted paperwork confirming that his absence from work was medically necessary as a result of his PTSD.” Affirmed.