Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Breach of contract (settlement agreement concerning shares of stock); The implied covenant of good faith & fair dealing; Hammond v United of Oakland, Inc
Holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not sustain plaintiff-shareholder’s breach of contract claim, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. The parties agreed to use a formula to calculate the redemption price of plaintiff’s stock shares in defendant-ski resort. When the formula produced a negative redemption price, plaintiff sued the resort and its CEO alleging they refused to use an alternative formula in breach of the parties’ contract. The trial court allowed plaintiff’s claim to proceed, finding questions of fact remained as to whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could sustain it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On leave, the court found that because the parties “‘unmistakably expressed their respective rights’ regarding redemption-price calculation, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that defendants were contractually obligated to use a different formula under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” The parties “agreed to an unambiguous formula to calculate . . . plaintiff’s redemption price. And the phrase ‘unless otherwise agreed by the Parties’ created no discretionary duty or obligation to depart from this agreed-upon formula.” The Court of Appeals’ “holding to the contrary effectively transformed the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an independent cause of action that may be asserted in the absence of an underlying contractual duty or obligation. Because this surpasses the scope of the implied covenant as laid out in Court of Appeals precedent, the panel erred by holding that plaintiff stated a valid claim for breach of contract on that basis.” Remanded to the trial court.
The Michigan Tax Tribunal’s (MTT) jurisdiction; Challenge to denials of the manufacturing personal property (EMPP) exemption under MCL 211.9m & 211.9n; Effect of failing to protest the denials before the March Board of Review (the Board or BOR); MCL 205.735a(3); Parkview Mem’l Ass’n v Livonia; W & E Burnside, Inc v Bangor Twp; Procedural due process; Constitutionally sufficient notice; Requirements for an assessor’s denial of the EMPP exemptions
The court held that the MTT did not have jurisdiction to hear petitioner-taxpayer’s (Praxis) claim because “Praxis failed to timely protest the exemption denial to the March” BOR, and the notice respondent-Township provided satisfied due process. The court overruled Parkview to the extent it incorrectly held that MCL 205.735’s protest requirement, “the precursor to MCL 205.735a, is a mere ‘procedural requirement[] for perfecting an appeal in the’” MTT rather than “an express limitation on” its jurisdiction. Praxis unsuccessfully applied to the Township for the EMPP exemption under MCL 211.9m and 211.9n. It asserted that its failure to protest before the BOR “may be excused or waived because” the Township did not provide it with constitutionally sufficient notice. The MTT dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in a published opinion. The court found that the Legislature “clearly mandated that the requirement for appeal in the MTT under MCL 205.735a(3) is jurisdictional.” Further, a court may only waive it “if necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.” The relevant statutes “require that an assessor’s denial of an EMPP exemption (1) be in a writing sent to the person who filed the form, (2) contain a statement of ‘the reason for the denial,’ and (3) advise the person that they have the right to appeal the denial to the Board under MCL 211.30 by ‘filing a combined document’ in the manner required by MCL 211.9m(2) and” 211.9n(2). The court concluded that taken “together, the Township’s denial notice, which stated that protest to the March [BOR] was required to protect appellate rights; the notice of assessment, which provided specific requirements for perfecting the protest; and the information provided by [the assessor] to Praxis’s agents, which was accurate (if less than complete), sufficed to protect Praxis’s due-process rights.” While there were “shortcomings in the denial notice, including its failure to advise Praxis of the requirement to submit a combined document, Praxis received actual notice of the deadline and schedule for perfecting a written appeal to the Board in the notice of assessment.” As its due-process rights were not violated, there was “no basis to waive the statutory jurisdictional requirement of protesting to the” BOR. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed and the MTT’s dismissal of the petition reinstated.
Sentencing; Waiver right to the remainder of a Miller hearing; Miller v Alabama; MCL 769.25(6) & (7); Life without parole (LWOP)
The court concluded that defendant’s waiver of MCL 769.25(6) and (7)’s “requirements extinguished any error, and he cannot now ‘seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights.’” And even if it were to treat his “claim ‘as merely forfeited rather than affirmatively waived,’” it would still find no reversible error. He was convicted of first-degree murder in 1983 for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. The prosecution moved to resentence him to LWOP “under MCL 769.25(2), and in accordance with MCL 769.25(6), the trial court held a hearing on” that motion. At the start of the second day of the “hearing, before defendant presented his evidence, [he] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to [] proceed with the remainder of the hearing.” The trial court resentenced him to LWOP. Defendant argued that it abused its discretion when it resentenced him “without making the required findings.” The court noted that “before the trial court had an opportunity to make the required findings, [he] unequivocally waived his right to the remainder of the hearing. Additionally, the requirements of MCL 769.25(6) and (7) generally establish the process that courts are to follow when deciding whether to sentence a juvenile offender to” LWOP. But here, he “affirmed that a consequence of his waiver was that he would be resentenced to [LWOP], and he further affirmed that he was ‘in agreement with that.’” Taken as a whole, the facts suggested that he “waived the requirements of MCL 769.25(6) and (7).” The court noted that no “published decision in this state has considered whether a defendant can waive” these protections, “and if so, how.” Resolution of whether he “could and validly did waive” these requirements was “potentially dispositive—if defendant can and did waive the requirements of MCL 769.25(6) and (7), then [his] appeal based on the trial court’s failure to fulfill” them could not proceed. He did “not address whether a waiver of the ‘procedural mechanisms’ under MCL 769.25 is proper in the first instance, jumping only to the question: what are the responsibilities of a sentencing court following a valid waiver of a Miller hearing? As a result, any argument about whether a defendant could not waive the requirements of MCL 769.25(6) and (7) is saved for another day.” This made resolving the appeal “straightforward. At his Miller hearing, defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and unequivocally waived his right to the remainder of the Miller hearing and agreed that the likely consequence of his decision was that he would be resentenced to” LWOP. By so doing, he “effectively waived the requirements of MCL 769.25(6) and (7).” And because he “was no longer opposing the prosecution’s motion to resentence him to” LWOP, the trial court so sentenced him. He abandoned any claim “that he could not or did not validly waive his rights under those subsections because he failed to adequately brief the issue.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for a first-degree premeditated murder conviction; People v Oros; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to use a police report to impeach a witness; Factual basis for a claim; Failure to provide defendant with a full discovery packet; Failure to call a specific witness; Prejudice; Admission of a photo; Relevance; Unfair prejudice; Harmless error
The court held that there was sufficient evidence of the premeditation element to support defendant’s first-degree murder conviction. The case arose from the murder of victim-G at the residence of a woman (C) who testified “that she had an intermittent relationship with defendant” and that after she discovered him with another woman (M), she engaged in a relationship with G, M’s ex-boyfriend. The jury was presented with evidence that “defendant sent a text message on the morning of the shooting to [M], asking for [G’s] address. [G] had recently been staying at [C’s] trailer. At about noon that day, defendant found” G there. When he “arrived, he got out of his truck and started shooting without saying anything. Defendant shot [G] seven times, killing him. The handgun that was linked to the shooting was registered to and found in the possession of defendant.” The court determined that from “this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant obtained his handgun, got into his truck, and set out to find and kill [G]. Those inferences support a conclusion that defendant thought about his actions before carrying them out and had time during his drive [to] subject his planned actions to a ‘second look.’” In addition, he fired his gun at G seven times, “leading to a reasonable conclusion that defendant’s actions were deliberate and premeditated. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have reasonably found beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the murder with premeditation and deliberation.” The court noted that to the extent he appeared “to argue that the jury should have reached a contrary conclusion and that there was evidence that would have supported a contrary conclusion, we defer to the jury’s assessments regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses; it is not our task as an appellate court to redetermine those assessments anew.” The court also rejected his claims in his Standard 4 brief that defense counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred in admitting a photo of the victim’s damaged car. Affirmed.
Divorce; Property division; Cunningham v Cunningham; Money owed under a status-quo order; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b) & (f); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Marine City Auto Care (MCAC)
The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court’s division of the” parties’ marital estate was inequitable, and it found no error in its handling of the status-quo order. It also concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-ex-husband’s motion for relief from judgment. But it determined that an award of attorney fees to plaintiff-ex-wife was not permissible under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) and this required it to vacate the attorney fee award and remand for further proceedings. As to the property division, the trial court “did not err by refusing to treat defendant’s initial $35,000 investment in” a business (MCAC) as separate property. “The $35,000 investment that defendant made to acquire MCAC lost any character it had as separate property when MCAC itself became marital property.” Next, the court found his argument about the valuation of MCAC “specious.” As to whether the property division was equitable, the record showed “the trial court treated the real property that each party came into the marriage with the same—each party left the marriage with the real property that they came into [it] with, and neither party was awarded any interest in the appreciation in value of the other’s property. The result of dividing the property in this way was an unequal division of the marital estate, but we are not definitely and firmly convinced that dividing the marital estate in a way that treated the parties’ respective properties the same was inequitable. This is especially so because the trial court somewhat balanced the unequal distribution of [their] real property by awarding defendant the parties’ revenue-generating asset—MCAC—without awarding plaintiff anything for her stake in the company.” As to the attorney fee award, the court agreed with defendant “that the trial court clearly erred when it found that plaintiff was unable to bear the expense of the litigation.” And because it “did not specify how much of its $8,000 ordered attorney fees were being awarded under” subsection (a) versus (b), the award had to be vacated. As to fees under subsection (b), the court agreed “with defendant that the trial court was justified in awarding plaintiff attorney fees” to the extent they “were incurred as a result of [his] noncompliance with the status quo order. We also hesitantly agree with” him that the rest of the award was improper. It found the trial court’s justifications, absent more specificity, were insufficient. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
PIP benefits; Ineligibility under MCL 500.3173a(4); “Fraudulent insurance act”; Procedural due process; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3); Entry of an amended order granting the motion after initially denying it; Kokx v Bylenga
The court concluded that the trial court did not deprive plaintiff-Washington “of procedural due process by sua sponte entering an amended order granting [defendant-]Farm Bureau’s motion for reconsideration after denying the motion in the first instance.” It also did not err by holding “as a matter of law that Washington knowingly made false statements material to her claim for PIP benefits, thereby rendering her ineligible for such benefits under MCL 500.3173a(4).” The case stemmed from her involvement in a 2021 motor vehicle collision. She first argued “that the trial court deprived her of procedural due process by sua sponte entering an amended order granting Farm Bureau’s motion for reconsideration after” initially denying it. The trial court’s “decision to do so fell within its considerable discretion to grant reconsideration, . . . and it was otherwise free to revisit Farm Bureau’s reconsideration motion that it previously denied[.]” The court held that on “these bases, and because Washington does not argue that she was deprived of notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard in relation to Farm Bureau’s summary disposition motion, [she] has failed to establish that the trial court deprived her of procedural due process.” As to the trial court’s ruling that she was ineligible for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3173a(4), the court held that “the trial court did not err by concluding as a matter of law that Washington knowingly made false statements material to her claim for PIP benefits.” The record reflected that she “misrepresented the nature and extent of her preexisting medical conditions and injuries. In her original application for PIP benefits, [she] stated that she sustained injuries in the collision, resulting in pain throughout her entire body, including her eye, right side, back, neck, and left leg. Washington claimed that she did not have any preexisting medical conditions and had not previously incurred any of the injuries she sustained in the collision. But she later disclosed that . . . she was blind in her right eye because she suffered a detached retina as a child and had a portion of her eye surgically removed in 2012. She recounted an incident in 2012 in which she sustained injuries after a panel of cement collapsed from under her. And she disclosed that she was diagnosed with or sought treatment for several conditions before the collision, including cervical pain, lumbar pain, degenerative joint disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis, and bilateral knee pain.” Thus, the record reflected “that Washington made false statements material to her claim for PIP benefits.” Affirmed.
Recreational soccer injury; Standard of care among coparticipants in recreational activities; Ritchie-Gamester v Berkley; The reckless-misconduct standard; Behar v Fox; Sherry v East Suburban Football League; Duty owed to participants by a sports facility &/or referee; Karas v Strevell (IL); Kline v OID Assoc, Inc (OH App); Negligence; Finazzo v Fire Equip Co; Duty; Composto v Albrecht; Ordinary care; Case v Consumers Power Co; Vicarious liability; Laster v Henry Ford Health Sys; Respondeat superior; Reaching the correct result for the wrong reason
Addressing issues of first impression, the court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition of plaintiff’s direct and vicarious liability claims in favor of defendant-sports complex. Plaintiff sued defendant, as well as its referee, for injuries he sustained during a recreational soccer game at defendant’s facility. He claimed defendant breached its direct duty to him, and also that it was vicariously liable for the referee’s conduct. On appeal, the court noted that this case “presents two related issues of first impression in Michigan: (1) whether referees tasked with officiating recreational activities owe the participants a duty to refrain from acting recklessly under the standard articulated in Ritchie-Gamester, and (2) whether owners and operators of recreational sports facilities owe the participants a duty to refrain from acting recklessly in facilitating recreational activities under” the same standard. It looked to other jurisdictions and agreed with them, finding “that referees tasked with officiating recreational activities owe the participants a duty to refrain from acting recklessly under the” Ritchie-Gamester standard. It also concluded that “recreational sports facilities tasked with organizing recreational activities owe the participants a duty to refrain from acting negligently in organizing such activities.” It then rejected plaintiff’s argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sports complex breached its duty by assigning a “single inattentive referee” to officiate the soccer game. It noted plaintiff failed to present any evidence that more than one referee was required, that defendant knew the referee was inattentive, and that it hired or retained him despite such knowledge or otherwise neglected to adequately train him. Thus, plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant neglected to exercise ordinary care or whether its acts or omissions caused his injury. As to his vicarious liability claim, “evidence that a referee failed to call two fouls throughout the course of a soccer game . . . alone does not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding a referee’s willingness to harm others or an indifference to whether such harm occurs, as required to establish reckless misconduct.” And while the trial court erred by dismissing this claim on the basis of its conclusion that defendant failed to join the referee as a necessary party because the referee was not a necessary party, it declined to reverse on this basis “because the trial court reached the correct result, albeit partially for the wrong reason.” Affirmed.
Title to a decedent’s credit union account; Whether a presumption of undue influence was established; In re Estate of Karmey; Existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship; In re Wood’s Estate; Knight v Behringer; In re Jennings’ Estate
The court held that the probate court clearly erred in finding that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between the decedent and his brother (appellant-Michael). Absent that finding, appellee-McBurrows-Sherrod (the decedent’s daughter) could not establish a presumption of undue influence and she did not argue that she produced sufficient evidence to establish undue influence without the presumption. Thus, the court reversed the probate court’s ruling that Michael unduly influenced decedent to name him the beneficiary of his credit union account (the DMCU account). “Trust alone is not sufficient to establish a confidential or fiduciary relationship.” Rather, what is required is “‘a reposing of faith, confidence and trust and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of another.’” The probate court concluded “that its finding of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between decedent and Michael was supported by Michael’s testimony that (1) decedent ‘needed Michael Sherrod to help him’ by driving him to the bank after he became ‘very suspicious of’ McBurrows-Sherrod, (2) decedent told Michael ‘you’re the only person I can trust,’ and (3) decedent ‘redirected all his mail to—to Michael’s house with regard to financial issues.’” But the court held that this “evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of a confidential or fiduciary relationship.” To establish that such a relationship existed, in addition to a finding that decedent trusted Michael, “there needed to be evidence that [he] demonstrated his trust in Michael by placing reliance on Michael’s judgment or advice[.]” The court found “no such evidence in the record.” It noted that nothing in the record suggested he “gave Michael any control over [his] finances such that decedent would have to trust Michael’s judgment. Indeed, [he] did not even give Michael access to the funds in his DMCU account while [he] was alive—decedent only made Michael the beneficiary on his DMCU account. And while Michael drove [him] to DMCU in a trip that resulted in decedent naming Michael the beneficiary of [his] account, this supports only that Michael had the opportunity to influence” him, not that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed. Even if decedent may have been confused around that time, this “would not establish that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between Michael and decedent.”
Interaction of criminal forfeiture & tax laws; Seizure of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA); Whether the forfeiture triggered tax obligations; Whether the IRS qualified as the “payee or distributee” of the funds; 26 USC § 408(d)(1); Old Colony Trust Co v Commissioner
The court reversed the tax court’s ruling that plaintiff-Hubbard was responsible for income taxes owed on an IRA seized under the criminal-forfeiture laws. It held that because “the IRS owned and controlled the IRA and received the funds, it qualified as the payee or distribute[,]” not Hubbard. He was convicted of running a “pill mill,” and his sentence included prison and extensive criminal forfeiture. The government seized his home, boat, and financial accounts, including his IRA (seized in 2017). It later “sent him a notice of deficiency suggesting that he owed $274,979.91 for his failure to pay taxes in 2017. That total included three components: (1) $122,601 for the income taxes owed on the withdrawal in 2017; (2) $42,752 for the 10% penalty that arose because the IRA funds were withdrawn before Hubbard turned 59 and a half; and (3) $109,626.91 in interest and penalties because [he] failed to file a tax return and pay the required taxes on time.” The IRS conceded in the tax court that he “should not have to pay either the 10% penalty for withdrawing the IRA funds early or a small part of the penalties” but it otherwise successfully moved for summary judgment. The tax court found that under its precedent, “IRA funds qualify as income even when forfeited through an ‘involuntary distribution’ to a third party” and it determined “that this rule applied to Hubbard’s IRA.” On appeal, the court found that the tax court’s conclusion that “the transfer of the IRA funds qualified as Hubbard’s income because it discharged an ‘obligation’ that [he] owed . . . misunderstood the type of forfeiture at issue. When courts impose a forfeiture, they can either grant the government ownership of a specific asset or enter a money judgment that allows the government to collect on any of the defendant’s property.” The forfeiture order here “granted the IRS ownership of his IRA; it did not enter a money judgment against him. So when the IRS withdrew the funds from the IRA, it was not taking Hubbard’s money to discharge a debt. It was simply transferring its own money.” Thus, the court held that this “forfeiture does not trigger tax obligations for Hubbard.”
Jurisdiction over the minor children; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); In re Long; Anticipatory-neglect doctrine
The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying jurisdiction over the minor children in this case under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The DHHS asserted “that the trial court erred by not acknowledging that a preponderance of the evidence indicated that respondents demonstrated negligence in their care of their deceased child.” Further, the DHHS highlighted “that respondents have previously been subject to investigations by [CPS], thereby invoking the anticipatory-neglect doctrine in this context.” Also, the DHHS argued that the state of their “apartment provided adequate grounds for the trial court to establish jurisdiction.” As to MCL 712A.2(b)(2), the record was clear that the DHHS “did not provide substantial evidence or expert testimony to demonstrate that the respondents’ residence was an unsuitable environment for a minor child.” As referenced in Long, the only evidence presented by the DHHS “indicated that the apartment was cluttered, which does not satisfy the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” Thus, the trial court was correct in holding that the DHHS “failed to meet its burden of proof.” As to MCL 712A.2(b)(1), the evidence submitted by the DHHS “was limited solely to the decedent’s medical needs, the medical care received, and the cause of death. There was a notable absence of evidence regarding the care and living conditions of the other minor children involved in this case.” Also, the anticipatory-neglect doctrine was “not convincingly applicable here, especially given the significant medical needs of the decedent rather than those of the other children.” As it pertained to MCL 712A.2(b)(1), the DHHS “failed to present any evidence regarding the care or conditions of the other minor children in this matter.” Further, the anticipatory-neglect doctrine was “not persuasive in this matter, given the significant medical needs that the decedent had, and no evidence was presented establishing that any of the other minor children had the same required level of care. The anticipatory-neglect doctrine is not an absolute method for establishing jurisdiction; instead, it is a permissible inference whose weight may shift considerably depending on the facts in a given matter. In this case, given the lack of evidence presented by [the DHHS], the trial court had no other choice than to attribute very little weight to the anticipatory-neglect doctrine, and [it] did not clearly err by doing so.”