Divorce; Property division; Cunningham v Cunningham; Money owed under a status-quo order; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b) & (f); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Marine City Auto Care (MCAC)

The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court’s division of the” parties’ marital estate was inequitable, and it found no error in its handling of the status-quo order. It also concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-ex-husband’s motion for relief from judgment. But it determined that an award of attorney fees to plaintiff-ex-wife was not permissible under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) and this required it to vacate the attorney fee award and remand for further proceedings. As to the property division, the trial court “did not err by refusing to treat defendant’s initial $35,000 investment in” a business (MCAC) as separate property. “The $35,000 investment that defendant made to acquire MCAC lost any character it had as separate property when MCAC itself became marital property.” Next, the court found his argument about the valuation of MCAC “specious.” As to whether the property division was equitable, the record showed “the trial court treated the real property that each party came into the marriage with the same—each party left the marriage with the real property that they came into [it] with, and neither party was awarded any interest in the appreciation in value of the other’s property. The result of dividing the property in this way was an unequal division of the marital estate, but we are not definitely and firmly convinced that dividing the marital estate in a way that treated the parties’ respective properties the same was inequitable. This is especially so because the trial court somewhat balanced the unequal distribution of [their] real property by awarding defendant the parties’ revenue-generating asset—MCAC—without awarding plaintiff anything for her stake in the company.” As to the attorney fee award, the court agreed with defendant “that the trial court clearly erred when it found that plaintiff was unable to bear the expense of the litigation.” And because it “did not specify how much of its $8,000 ordered attorney fees were being awarded under” subsection (a) versus (b), the award had to be vacated. As to fees under subsection (b), the court agreed “with defendant that the trial court was justified in awarding plaintiff attorney fees” to the extent they “were incurred as a result of [his] noncompliance with the status quo order. We also hesitantly agree with” him that the rest of the award was improper. It found the trial court’s justifications, absent more specificity, were insufficient. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.