Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Dispute over an attorney-fee agreement; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Amount in controversy; MCL 600.8301(1); Meisner Law Group, PC v Weston Downs Condo Ass’n; Breach of contract; Fraud in the inducement; Statutory & common-law conversion
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-attorney and law firm summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims seeking the return of funds he paid to retain them. Defendants represented plaintiff in a criminal matter. He signed a retainer agreement for a flat fee of $15,000. After the charges against him were dismissed, he sued defendants alleging a variety of tort claims, as well as breach of contract, based on alleged lack of representation and failure to return the retainer. Defendants successfully moved for summary disposition on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims because the amount in controversy did not meet its jurisdictional minimum. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred. As to his breach of contract claim, he failed to provide “any evidence in support of his claim that he incurred more than $10,000 in consequential damages (beyond the $15,000 paid to defendants) as a result of defendants’ alleged breach of contract. The mere possibility that these claims might be supported by evidence at trial was insufficient to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.” As to his tort claims, his “fraud in the inducement claim recited the same damages as plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, along with damages for emotional stress and anxiety. [He] has never even estimated the amount of damages incurred for alleged emotional stress and anxiety and . . . the other claimed damages are insufficient to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.” His statutory conversion claim was also based on defendants’ “alleged failure to perform under the contract.” And as to common-law conversion, “the engagement agreement [he] signed specified both that no refunds would be given and that the funds would immediately be deposited into the firm’s business accounts.” As such, when defendants received and deposited the funds they “had the right, under the engagement agreement, to do so—they did not wrongfully exert dominion over plaintiff’s property.” He also alleged he requested a refund, which defendants refused, but even assuming this constituted an act of common-law conversion, he only made the conclusory allegation that they converted the $15,000 without any specifics regarding the use of these funds. “Without more, the record does not show a genuine issue of material fact concerning these damages.” Affirmed.
Due process claim against school officials under the Fourteenth Amendment; Whether the school defendants’ actions “shock the conscience”; Doe v Jackson Local Sch Dist Bd of Educ
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the defendants-school officials in this case arising from the Oxford school shooting did not violate plaintiffs-parents’ due-process rights where none of their alleged acts “shock the conscience.” Plaintiffs sued the school district and others involved in the 2021 Oxford school shooting under the rather “narrow[]” theory of “due process.” The district court dismissed all but one claim based on qualified immunity. The court explained that to succeed under their theory, plaintiffs needed to “allege more than that the school officials in these cases”—a counselor (defendant-Hopkins) and the dean of students (defendant-Ejak)—“made bad decisions or could have done more to prevent this tragedy.” They were required to show that these defendants’ actions “were so outrageous, and so callous in their disregard of the danger posed” by the shooter “as to shock the conscience.” The court agreed with the district court that two of the alleged acts at issue, (1) that they returned the shooter's bag and sent him back to class, and (2) that they “concealed” the danger he posed from other school officials, could not support liability. It concluded that returning the backpack left “plaintiffs ‘in no worse position’ than the one in which they would have been had the defendants ‘not acted at all.’” And it noted that “failures to act usually are not affirmative acts for purposes of” the due process theory. Further, plaintiffs pointed to nothing in the record plausibly supporting “an inference that Hopkins or Ejak sought to cover up any risk of harm.” Thus, this omission also could not support liability. The district court thought that Hopkins’ warning to the shooter’s parents that he would contact Child Protective Services if they did not seek help for their son within 48 hours “was an affirmative act because it ‘increased the risk that a mentally unstable teenager’ would harm other students.” The court found that one “could debate that point; but less debatable, in our view, is whether that warning was ‘so outrageous’ as to violate due process.” It found that “Hopkins made that demand to mitigate risk, not to increase it; and his demand was indisputably made for a legitimate governmental purpose, which all but excluded a finding that it was ‘conscience shocking.’” The court concluded that all plaintiffs’ claims here must be dismissed. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Specific unanimity jury instruction; Domestic violence; MCL 750.81(2); Great weight of the evidence; Assault or an assault & battery; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a specific unanimity instruction & an instruction for the lesser included offenses of assault or assault & battery; Failure to object to the prosecutor’s error; Alleged personal belief comment; Vouching; Witness credibility
The court held that “a specific unanimity jury instruction was not warranted, and the trial court did not plainly err by failing to give it.” Also, defendant’s conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence and he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of domestic violence, third offense. “MCL 750.81(2) makes it clear that there are alternative methods of establishing the first element of domestic violence, namely, (1) assault, or (2) assault and battery. The statute does not create distinct offenses. Additionally, throughout trial, the prosecutor did not present materially distinct proofs for the alternative means of committing the crime of domestic violence. Instead, he consistently claimed that the evidence supported a conviction based on both assault or assault and battery. The evidence also showed that the assault and battery occurred both closely in time and as part of a continuous course of conduct by defendant.” Defendant also argued that he was “entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” The court noted that the only issue it needed “to address is whether defendant committed an assault or an assault and battery against” victim-SC. It held that because “the evidence does not weigh against defendant’s conviction, issues of credibility and discrepancies in the evidence are insufficient grounds for granting a new trial, and no exceptional circumstances exist to warrant overturning the jury’s verdict, defendant is not entitled to a new trial.” In addition, the court rejected his claims that a police witness vouched for SC’s credibility. Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the scoring of OVs 5, 9, & 13; MCL 777.35(1)(a); MCL 777.39(1)(b); People v McGraw; MCL 777.43(1)(c); Failure to raise a futile objection; Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OUI)
The court rejected defendant’s claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the scoring of OVs 5, 9, and 13. It also held that his sentences were not disproportionate and unreasonable. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, OUI causing death, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident when at fault and the accident resulted in death. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 100 months to 15 years for each conviction. As to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s scoring OV 5 at 15 points, one of the decedent’s daughters spoke at sentencing “of her father’s positive qualities, and of defendant’s ‘sickening’ behavior.” She also stated that the decedent “‘was supposed to grow old and watch his grandkids and his children grow old, and we don’t get that anymore.’” Another daughter of the decedent “offered a statement, including that defendant had deprived her of the best time of her adult life,” and in addition “that her father told her, on the day that he was killed, ‘to stay positive, focused, and optimistic,’ but that now she ‘can’t do that.’” The court found that a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s scoring. As to the assessment of 25 points for OV 9, the trial record showed “that the prosecution and the driver of the delivery truck both referred to defendant passing not only the truck (which contained the driver and the passenger) but other vehicles before striking the decedent.” And witness testimony indicated “there were numerous open businesses near the area of the accident.” The court also upheld the scoring of 25 points for OV 13, concluding that “defendant’s convictions were based on distinct felonious actions.” As to proportionality, it noted that the “trial court explicitly credited defendant at sentencing for having no previous felony convictions, which was accounted for in assessing the sentencing variables; yet [it] concluded that the extreme nature of [his] crime warranted a higher sentence. [It] characterized [his] conduct as ‘horrible,’ and stated its belief that the seriousness of the offense was difficult to overstate. [It] noted that [he] had been traveling at more than double the speed limit while his blood alcohol level was more than three times the legal limit at the time of the accident.” It also noted that he discarded “the decedent’s dismembered arm from his vehicle[.]” Affirmed.
Motion to suppress identification evidence; People v Kurylczyk; Substantial likelihood of misidentification in a lineup; Successive identifications; Simmons v United States; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Evidence that defendant fled from the police; Images of him possessing a gun; Relevance; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Joinder of charges; MCR 6.120(B)(1) Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that one of the victims (A) “identified him as the shooter in a pretrial lineup.” It also rejected his claim that evidence that he fled from the police and images of him possessing a gun should have been excluded. His argument that the witness intimidation charge should not have been joined with the other charges likewise failed. Finally, the court held that his 35 to 60-year sentence for his second-degree murder conviction was not “disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and offender.” He was also convicted of AWIM, FIP, witness interference, and felony-firearm. The court first determined that given “the totality of the circumstances of [A’s] identifications, the procedure for identifying defendant in the live lineup two weeks after the identification in a photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive. Two different modalities were used. The first was photographs, which were apparently not current, and resulted in an only tentative identification of defendant as the attacker. The live lineup featured [his] entire body and most recent appearance, from which [A] readily identified him. Thus, [A] was presented with different versions of defendant based on those different modalities, the first of which did not necessarily suggest the second. Indeed, [A] was shown a completely novel presentation of defendant in the live lineup, given that [it] did not call for focusing narrowly on the subject’s face and offered a view of defendant’s current appearance.” The court also noted that while A “had never met defendant before the incident in question, on that occasion [A] participated in an estimated five-minute conversation with [him] at close range, after seeing defendant walk in front of him, in clear, sun-lit conditions, immediately before defendant shot him.” The court further concluded that “evidence of defendant’s attempt to evade capture was admitted for the proper purpose of demonstrating his consciousness of guilt after the shootings, rather than as improper character evidence.” And the cell phone images of him “with a semiautomatic handgun similar to the one used in the shootings were admitted for the proper purpose of proving his identity, knowledge, preparation, and possibly a lack of mistake in unlawfully possessing a handgun, rather than as improper character evidence.” Affirmed.
Motion for a mistrial; Officer testimony regarding credibility; People v Lowrey; Referring to a complaining witness as a victim; People v Wisniewski; “Victim”; MCL 750.520a(s); Lay testimony; MRE 701; People v Brown; Prejudice; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 7 (aggravated physical abuse); MCL 777.37(1); People v Rosa; Proportionality
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial, and that the trial court did not err in scoring OV 7 as to Count 3. However, because it did err as to Count 2, the court vacated as to that count and remanded, but otherwise affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. He was convicted of CSC I, CSC III, and AWIGBH, arising out of 3 sexual assaults and a stabbing he committed against the victim, KC, whom he dated for several months when she was 16 years old and he was 18. The trial court sentenced him to 25 to 50 years for each CSC I, 8 to 15 for CSC III, and 5 to 10 for AWIGBH. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. Detective M’s testimony did “not vouch for KC’s credibility or suggest that [he] had special knowledge of her truthfulness; it merely provide[d] context for the steps he undertook during his investigation.” In addition, “by stating that defendant admitted he was a liar, Detective [M] did not improperly comment on defendant’s credibility; he merely recited defendant’s own statements from the interview.” Further, his “testimony regarding defendant’s nonverbal body language did not constitute improper commentary on defendant’s credibility.” Moreover, Detective M did not “invade the province of the jury by testifying about sexual offender recidivism statistics.” Finally, defendant could not show prejudice. He next argued that the trial court erred by assessing 50 points for OV 7 as to his two CSC I convictions. The prosecution conceded on appeal that the trial court erred as to Count 2 but not as to Count 3. Consistent with that concession, and because the correction altered the guidelines range, it vacated as to Count 2 but affirmed as to Count 3. “That defendant trapped KC in the vehicle and strangled her supports an inference that he ‘engaged in conduct beyond the minimum required to commit the offense’ and ‘intended to make [KC’s] fear or anxiety greater by a considerable amount.’” Finally, considering the length of defendant’s “departure, the record evidence of [his] escalating violent behavior, and the trial court’s explanation of its rationale, [he] has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an upward departure sentence with respect to Count 3.”
Declaratory judgment action; Disbursement of proceeds from the foreclosure & sale of property; MCL 205.25(1); United States v New Britain; Standing; MCR 2.605; Actual controversy; League of Women Voters v Secretary of State; Real party in interest; Constitutionality of MCL 205.25; Unlawful taking
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-Department of Treasury summary disposition of plaintiff-corporation’s action seeking a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that defendant must stay its tax lien proceedings until plaintiff’s federal tax liens were satisfied and discharged. The trial court found that “plaintiff lacked standing because the dispute was between defendant and the IRS over the proceeds of the envisioned sale of plaintiff’s property.” On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by dismissing its claim for lack of standing. “The essence of plaintiff’s complaint was not to seek a declaration of rights as between plaintiff and defendant; instead, plaintiff seeks a declaration of the IRS’s rights relative to defendant’s. We agree with the trial court that plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment to preserve the legal rights of a nonparty, whether that limitation is characterized as plaintiff’s lack of standing or the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in interest.” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that foreclosure under MCL 205.25 would be an unconstitutional taking. It did not present the court with any “authority for the proposition that the potential existence of another secured creditor with a superior claim renders defendant unable to foreclose on property under MCL 205.25(1). At this point in the proceedings, any holding this Court made regarding MCL 205.25(1)’s constitutionality as applied to plaintiff would be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which we decline to issue.” Affirmed.
Jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Children’s best interests
The court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the DHHS “established by a preponderance of the evidence statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over the children” AT and DT under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Also, the court held that statutory grounds for termination existed under § (i) and the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in the children’s best interests.” Respondent-father argued that “the trial court’s jurisdictional finding was clearly erroneous because” the mother (B) “had custody over the children, no evidence was presented that respondent abused the children, and [B’s other child] DG regarded respondent as a stepfather.” These arguments were unpersuasive. It was true that B “testified that she had sole custody over the children by virtue of a Friend of the Court order. However, she also testified that respondent was granted visitation with the children, and the children resided with respondent for a year from 2020 to 2021.” Moreover, DG “testified that the abuse occurred in the summer of 2020 or 2021 when both she and the children were staying at respondent’s home. Further, while no evidence was presented that respondent abused the children, ‘[i]n cases with multiple children, the doctrine of anticipatory neglect may apply to confer jurisdiction.’” The court concluded that the “trial court could properly find from respondent’s sexual abuse of DG while the children were present in the same room that the children were ‘subject to a substantial risk of harm to [their] mental well-being,’” and that respondent’s home, “‘by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent . . . , is an unfit place for the [children] to live in[.]’” The court held that “the fact that DG regarded respondent as a stepfather increases the probative value of the anticipatory-neglect inference, as it demonstrates that DG was similarly situated to respondent’s own children when the abuse occurred.” The record evidence supported “the trial court’s findings, and respondent has failed to demonstrate that [it] clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over the children[.]” Also, the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent sexually abused a sibling of the children, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the children will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed with [him]. Respondent, therefore, has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly erred by finding clear and convincing evidence to support termination of his parental rights under” § (i). Affirmed.