Dispute over an attorney-fee agreement; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Amount in controversy; MCL 600.8301(1); Meisner Law Group, PC v Weston Downs Condo Ass’n; Breach of contract; Fraud in the inducement; Statutory & common-law conversion

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-attorney and law firm summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims seeking the return of funds he paid to retain them. Defendants represented plaintiff in a criminal matter. He signed a retainer agreement for a flat fee of $15,000. After the charges against him were dismissed, he sued defendants alleging a variety of tort claims, as well as breach of contract, based on alleged lack of representation and failure to return the retainer. Defendants successfully moved for summary disposition on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims because the amount in controversy did not meet its jurisdictional minimum. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred. As to his breach of contract claim, he failed to provide “any evidence in support of his claim that he incurred more than $10,000 in consequential damages (beyond the $15,000 paid to defendants) as a result of defendants’ alleged breach of contract. The mere possibility that these claims might be supported by evidence at trial was insufficient to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.” As to his tort claims, his “fraud in the inducement claim recited the same damages as plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, along with damages for emotional stress and anxiety. [He] has never even estimated the amount of damages incurred for alleged emotional stress and anxiety and . . . the other claimed damages are insufficient to vest the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction.” His statutory conversion claim was also based on defendants’ “alleged failure to perform under the contract.” And as to common-law conversion, “the engagement agreement [he] signed specified both that no refunds would be given and that the funds would immediately be deposited into the firm’s business accounts.” As such, when defendants received and deposited the funds they “had the right, under the engagement agreement, to do so—they did not wrongfully exert dominion over plaintiff’s property.” He also alleged he requested a refund, which defendants refused, but even assuming this constituted an act of common-law conversion, he only made the conclusory allegation that they converted the $15,000 without any specifics regarding the use of these funds. “Without more, the record does not show a genuine issue of material fact concerning these damages.” Affirmed.