Nondomestic ex parte personal protection order (PPO); MCR subchapter 3.700; MCR 3.705 & 3.707; Whether the family court referee had authority to hear a motion to terminate the PPO; MCR 3.215(E); Judicial findings requirement; MCL 600.2950a; MCR 3.705(A)(2); Procedural due process; Bonner v Brighton

Holding that the trial court’s process did not comply with the procedure for nondomestic PPO proceedings required under MCR subchapter 3.700 and that the procedural error violated respondent’s due process rights, the court vacated the orders granting an ex parte PPO and denying his motion to terminate the PPO. It instructed the trial court to amend its nondomestic PPO procedures “consistent with MCR 3.700 and other governing rules consistent with” the court’s opinion. The order granting petitioner’s request for an ex parte PPO “did not include specific findings or reasoning as to why” the trial court issued it, although “judicial findings are statutorily required pursuant to MCL 600.2950a, as well as mandated by” MCR 3.705(A)(2). Given that the case arose from “a nondomestic dispute between neighbors” and there was no domestic relations matter involved, “the trial court plainly erred by allowing the referee to initially hear the PPO proceedings, including respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO, under MCR 3.215. The trial court also erred by denying respondent’s request for a hearing. There is no provision in the court rules or statute that permitted this outcome. There was no basis of authority for the referee to review or provide recommendations on respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO.” Under MCR 3.707(A)(2), the trial court was required to hold a hearing on the motion to terminate the PPO. It denied respondent’s request for one. While it later conducted a “de novo hearing” during a PPO violation hearing, the notice he was given about “the hearing was in relation to the show cause violation hearing, not for a reexamination of the PPO.” Thus, he did not receive “proper notice about the ‘de novo hearing’ on his motion to terminate.” The court found that he “established plain error affecting his substantial rights because the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Remanded.