Issuance of a PPO in a domestic context; MCL 600.2950(1) & (4); Principle that a court shall not issue a PPO that restrains or enjoins conduct described in subsection (1) if petitioner is the unemancipated minor child of respondent; MCL 600.2950(26)(b); Whether respondent was the natural father or parent as defined by MCL 722.1(b); “Minor” & “emancipated”; Principle that the trial court must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before issuing a PPO; Kampf v Kampf; “Good cause”; MCR 3.707(A)(1)(b); Principle that MCL 600.2950(1)(j) allows the trial court to restrain individuals from engaging in conduct prohibited under MCL 750.411h; “Stalking”; MCL 750.411h(1)(a) & (d); Principle that MCL 750.411h does not require a showing of fear; Hayford v Hayford; “Willful”; Jennings v Southwood

Addressing an issue of first impression in these consolidated appeals, the court held that because respondent’s parental rights to the children were terminated at the time petitioner-mother sought PPOs on their behalf, the children were emancipated and the trial court was not precluded from issuing the PPOs under MCL 600.2950(26)(b). It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPOs. Petitioner filed two separate petitions seeking ex parte PPOs against respondent on behalf of the children. She alleged he attended four of one of the children’s basketball games, where he stood up in the stands and tried to intimidate the child. She claimed the children exhibited mental distress after seeing him at the games. The trial court entered an ex parte PPO against respondent on behalf of the children. He unsuccessfully moved to terminate the orders, asserting they could not be issued against him because he was the parent of the unemancipated children, and that the allegations were insufficient to support their issuance. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of MCL 600.2950(26)(b). “Based on the definitions provided under MCL 722.1,” the children were “‘emancipated minors’ as to respondent because [his] parental rights were terminated at the time the petitions were filed.” As such, “the trial court was not precluded from issuing the PPOs under MCL 600.2950(26)(b) because it did not apply under these circumstances.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the PPOs and denying his motion to terminate them. “The allegations and evidence established that there was reasonable cause to believe that respondent engaged in stalking behavior.” Because he “did not dispute that he attended at least four basketball games on four separate occasions, that he stood in the stands, or that [the children] actually saw him at the games[,]" the trial court did not err in concluding he “engaged in ‘a willful course of conduct’ that included a ‘series of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.’” It also did not err in holding that the children “experienced emotional distress as a result of respondent’s harassment.” Given the circumstances, “the trial court did not err by concluding that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result from the delay required to give notice to respondent or abuse its discretion by granting the” PPOs.