Finding that respondent violated a PPO; “Stalking” (MCL 750.411h(1)(d)); “Course of conduct” (MCL 750.411h(1)(a)); Principle that a single act cannot constitute stalking; Willful violation of a court order; Criminal contempt; Mens rea; Application of the “should have known” standard; Waiver of a judicial bias claim

The court held that the trial court committed an error of law in determining that each of three incidents “constituted a separate” PPO violation in the form of stalking. Further, while the record supported that respondent violated the PPO by going to the marital home, it did not support a finding that he had the necessary mens rea by willfully violating the order. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court clearly erred in holding him in criminal contempt. The court vacated the order holding respondent in contempt for violating the PPO, and remanded. He and petitioner divorced in 12/19. The trial court, in determining that he violated the PPO as a result of his 2/5/20, 2/14/20, and 3/11/20 actions, “reasoned that each incident individually constituted stalking behavior as prohibited by the PPO.” But the court noted that a “single act cannot constitute stalking; rather, two or more actions must occur for behavior to qualify as stalking. As such, the trial court committed an error of law” when it found him guilty of three stalking violations of the PPO. Its finding that he willfully violated the PPO on 2/5/20 “by violating a court order rather than by engaging in ‘stalking,’ presents a closer call. On that date, respondent entered onto property on which petitioner lived, which the PPO specifically prohibited.” While he testified that he thought “he had the right to enter the home on” that date and denied knowing that she “still lived there, the trial court explicitly stated that it found” her testimony more credible. It also determined that he “knew or should have known that petitioner had the right to live in the home on” that date. The court concluded that in ruling that he “could be found guilty of violating the statute through conduct which he ‘should have known’ violated the PPO, the trial court lessened” petitioner’s burden. This standard “encompasses situations in which an individual erroneously, but in good faith, was unaware that his or her conduct violated a PPO. . . . As such, the trial court erred, and it did so in a manner which necessarily was prejudicial to respondent, by lowering the standard for a finding of a violation of the PPO. The record” did not support a finding that he “willfully violated the PPO when he arrived at the home” on 2/5/20. Even construing the facts as showing that his presence there “violated the PPO, the trial court failed to make any factual findings establishing that he did so willfully.”