The National Firearms Act; 26 USC § 5845(b); Whether an agency’s decision was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council; Whether a “bump stock” may be properly classified as a machine gun under § 5845(b)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that an administering agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference, and that a bump stock cannot be classified as a machine gun where “the phrase ‘the single function of the trigger’ refers to the mechanical process of the trigger, not the shooter’s pulling of the trigger.” Thus, it reversed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs an injunction as to implementation of the ATF’s rule classifying bump stocks as machine guns (the Final Rule). Plaintiffs-gun owners alleged that the Final Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. They also moved to enjoin it. The district court, employing Chevron deference, concluded that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits and denied a preliminary injunction. The court first held that an administering agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference under Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent. It reasoned that “the first rationale of Chevron deference—deferring to an agency’s expertise—is unconvincing because the agency’s technical specialized knowledge does not assist in making the value-laden judgment underlying our criminal laws. That judgment is reserved to the people through their duly elected representatives in Congress.” It also found that Chevron deference in the criminal context violated the separation of powers, conflicts with the rule of lenity, and gives rise to “fair-notice concerns.” The court next held that a bump stock may not be properly classified as a machine gun under § 5845(b). Acknowledging that “a bump stock increases a semiautomatic firearm’s rate of firing, possibly to a rate nearly equal to that of an automatic weapon[,]” it noted that “the trigger still must be released, reset, and pulled again before another shot may be fired. A bump stock may change how the pull of the trigger is accomplished, but it does not change the fact that the semiautomatic firearm shoots only one shot for each pull of the trigger.” It observed that Congress could amend that statute to include bump stocks, but that the courts may not do so. It then considered the remaining preliminary-injunction factors and concluded that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction where they would be forced to surrender or destroy the devices. Further, they were likely to prevail on the merits and were entitled to an injunction, the scope of which should be briefed by the parties and decided by the district court.