Uninsured motorist benefits; Distinguishing Dancey v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co.; Defining “hit”; Whether an “uninsured motor vehicle” as defined by the insurance contract was involved in the accident; Insurance contract interpretation; Hunt v. Drielick; McCoig Materials, LLC v. Galui Constr., Inc.; Twichel v. MIC Gen. Ins. Corp.; Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Seils

The court concluded that the trial court was correct that a material question of fact existed as to whether an uninsured vehicle as defined by the insurance contract was involved in the accident. However, the defendant-insurer was entitled to summary disposition because the unrefuted testimony showed that the other vehicle (a pickup truck) did not cause the building materials that fell from its bed or trailer to hit the ambulance in which plaintiff was riding – rather, “the ambulance hit the stationary building materials.” Plaintiff sought uninsured motorist benefits under his employer’s policy on the ambulance. As to defendant’s argument that there was no evidence an uninsured motor vehicle was involved in the accident given the contractual definition, the court found it “unnecessary to determine whether the phrase ‘hit-and-run vehicle’ requires knowledge of the accident on the part of the driver because assuming, without deciding, that knowledge is required, the trial court correctly” found questions of fact as to this issue. However, defendant also argued that “it was entitled to summary disposition because the unrefuted evidence demonstrated that the ambulance struck the stationary pile of building materials—the building materials did not strike the ambulance.” The trial court determined that Dancey required it to deny defendant summary disposition on this basis. The court concluded that while “Dancey involved the same policy language and substantially similar facts, it did not turn on the same issue—i.e., how to give effect to the language requiring that the hit-and-run vehicle ‘cause an object to hit’ the insured, an insured vehicle, or a vehicle occupied by an insured.” Thus, it was not dispositive. Construing the policy language, the court held that coverage was only available “if the subject of the sentence (the ‘vehicle,’ meaning the hit-and-run vehicle), caused the direct object (‘an object’) to hit the indirect object (‘an “insured”, a covered “auto” or a vehicle an “insured” is “occupying”’). The order of the words in this sentence is grammatically distinct from the language that would be used to describe circumstances in which the hit-and-run vehicle caused the insured to hit an object.”