Motion to modify or terminate the personal protective order (PPO); Hayford v. Hayford; Woodard v. Custer; MCL 600.2950; MCL 600.2950(4); MCL 600.2950(1)(b) & (j); MCL 600.2950(4)(a) & (b); Pickering v. Pickering; MCL 600.2950(6); Witness credibility; MCR 2.613(C); Brandt v. Brandt; Visser v. Visser; Motion to modify the provision of the PPO that only allowed the respondent-father supervised parenting time with his adolescent son; MCL 600.2950(1)(d); MCR 3.706(C)(2); Claim that his due process rights were violated by respondent's lack of notice of the proceedings in which petitioner amended the original ex parte PPO; General Motors Corp. v. Department of Treasury; Kampf v. Kampf; King v. Oakland Cnty. Prosecutor; MCL 600.2950(12) & (13); MCL 600.2950(22); MCR 3.707(A)(1)(a)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent-father's motion to terminate or modify the PPO obtained by the petitioner (his ex-wife). At the hearing on respondent's motion to modify or terminate the PPO, the petitioner testified that "she was the victim of two physical attacks by defendant; one that led to bruises on her face, collarbone, and arm, and a second incident in which respondent shoved her into furniture and a wall. She also testified that she experienced threats and harassment from respondent on numerous occasions. During one attack respondent bumped his adolescent son against the wall." His argument on appeal was that "petitioner's testimony was incredible because she never reported these physical attacks during the parties' numerous divorce court proceedings nor filed a police report for most of the alleged instances of violence." However, the court noted that pursuant to MCL 600.2950(6), "[a] court shall not refuse to issue a personal protection order solely due to the absence of" a police report, a medical report, a report or finding of an administrative agency, or physical signs of abuse or violence. As an "'appellate court may not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses,'" respondent's argument that petitioner's testimony was incredible was "insufficient to overcome the trial court's discretion in regards to the grant or denial of a PPO." The court has previously held that "a wife's allegations of threats by her husband, spanning over the course of a year, were sufficient to support a finding of 'reasonable apprehension of violence,'" and the entering of an ex parte PPO. Because the trial court found petitioner's testimony credible, and her testimony met the requirements of MCL 600.2950(1)(b), (c), and (j), "the trial court properly exercised its discretion in continuing the PPO." Affirmed.