Validity of a personal protection order (PPO); Sufficiency of the evidence to find respondent guilty of criminal contempt for violating the PPO

The court concluded the trial “court properly issued the PPO based upon respondent’s repeated, unconsented-to contacts.” Also, the evidence was “sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent violated the first amended PPO, and the trial court properly found [her] guilty of criminal contempt.” The case arose from the alleged stalking of petitioner by respondent. Respondent argued “the trial court improperly entered the PPO under MCL 600.2950 because there was no domestic relationship between petitioner and respondent and the legal criteria to establish stalking had not been met.” The court held that there was no merit to this claim as both the initial and the first amended PPOs were issued “under MCL 600.2950a, not MCL 600.2950.” She next challenged the issuance of the initial PPO as well as the first amended PPO. Petitioner’s “initial petition described respondent’s willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of petitioner.” Thus, the trial court properly issued the PPO. Respondent further contended it “improperly found her guilty of criminal contempt because there was insufficient evidence offered at the show cause hearing to demonstrate that she violated the terms of the PPO by sending e-mails to petitioner’s employer.” She alternatively argued that, even if she “had sent the e-mails, because the PPO only prohibited contact with petitioner, respondent could not be found in contempt.” The court held that viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, respondent’s conduct violated the first amended PPO. That PPO expressly banned respondent from posting messages through any electronic medium under MCL 750.411s and third-party contact. By e-mailing the administrators of petitioner’s school, respondent improperly initiated electronic third-party contact expressly banned by the PPO.” Contrary to her claim, “this communication constitutes a violation of the [8/21] first amended PPO because MCL 750.411s applies to third-party communications resulting in unconsented contacts with the victim.” The court noted that while she “denied sending the e-mails, the trial court remarked that it found petitioner’s testimony ‘very credible’ and accorded it great weight. After reviewing the circumstantial evidence, the trial court further found that respondent was responsible for sending the e-mails.” As the court does not weigh the evidence or witness credibility, “and because the trial court is in a superior position to assess the witnesses’ testimony,” it deferred to the trial court’s credibility assessment. Affirmed and remanded solely for a ministerial correction to the 8/10/22 order.