Request for a non-domestic personal protection order (PPO); MCL 600.2950a(1); “Stalking” (MCL 750.411h(1)(d)); “Course of conduct” (MCL 750.411h(1)(a)); “Harassment” (MCL 750.411h(1)(c)); “Unconsented contact” (MCL 750.411h(1)(e)); “Emotional distress” (MCL 750.411h(1)(b)); Sufficiency of the trial court’s findings; MCR 2.517(1)(A); MCR 3.705(B)(6); Harmless error as to reviewing exhibits

Holding that none of respondent’s conduct petitioner cited on appeal was prohibited by MCL 750.411h, the court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for a non-domestic PPO. It also found that the trial court complied with MCR 2.517(A) and 3.705(B)(6), and that to the extent it may have erred in not reviewing her “exhibits, the error was harmless.” As an initial matter, it noted the trial court did not admit any of the parties’ exhibits, so they were not part of the record. But they contained all the text and Facebook messages exchanged by the parties and petitioner relied on them on appeal. Because she moved to admit them “on multiple occasions and the trial court simply failed to rule on” her motions, the court considered their content. As to a text message she relied on, it was clear “it was sent during the course of a text conversation between respondent and petitioner. Thus, the contact was clearly not unconsented,” and the court found that it also was not “conduct ‘that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested . . . .’” The court noted that while “having police officers involved may increase the tension of any situation, the presence of police officers mitigates the danger to either party—a police officer acts as a neutral third party” insuring a smooth interaction between the parties. As to the police being called to the home of petitioner’s friend, and evidence “respondent called petitioner’s husband’s place of employment,” the court concluded that as this “conduct was not directed towards petitioner,” it could not be harassment of her under MCL 750.411h(1)(c) or “otherwise constitute ‘stalking’ as defined in MCL 750.411h(1)(d).” And the Facebook messages she received from respondent, like the text messages, “were sent during the course of a mutual conversation.” Petitioner pointed to messages stating that she needed mental help, to have “‘the rules of law explained to you,’ and that respondent will contact ‘the appropriate agencies,’ but it is unclear how such messages constitute stalking, or how they would make a reasonable person feel ‘terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.’” The court added she ignored “that the messages she complains of were sent in response to petitioner’s barrage of disparaging messages to respondent.” Affirmed.